Thames v. Thames

15 Citing cases

  1. Cheatham v. Cheatham

    537 So. 2d 435 (Miss. 1988)   Cited 143 times
    In Cheatham v. Cheatham, 537 So.2d 435, 438 (Miss. 1988), the following factors were considered in awarding lump-sum alimony: 1) substantial contribution to accumulation of wealth by quitting job to become housewife or assisting in husband's business; 2) long marriage; 3) separate income or separate estate meager in comparison to that of payor spouse; and 4) financial security without lump-sum alimony.

    Gregory argues on the authority of Stribling v. Stribling, 215 So.2d 869 (Miss. 1968), and Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 100 So.2d 868 (Miss. 1958), resumption of cohabitation alone condones the marital offense. In Stribling this Court did state, "Nevertheless, the misconduct on the part of the wife, whether it be adultery or specific acts or cruel and inhuman treatment, was condoned by the husband by resumption of cohabitation with her."

  2. Kyzar v. Kyzar

    157 So. 2d 770 (Miss. 1963)   Cited 7 times
    Granting $125 for appellate fees, half of the $250 for trial court work

    Jones Stratton, Brookhaven; William F. Riley, Fred C. Berger, Natchez, for appellant. I. Cited and discussed the following authorities: Brown v. Brown, 237 Miss. 53, 112 So.2d 556; Cocke v. Hannum, 39 Miss. 423; Johns v. Johns, 57 Miss. 530; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 222 Miss. 469, 76 So.2d 375; Miles v. Miles, 111 Miss. 110, 71 So. 295; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 218 Miss. 37, 65 So.2d 265; Scott v. Scott, 219 Miss. 614, 631, 69 So.2d 489; Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 100 So.2d 868; Bunkley and Morse, Amis Divorce and Separation in Mississippi, Sec. 8.05. No counsel for appellee.

  3. Brown v. Brown

    112 So. 2d 556 (Miss. 1959)   Cited 19 times
    In Brown v. Brown, 237 Miss. 53, 112 So.2d 556, the Court again reversed the decree of the chancellor upon a finding that there was no evidence in the record indicating that the appellant had abandoned or neglected her little girl or that she was unfit in any way for her custody.

    III. Appellant should be awarded the custody of the minor child of the parties. Boswell v. Pope, 213 Miss. 31, 56 So.2d 1; Cocke v. Hannum, 39 Miss. 423; Duncan v. Duncan, 119 Miss. 271, 80 So. 697; Johns v. Johns, 57 Miss. 530; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 222 Miss. 469, 76 So.2d 375; McShan v. McShan, 56 Miss. 413; Miles v. Miles, 111 Miss. 110, 71 So. 295; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 218 Miss. 37, 65 So.2d 265; Montgomery v. Walker, 227 Miss. 552, 86 So.2d 502; O'Neal v. O'Neal, 95 Miss. 415, 48 So. 623; Payne v. Payne, 213 Miss. 815, 58 So.2d 9; Scott v. Scott, 219 Miss. 614, 69 So.2d 489; Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 100 So.2d 868; Secs. 399, 2743, Code 1942. IV. Appellant should be awarded one-half of the real and personal property of the parties.

  4. Gerty v. Gerty

    265 So. 3d 121 (Miss. 2018)   Cited 10 times

    Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital wrong on the part of the wronged party. Condonation may be expressed or implied. Thames v. Thames , 233 Miss. 24, 29, 100 So.2d 868, 870 (1958) ; Armstrong v. Armstrong , 32 Miss. 279, 283 (1856) and Scott v. Scott , 219 Miss. 614, 629, 69 So.2d 489, 494 (1954).The mere resumption of residence does not constitute a condonation of past marital sins and does not act as a bar to a divorce being granted.

