Gregory argues on the authority of Stribling v. Stribling, 215 So.2d 869 (Miss. 1968), and Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 100 So.2d 868 (Miss. 1958), resumption of cohabitation alone condones the marital offense. In Stribling this Court did state, "Nevertheless, the misconduct on the part of the wife, whether it be adultery or specific acts or cruel and inhuman treatment, was condoned by the husband by resumption of cohabitation with her."
Jones Stratton, Brookhaven; William F. Riley, Fred C. Berger, Natchez, for appellant. I. Cited and discussed the following authorities: Brown v. Brown, 237 Miss. 53, 112 So.2d 556; Cocke v. Hannum, 39 Miss. 423; Johns v. Johns, 57 Miss. 530; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 222 Miss. 469, 76 So.2d 375; Miles v. Miles, 111 Miss. 110, 71 So. 295; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 218 Miss. 37, 65 So.2d 265; Scott v. Scott, 219 Miss. 614, 631, 69 So.2d 489; Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 100 So.2d 868; Bunkley and Morse, Amis Divorce and Separation in Mississippi, Sec. 8.05. No counsel for appellee.
III. Appellant should be awarded the custody of the minor child of the parties. Boswell v. Pope, 213 Miss. 31, 56 So.2d 1; Cocke v. Hannum, 39 Miss. 423; Duncan v. Duncan, 119 Miss. 271, 80 So. 697; Johns v. Johns, 57 Miss. 530; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 222 Miss. 469, 76 So.2d 375; McShan v. McShan, 56 Miss. 413; Miles v. Miles, 111 Miss. 110, 71 So. 295; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 218 Miss. 37, 65 So.2d 265; Montgomery v. Walker, 227 Miss. 552, 86 So.2d 502; O'Neal v. O'Neal, 95 Miss. 415, 48 So. 623; Payne v. Payne, 213 Miss. 815, 58 So.2d 9; Scott v. Scott, 219 Miss. 614, 69 So.2d 489; Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 100 So.2d 868; Secs. 399, 2743, Code 1942. IV. Appellant should be awarded one-half of the real and personal property of the parties.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital wrong on the part of the wronged party. Condonation may be expressed or implied. Thames v. Thames , 233 Miss. 24, 29, 100 So.2d 868, 870 (1958) ; Armstrong v. Armstrong , 32 Miss. 279, 283 (1856) and Scott v. Scott , 219 Miss. 614, 629, 69 So.2d 489, 494 (1954).The mere resumption of residence does not constitute a condonation of past marital sins and does not act as a bar to a divorce being granted.
Buntyn v. Smallwood, 412 So.2d 236, 238 (Miss. 1982) (custody of female child of five years of age granted to mother); Kyzar v. Kyzar, 248 Miss. 59, 157 So.2d 770 (1963) (custody of three females and one male, ranging in age from one and one-half years old to nine years old, granted to mother); Brown v. Brown, 237 Miss. 53, 112 So.2d 556 (1959) (custody of four and onehalf year old female granted to mother); Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 100 So.2d 868 (1958); Scott v. Scott, 219 Miss. 614, 631, 69 So.2d 489 (1954) (custody of female five year old granted to mother); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 222 Miss. 469, 76 So.2d 375 (1954) (custody of four year old male granted to mother); Boswell v. Pope, 213 Miss. 31, 56 So.2d 1 (1952) (custody of three year and five month old female granted to mother); Miles v. Miles, 111 Miss. 110, 71 So. 295 (1916). ¶ 13.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital wrong on the part of the wronged party. Condonation may be expressed or implied. Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 29, 100 So.2d 868, 870 (1958); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 32 Miss. 279, 283 (1856) and Scott v. Scott, 219 Miss. 614, 629, 69 So.2d 489, 494 (1954). The mere resumption of residence does not constitute a condonation of past martial sins and does not act as a bar to a divorce being granted.
But condonation of cruelty has been found where the parties separated and then resumed their marital relationship. Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 29, 100 So.2d 868, 870 (1958); Stribling v. Stribling, 215 So.2d 869, 870 (Miss. 1968).
This Court then affirmed the divorce decree. See also Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 100 So.2d 868 (1958) and Hoffman v. Hoffman, 213 Miss. 9, 56 So.2d 58 (1952). In the instant case it is obvious that these two persons cannot resume their marital relationship, and we cannot now say that the chancellor was manifestly wrong in his determination in granting a divorce on the evidence here adduced.
II. The appellee was not entitled to a divorce from the appellant on the ground of habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment. Johns v. Johns, 57 Miss. 530; Manning v. Manning, 160 Miss. 318, 133 So. 673; Russell v. Russell, 157 Miss. 425, 128 So. 270; Sarphie v. Sarphie, 180 Miss. 313, 177 So. 358; Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 100 So.2d 868; Bunkley and Morse, Amis, Divorce and Separation in Mississippi, Sec. 3.14(17) p. 131. III. The award of $2,000.00 to the appellant, including alimony and solicitor's fees, after a marriage of sixteen years, normally the most vital years of appellant's life, was grossly inadequate.
I. A court of equity will change the custody of children if their welfare requires it; and if there is a prior decree, the custody may be changed if the conditions have been changed since the decree. Boswell v. Pope, 213 Miss. 31, 56 So.2d 1; Kyzar v. Kyzar, 248 Miss. 59, 157 So.2d 770; Nowell v. Nowell, 250 Miss. 805, 168 So.2d 301; Thames v. Thames, 233 Miss. 24, 100 So.2d 868; Tighe v. Moore, 246 Miss. 649, 151 So.2d 910. Willard L. Mcllwain, Greenville, for appellee.