Opinion
2012-01-24
Andrew M. THALER, as trustee of the estate of Theresa D'Amico, appellant, v. John W. FELSBERG, et al., respondents, et al., defendants.
Siben & Siben, LLP, Bay Shore, N.Y. (Alan G. Faber of counsel), for appellant. Carman, Callahan & Ingham, LLP, Farmingdale, N.Y. (Tracy S. Reifer of counsel), for respondents John W. Felsberg and John J. Felsberg, and John T. Ryan & Associates, Lake Success, N.Y. (David M. Reilly of counsel), for respondents Selma Stewart and Phillip C. Stewart (one brief filed).
Siben & Siben, LLP, Bay Shore, N.Y. (Alan G. Faber of counsel), for appellant. Carman, Callahan & Ingham, LLP, Farmingdale, N.Y. (Tracy S. Reifer of counsel), for respondents John W. Felsberg and John J. Felsberg, and John T. Ryan & Associates, Lake Success, N.Y. (David M. Reilly of counsel), for respondents Selma Stewart and Phillip C. Stewart (one brief filed).
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, ARIEL E. BELEN, PLUMMER E. LOTT, and SHERI S. ROMAN, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Pitts, J.), dated September 30, 2010, as granted the separate motions of the defendants John W. Felsberg and John J. Felsberg, and the defendants Selma Stewart and Phillip C. Stewart, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them on the ground that Theresa D'Amico did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d), and denied, as academic, his cross motion, in effect, to compel those defendants to accept a supplemental bill of particulars.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs, the separate motions of the defendants John W. Felsberg and John J. Felsberg, and the defendants Selma Stewart and Phillip C. Stewart, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them are denied, and the plaintiff's cross motion, in effect, to compel those defendants to accept a supplemental bill of particulars is granted.
The defendants John W. Felsberg and John J. Felsberg, and the defendants Selma Stewart and Phillip C. Stewart (hereinafter collectively the defendants), failed to meet their prima facie burdens of showing that Theresa D'Amico did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident ( see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 350, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176). The plaintiff, who was the trustee of D'Amico's bankruptcy estate, essentially alleged, inter alia, that as a result of the subject accident, the cervicothoracic region of D'Amico's spine sustained certain injuries. On their motions for summary judgment, the defendants addressed those alleged injuries by arguing that they were not caused by the subject accident ( see Pommells v. Perez, 4 N.Y.3d 566, 579, 797 N.Y.S.2d 380, 830 N.E.2d 278). However, the defendants' evidentiary submissions revealed the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether those alleged injuries were caused by the subject accident ( see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572; Rose v. City of New Rochelle, 57 A.D.3d 506, 867 N.Y.S.2d 696). Since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burdens, we need not consider the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers ( see Rose v. City of New Rochelle, 57 A.D.3d at 506, 867 N.Y.S.2d 696; Litz v. F.J. Gray & Co., 39 A.D.3d 490, 491, 835 N.Y.S.2d 227).
Under the circumstances, it is clear that the plaintiff did not need leave of court to serve a supplemental bill of particulars ( see CPLR 3043[b]; see Zenteno v. Geils, 17 A.D.3d 457, 458, 793 N.Y.S.2d 112). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff's cross motion, in effect, to compel the defendants to accept a supplemental bill of particulars.