We hold those contentions are without merit. See Florida Land Co. v. Graham, 97 Fla. 476, 121 So. 462; Louisville N.R. Co. v. Amos, 98 Fla. 350, 123 So. 745; Devane v. Leatherman, 113 Fla. 216, 151 So. 530; Ranger Realty Co. v. Hefty, 112 Fla. 654, 152 So. 439; Buchanan v. City of Tampa, 134 Fla. 618, 184 So. 104; Arundel Corporation v. Sproul, 136 Fla. 167, 186 So. 679; City of Tampa v. Wiley, 137 Fla. 126, 188 So. 134; City of Fort Myers v. Heitman, 149 Fla. 203, 5 So. 410. Dewhurst v. City of St. Augustine, (1926) 91 Fla. 314, 107 So. 689; Folsom v. Bank of Greenwood, (1929) 97 Fla. 426, 120 So. 317; City of Tampa v. Wiley, (1939) 137 Fla. 126, 188 So. 134.
w Article 10, Section 3A) and Article III, Section 29; 170 S.E.2d 873; Article V of Chapter 5 of the Income Act of 1926, as amended; 336 U.S. 169, 69 S.Ct. 432; 95 S.Ct. 1538; 311 U.S. 435, 61 S. Ct. 246; 336 U.S. 169, 69 Sup. Ct. 432; 256 U.S. 589, 41 Sup. Ct. 566; 347 U.S. 590; 74 Sup. Ct. 757; 386 U.S. 753, 87 Sup. Ct. 1389; 159 F.2d 897; 247 F. Supp. 296; 140 Cal.App.2d 311, 295 P.2d 46; 51 Cal.2d 314, 33 P.2d 324; 311 U.S. 435, 61 Sup. Ct. 246. Messrs. Furman, Jenkins Buist, of North Charleston, Augustine T. Smythe, of Buist, Moore, Smythe McGee, Charleston, Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., and Joe L.Allen, Jr., Dep. Atty. Gen., of Columbia, for Respondent, cite: As to the taxation of the Appellant's property on anonapportioned basis not denying due process of law: 16 Am. Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, Sec. 548, p. 941; Section 648 of Vol. 16A, C.J.S., Constitutional Law; 224 U.S. 362, 32 S.Ct. 499; 233 S.C. 129, 103 S.E.2d 908; 84 C.J.S., Taxation, Sec. 107, p. 220; 141 S.E.2d 314; 186 So. 679; 99 Ala. 462, 12 So. 720; 201 S.W. 1065; 90 F. 360; 56 Wn. 565, 106 P. 162; annotation 110 A.L.R. 707. As to the County of Charleston not beingestopped by judgment from taxing the Appellant's propertyon a nonapportioned basis for the 1971 tax year becauseof the order that provided for such apportionment and taxationfor the 1970 tax year: 135 F.2d 986, 150 A.L.R. 1; 216 S.E.2d 177; 150 A.L.R. 47; 259 S.C. 174, 191 S.E.2d 144; 252 S.C. 503, 167 S.E.2d 307; 135 F.2d 986, 150 A.L.R. 1. March 9, 1976.
City of Tampa v. Mugge, 40 Fla. 326, 24 So. 489; Pickett v. Russell, 42 Fla. 116, 28 So. 764. After the passage of Chapter 8586, Laws of 1921, now Section 196.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the Court applied the same rule. Since then the rule has been that the requirements of the statute are met if there is an offer to do equity and the trial judge requires a deposit of the valid portion of the tax before he grants any relief. Louisville and N.R. Co., et al. v. Amos, 98 Fla. 350, 123 So. 745. Where a taxpayer assaulted an assessment but failed to tender with the complaint the amount of taxes admittedly due, the Court held that an amended complaint with a proper tender should be allowed as a condition to relief. Arundel Corp. v. Sproul, 136 Fla. 167, 186 So. 679. Section 196.01, supra, was similarly construed in City of Tampa et al. v. Wiley, 137 Fla. 126, 188 So. 134. There, the trial judge denied a motion to dismiss a complaint. The motion was grounded on the plaintiff's failure to pay the tax legally due at the time of filing the complaint.
