And the other way asks whether "differences between the claimed invention and the accused device or process are 'insubstantial.' " Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1996). "Different linguistic frameworks may be more suitable to different cases, depending on their particular facts," but these formulations all aim to investigate the same "essential inquiry."
It is well settled law that unfounded conclusions will not survive summary judgment. Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc., 508 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Motionless Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 1376, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2007). GTX had the burden of providing "particularized testimony and linking argument as to the `insubstantiality of the differences' . . . with respect to the function, way, result test."
"Substantial evidence is `such relevant evidence from the record taken as a whole as might be accepted by a reasonable mind as adequate to support the finding under review.'" Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
Second, it disputes Beautone's reading of the Federal Circuit's decision in Cybor, asserting that Cybor has nothing whatsoever to do with issue preclusion. Third, relying on Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1996), it contends that determinations of the ITC, even after review by the Federal Circuit, have no preclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a district court action for patent infringement. "Law of the Patent"
On remand the district court considered the issue on the existing record but requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the doctrine of equivalents. In its supplemental brief Techniche argued that: (1) AquaTex was barred by amendment estoppel from asserting the doctrine of equivalents; (2) its product did not include the equivalent of fiberfill batting; and (3) AquaTex provided "only conclusory statements regarding equivalence, without any particularized testimony and linking argument as to the `insubstantiality of the differences' between the claimed invention and the accused device, or with respect to the `function, way, result test'" as required by Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir.1996). See Defendant Techniche Solutions' Memorandum as to the Doctrine of Equivalence at 16 (quoting PC Connector Solutions, LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir.2005)).
”Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567 (Fed.Cir.1996). It remains to apply these principles to the facts of the case to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate.
A party requesting judgment as matter of law "must show that substantial evidence did not support the jury's findings, where substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence from the record taken as a whole as might be accepted by a reasonable mind as adequate to support the finding under review.'" Koito Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). "Substantial evidence is 'more than a mere scintilla' and is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'"
As indicated earlier, "[t]o literally infringe, the accused [product] must contain every limitation of the asserted claim." Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp. ("Cypress Semiconductor"), 90 F.3d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Generally, claims should not be interpreted to read a limitation out of a claim.
A plaintiff must provide “particularized testimony and linking argument to show the equivalents” are insubstantially different. AquaTex Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Solutions, 479 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed.Cir.2007); accord Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed.Cir.1996). “Generalized testimony as to the overall similarity between the claims and the accused infringer's product or process will not suffice.” Texas Instruments, 90 F.3d at 1567.
In reviewing the trial judge's denial of Kentucky Farms' motion for JMOL, we keep in mind our standard of review, which is the same standard that was applicable at the trial court level. See Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1563, 39 USPQ2d 1492, 1496 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that a district court's JMOL ruling is reviewed by reapplying JMOL standard), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1818 (1997).