  5. Mercier v. Mercier

    96 CA 564 (Miss. 1998)   Cited 52 times
    Finding seven-year-old to be "long past the age that requires this type of special care from her mother"

    Buntyn v. Smallwood, 412 So.2d 236, 238 (Miss. 1982) (custody of female child of five years of age granted to mother); Kyzar v. Kyzar, 248 Miss. 59, 157 So.2d 770 (1963) (custody of three females and one male, ranging in age from one and one-half years old to nine years old, granted to mother); Brown v. Brown, 237 Miss. 53, 112 So.2d 556 (1959) (custody of four and onehalf year old female granted to mother); Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 100 So.2d 868 (1958); Scott v. Scott, 219 Miss. 614, 631, 69 So.2d 489 (1954) (custody of female five year old granted to mother); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 222 Miss. 469, 76 So.2d 375 (1954) (custody of four year old male granted to mother); Boswell v. Pope, 213 Miss. 31, 56 So.2d 1 (1952) (custody of three year and five month old female granted to mother); Miles v. Miles, 111 Miss. 110, 71 So. 295 (1916). ¶ 13.

  6. Wood v. Wood

    495 So. 2d 503 (Miss. 1986)   Cited 40 times

    Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital wrong on the part of the wronged party. Condonation may be expressed or implied. Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 29, 100 So.2d 868, 870 (1958); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 32 Miss. 279, 283 (1856) and Scott v. Scott, 219 Miss. 614, 629, 69 So.2d 489, 494 (1954). The mere resumption of residence does not constitute a condonation of past martial sins and does not act as a bar to a divorce being granted.

  7. Chaffin v. Chaffin

    437 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1983)   Cited 20 times
    In Chaffin, we held that a spouse's habitual nagging and continual absence from home constituted a sufficient basis for a divorce grounded in cruel and inhuman treatment.

    But condonation of cruelty has been found where the parties separated and then resumed their marital relationship. Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 29, 100 So.2d 868, 870 (1958); Stribling v. Stribling, 215 So.2d 869, 870 (Miss. 1968).

  8. Wires v. Wires

    297 So. 2d 900 (Miss. 1974)   Cited 30 times
    In Wires, we held the chancery court "was in error in not providing adequate alimony under the close facts here shown, particularly where the wife is ill and willing to resume her marital duties."

    This Court then affirmed the divorce decree. See also Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 100 So.2d 868 (1958) and Hoffman v. Hoffman, 213 Miss. 9, 56 So.2d 58 (1952). In the instant case it is obvious that these two persons cannot resume their marital relationship, and we cannot now say that the chancellor was manifestly wrong in his determination in granting a divorce on the evidence here adduced.

  9. Hinton v. Hinton

    179 So. 2d 846 (Miss. 1965)   Cited 12 times
    In Hinton, we said that when both parties are guilty of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, if a divorce is to be granted, then it is incumbent upon the chancellor to determine which party's conduct was the proximate cause of separation. Since Hinton the Court has limited the proximate cause of separation requirement for divorce on this ground.

    II. The appellee was not entitled to a divorce from the appellant on the ground of habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment. Johns v. Johns, 57 Miss. 530; Manning v. Manning, 160 Miss. 318, 133 So. 673; Russell v. Russell, 157 Miss. 425, 128 So. 270; Sarphie v. Sarphie, 180 Miss. 313, 177 So. 358; Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 100 So.2d 868; Bunkley and Morse, Amis, Divorce and Separation in Mississippi, Sec. 3.14(17) p. 131. III. The award of $2,000.00 to the appellant, including alimony and solicitor's fees, after a marriage of sixteen years, normally the most vital years of appellant's life, was grossly inadequate.

  10. Grace v. Cummings

    179 So. 2d 836 (Miss. 1965)   Cited 4 times

    I. A court of equity will change the custody of children if their welfare requires it; and if there is a prior decree, the custody may be changed if the conditions have been changed since the decree. Boswell v. Pope, 213 Miss. 31, 56 So.2d 1; Kyzar v. Kyzar, 248 Miss. 59, 157 So.2d 770; Nowell v. Nowell, 250 Miss. 805, 168 So.2d 301; Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 100 So.2d 868; Tighe v. Moore, 246 Miss. 649, 151 So.2d 910. Willard L. Mcllwain, Greenville, for appellee.