The property was brought into Utah sometime in 1925 and was removed by April 30, 1926. In Arundel Corp. v. Sproul (1939), 136 Fla. 167, 186 So. 679, a personal-property tax was upheld on dredges and dredging equipment used by a nonresident in constructing dikes around Lake Okeechobee in Florida under a contract with the federal government. Its owner intended to return the property to Baltimore after completing the contract.
Moreover, the effect of the Statute is to authorize the tax assessor to do what this court has said that he cannot do — that is, systematically and intentionally omit from the tax rolls property of the same classification as plaintiff's. As stated in Arundel Corporation v. Sproul, 1939, 136 Fla. 167, 186 So. 679, 681: "It is fundamental that all property should bear its just burden of taxation.
This return should be filed before April 1 of each year. We have held that where the owner of tangible personal property fails to make a return thereof as required by law, he is not entitled thereafter to assault the ultimate assessment on the ground that he had no knowledge thereof or was deprived of an opportunity to contest the assessment before the Equalization Board. Arundel Corporation v. Sproul, 136 Fla. 167, 186 So. 679; Amos v. Jacksonville Realty Mortgage Co., 77 Fla. 403, 81 So. 524; Tampa Gas Co. v. Sparkman, 153 Fla. 177, 14 So.2d 196; Sanders v. State ex rel. Shamrock Properties, Fla. 1950, 46 So.2d 491. By Section 200.02, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the County Tax Assessor is authorized to correct any erroneous omissions or commissions in the tangible personal property tax roll in like manner as if he had performed the act correctly in the first instance. The roll when so corrected is thereby validated ab initio and the ultimate validity of the tax is not adversely affected.
Similar cases to the one at bar have recently been before this Court. See Arundel Corp. v. Sproul, 136 Fla. 167, 186 So. 679, 140 Fla. 50, 191 So. 26; Adams v. Fielding, 148 Fla. 552, 4 So.2d 678; City of Fort Myers v. Heitman, 203 Fla. 149, 5 So.2d 410. The petition for writ of certiorari directed to the order denying the motion to strike described portions of the amended bill of complaint is hereby granted and that portion of the order is quashed, but the petition is denied as to that part of the order overruling the motions of the defendants below to dismiss the amended bill of complaint.
In this case if the property was or was not returned for taxes as required by law, and the taxpayer had duly invoked the correcting statutory remedies without success, still, when it is sought to enjoin collection of the entire tax leived for some years, not because the taxation was not authorized by law but because the property was without authority of law, assessed on the tax rolls to "H. E. Heitman Est.," or because the valuations are excessive, or because of unjust discriminations in valuations or in not assessing all property that is subject to the same taxation, the plaintiff must offer to do equity; and, if so required, pay in the portion not reasonably claimed to be illegal and then may contest the remainder. See Sec. 1038 C.G.L.; Dewhurst v. City of St. Augustine, supra; L. . N. R. Co. v. Amos, 98 Fla. 350, 123 So. 745; Ranger Realty Co. v. Hefty, 112 Fla. 654, 152 So. 439; Hackney v. McKenny, 113 Fla. 176, 151 So. 524; Arundel Corp. v. Sproul, 136 Fla. 167, 186 So. 679; City of Tampa v. Wiley, 137 Fla. 126, 188 So. 134; Burnett v. Neclar, 142 Fla. 145, 194 So. 324; Devane v. Leatherman, 113 Fla. 216, 151 So. 530. The tax in this case is not wholly illegal, as in City of Winter Haven v. Lake Elbert Citrus Fruit Co., 122 Fla. 422, 165 So. 360.
" See City of West Palm Beach v. Eppelman, 132 Fla. 686, 181 So. 894; Buchanan v. City of Tampa, 134 Fla. 618, 184 So. 104; The Arundel Corp. v. Sproul, 136 Fla. 167, 186 So. 679. It is admitted that the assessed valuation of the property during the years 1926 and 1927 was placed at the sum of $52,500. During the month of March, 1939, the city council of Arcadia reduced the assessed valuation from $52,500.
Section 1038 C. G. L. confers on courts of chancery the power to pass upon excessive and discriminatory tax assessments and to render decrees setting aside the excessive and discriminatory assessments, in whole or in part, that appear to be contrary to law. See Arundel Corporation v. Sproul, 136 Fla. 167, 186 So. 679, at text page 174, where this Court said: "It is fundamental that all property should bear its just burden of taxation.