2. It is unnecessary to decide the question of judicial deference in this case. More than 30 years ago in The Atlanta Journal & Constitution v. Babush , 257 Ga. 790, 792 (2), 364 S.E.2d 560 (1988), we imported to Georgia the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on judicial deference to agency interpretations of regulations that has become known as Auer or Seminole Rock deference. See Auer v. Robbins , 519 U. S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997) (agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is "controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation" (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. , 325 U. S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945) (punctuation omitted)).

284 Ga. at 159 (2), 664 S.E.2d 223. But we did so based only on a statement in Atlanta Journal & Constitution v. Babush , 257 Ga. 790, 792 (2), 364 S.E.2d 560 (1988), which adopted "the view expressed in United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872, 97 S.Ct. 2150, 53 L.Ed.2d 48 (1977) that[,] in construing administrative rules, ‘the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the [rule].’ " Needless to say, uncritically importing federal precedent years after the adoption of the 1983 Constitution, as Atlanta Journal did, tells us little about a proper understanding of Georgia deference law, much less the original meaning of the Separation of Powers Provision and any implications that meaning may have for deference.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) The Atlanta Journal c. v. Babush, 257 Ga. 790, 792 (2) ( 364 SE2d 560) (1988). Barrow Regional argued below that its substantial rights were affected because NGMC should have had to file a new application, and if it had, there would have been a delay of three or four months in the review process, which would have allowed for a more thorough and accurate review of the adverse impact of the proposed new hospital.

2. In City of Guyton v. Barrow, 305 Ga. 799, 801-804 (2), 828 S.E.2d 366 (2019), we clarified the framework for interpreting administrative rules. As that decision makes clear, although our past decisional law has said that courts may defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own rules, id. at 801 (2), 828 S.E.2d 366 (citing The Atlanta Journal & The Atlanta Constitution v. Babush, 257 Ga. 790, 792 (2), 364 S.E.2d 560 (1988)), such deference will be warranted only in rare cases. This is because "our long-held rule" is that courts may defer to an agency’s construction of its own rule only if its meaning is ambiguous, Barrow, 305 Ga. at 802 (2), 828 S.E.2d 866, and once the traditional tools of construction are applied, "few statutes or regulations … are truly ambiguous," id. at 804 (2), 828 S.E.2d 366.

When an administrative agency decision is the subject of judicial review, judicial deference is to be afforded the agency's interpretation of statutes it is charged with enforcing or administering and the agency's interpretation of rules and regulations it has enacted to fulfill the function given it by the legislative branch. The Atlanta Journal Constitution v. Babush, 257 Ga. 790, 792 ( 364 SE2d 560) (1988) ("in construing administrative rules, `the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the (rule)'"); Dept of Community Health v. Gwinnett Hosp., 262 Ga. App. 879, 881-882 ( 586 SE2d 762) (2003); Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett County v. State Health Planning Agency, 211 Ga. App. 407 (2) ( 438 SE2d 912) (1993). The Court of Appeals gave the deference due a statute, rule or regulation to a term in a departmental manual, the terms of which had not undergone the scrutiny afforded a statute during the legislative process or the adoption process through which all rules and regulations must pass.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) The Atlanta Journal and The Atlanta Constitution v. Babush , 257 Ga. 790, 792 (3), 364 S.E.2d 560 (1988). "To further this purpose, the Act, including its default position that meetings be open, must be construed broadly, and any exceptions to the Act, including those pertaining to closed meetings, must be narrowly construed."

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) The Atlanta Journal, etc. v. Babush , 257 Ga. 790, 792 (2), 364 S.E.2d 560 (1988). See Northeast Ga. Med. Center., Inc. v. Winder HMA, Inc. , 303 Ga. App. at 57 (2), 693 S.E.2d 110 (accord).

(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) The Atlanta Journal & The Atlanta Constitution v. Babush , 257 Ga. 790, 792 (2), 364 S.E.2d 560 (1988) ; see Pruitt Corp. , 284 Ga. at 159-160 (2), 664 S.E.2d 223 (explaining that it is erroneous for a superior court to give full "deference due a statute, rule or regulation to a term in a departmental manual, the terms of which ha[ve] not undergone the scrutiny afforded a statute during the legislative process or the adoption process through which all rules and regulations must pass"). Given the foregoing, the ALJ erroneously interpreted the antidegradation rule as inapplicable for the mere reason that the LAS was a nonpoint source of discharge.

Because the Board's construction of the 2004 rule is not plainly erroneous, we must defer to their interpretation. See Babush , 257 Ga. at 792 (2), 364 S.E.2d 560. Accordingly, we find that the 2010 amendment did not change the residency requirement and thus that the evidence of record supports the Board's conclusion that Welcker failed to comply with the requirement as it existed in 2007.https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/full-time

Ga. Chemistry Council, Inc., 270 Ga.App. at 616, 607 S.E.2d 207 (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied); see also OCGA § 48-2-12 (a) ("The commissioner shall have the power to make and publish in print or electronically reasonable rules and regulations not inconsistent with this title or other laws or with the Constitution of this state or of the United States for the enforcement of this title and the collection of revenues under this title.").Pruitt Corp., 284 Ga. at 159 (2), 664 S.E.2d 223 ; see also Atlanta Journal v. Babush, 257 Ga. 790, 792 (2), 364 S.E.2d 560 (1988) ( "[I]n construing administrative rules, ‘the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the rule.’ " (punctuation omitted)), relying upon United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872(II) (A), 97 S.Ct. 2150, 53 L.Ed.2d 48 (1977) ("In construing administrative regulations, the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."