We do not agree. See Kerr v. Blair, 47 Tex.Civ.App. 406, 105 S.W. 548; Texas N. O. R. Co., v. Weems et al., (Tex.Civ.App.) 184 S.W. 1103; Mazzarella v. Whelan, 276 Pa. 313, 120 A. 141; Pelphrey v. Diver (Ct. of Civ.App. of Tex.), 348 S.W.2d 453; Blair v. Riddle, 3 Ala. App. 292, 57 So. 382. There was also testimony given by the wife, supported by the older daughter, to the effect that on an occasion after the divorce proceeding was filed, during a conversation between the parties in the vicinity of a bowling alley, an argument arose between the appellant and appellee as to who was entitled to the possession of some golf clubs and that on that occasion the appellant took hold of the appellee's arm and hit her across the face and knocked her against an automobile.

Other courts have upheld variances in dates between pleadings and proof up to three months. See Fortner, 687 S.W.2d at 11 (variance of 40 days); Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. Tucker, 418 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (variance of 23 days); Ingram v. Gentry, 205 S.W.2d 673, 675-76 (Tex.App. — Waco 1947, no writ) (variance of three months); Kleber v. Pacific Avenue Garage, 70 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1934, writ dism'd) (variance of three months); Texas N.O.R. Co. v. Weems, 184 S.W. 1103, 1104 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1916), aff'd 222 S.W. 972 (Tex.Civ.App. 1920) (variance of 30 days). The test in determining whether to uphold a variance between the pleadings and proof is whether the variance between the proof and the evidence was substantial, misleading, and prejudicial.

The term "on or about," with respect to a specified date, means generally in time around the date specified. Texas N.O.R. Co. v. Weems, 184 S.W. 1103, 1104 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1916, aff'd 222 S.W. 972 (Tex.Comm.App. 1920). The courts have so held, upholding variances in dates between the pleadings and proof of as much as a month.

Kleber v. Pacific Ave. Garage, Tex.Civ.App., 70 S.W.2d 812, 814 (writ dismissed). Our Supreme Court has even held that '* * * it is an elementary rule that, in proving the time at which a cause of action arose, the plaintiff is never confined to that laid in his declaration or petition.' Gulf, C. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Witte, 68 Tex. 295, 4 S.W. 490. The Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals has held that an allegation in a breach of contract suit that the dereliction occurred on or about the 13th or 14th of June was not error where the proof showed it occurred on the corresponding dates in July. Texas N. O. R. Co. v. Weems, Tex.Civ.App., 184 S.W. 1103 (affirmed on other grounds, Tex.Com.App., 222 S.W. 972). Requested Special Issue No. 2 which the court refused to give inquires if the wind was from a southerly direction when appellant sprayed the cotton on the 29th day of October, 1963. It is without contradiction in the record that the wind on the 29th of October, 1963, was from the south, southeast, or southwest at the period of time the cotton was being sprayed, if the 29th was the correct date.

Moreover the allegation of appellee was that his damage was caused by an explosion occurring `on or about August 5, 1959' and was broad enough to include August 18. Texas N. O. R. Co. v. Weems, Tex.Civ.App., 184 S.W. 1103, affirmed Texas N. O. R. Co. v. Weems, Tex.Com.App., 222 S.W. 972. Appellant's point thirteen complains that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to counsel's commenting on his failure to call his blasting man Ruiz as a witness.

These allegations and the testimony offered were sufficient to support a finding by the jury that the appellee sustained personal injury "on or about" June 15, 1943. See Kerr v. Blair, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 406, 105 S.W. 548, at p. 551; Texas N. O. R. Co. v. Weems, Tex. Civ. App. 184 S.W. 1103. For the reason heretofore given, appellant's points Nos. 11, 12, 13 and 14, to the effect that the evidence was insufficient to show that the appellee sustained personal injuries in the course of his work as a switchman with the appellant, that the court erred in failing to set aside the finding of the jury to such issue, and that there was no evidence to authorize the court in submitting to the jury an issue inquiring whether appellee sustained personal injuries by stepping on or against the rocks, if any, on appellant's roadbed, and that the court committed error in refusing to set aside and disregard the finding of the jury to the effect that the appellee did so sustain personal injuries, are overruled.

A variance, to be fatal, must be a substantial, misleading, and prejudicial departure. See Texas N. O. Ry. Co. v. Weems (Tex.Civ.App.) 184 S.W. 1103; Kerr v. Blair, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 406, 105 S.W. 548. Appellants requested the court to define the phrase "a preponderance of the evidence," used in its charge.

" On proof of allegations of time and place, see First National Bank v. Brown, 85 Tex. 80, 87, 23 S.W. 862; St. Louis, A. T. Ry. Co. v. Evans, 78 Tex. 369, 370, 14 S.W. 798; First National Bank v. Stephenson, 82 Tex. 435, 436, 18 S.W. 583; Wilkins v. Ferrell, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 231, 30 S.W. 450, 451; Kerr v. Blair, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 406, 105 S.W. 548, 551; Texas N. O. R. Co. v. Weems (Tex.Civ.App.) 184 S.W. 1103, 1104, par. 4; English v. City of Fort Worth (Tex.Civ.App.) 152 S.W. 179, 180; Bancroft Co. v. Haslett, 106 Cal. 151, 39 P. 602; Jackins v. Bacon, 63 Cal.App. 463, 218 P. 1027, 1029, par. 1; 49 C.J., p. 815, § 1200. Appellant cites and relies upon the case of May v. Anthony (Tex.Civ.App.) 151 S.W. 602. The court stated in the opinion in that case, in substance, that the time of the conversion was, under the facts involved, a material issue.

There is not an assignment presented to this court under which the action of the jury could be reviewed. Scott v. Farmers' Merchants' Nat. Bank (Tex.Civ.App.) 66 S.W. 485; Smith v. Hessey, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 478, 134 S.W. 256; Essex v. Mitchell (Tex.Civ.App.) 183 S.W. 399; Houston E. W. T. Ry. v. Hooper (Tex.Civ.App.) 184 S.W. 347; Texas N. O. R. Co. v. Weems (Tex.Civ.App.) 184 S.W. 1103; Blackwell v. Vaughn (Tex.Civ.App.) 176 S.W. 912; West Texas Supply Co. v. Dunivan (Tex.Civ.App.) 182 S.W. 425; First Texas State Insurance Co. v. Burwick (Tex.Civ.App.) 193 S.W. 165; Messimer v. Echols (Tex.Civ.App.) 194 S.W. 1171; Richmond v. Hog Creek Oil Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 229 S.W. 563; International G. N. R. Ry. Co. v. Biles Ruby, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 193, 120 S.W. 952; Arlington Heights Sanitarium v. Deaderick (Tex.Civ.App.) 272 S.W. 497; M., K. T. R. Co. v. Blachley, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 141, 109 S.W. 995; Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Jowers (Tex.Civ.App.) 110 S.W. 946; Davidson v. Jones et al. (Tex.Civ.App.) 196 S.W. 571; Martinez v. Gutierrez Heirs (Tex.Civ.App.) 172 S.W. 786; Bomar v. Powers (Tex.Civ.App.) 50 S.W. 142; St. Louis S. F. Ry. Co. v. Finley (Tex.Civ.App.) 163 S.W. 104. In entering judgment on the findings of the jury and other testimony adjusting the accounts and differences between the parties, the court recited:

Under such circumstances, the answers of the jury, under subdivision 6, article 2202, Rev.Civ.Stat. 1925, as between the parties, are conclusive as to the facts found. Smith v. Hessey, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 478, 134 S.W. 256; Texas N. O. Ry. Co. v. Weems et al. (Tex.Civ.App.) 184 S.W. 1103; Blackwell v. Vaughn et ux. (Tex.Civ.App.) 176 S.W. 912; Waller v. Liles, 96 Tex. 21, 70 S.W. 17, and cases there discussed. However, we have reviewed the evidence, and, without stating it, are of the opinion that it is sufficient to require the submission of the issues of discovered peril.