A: Yes, sir. We note that Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Hacker, 448 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) is factually similar to the instant case. In Hacker, the defendant alleged that there was no competent evidence or insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the plaintiff worked in the same employment for the same or another employer for at least 210 days during the year immediately preceding the date of plaintiff's injury (pursuant to Art. 8309 Sec. 1(1)).
Appellant contends the foregoing statements consist of an attempt to contrast between the meager resources of the plaintiff and the large corporate defendants. It is improper to contrast the wealth of the parties to a suit in an effort to prejudice the jury against one of such parties. Appellant cites as authority for reversal the case of Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Hacker, 448 S.W.2d 534 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) in which the following statement was held to be reversible error: "I apologize to the Jury also for becoming a little steamed up. When I get a little steamed up I see an all powerful insurance company kick a workman down. Never paid him one penny compensation.
It is doubtful that any instruction could have eliminated this direct and forceful appeal to the jurors to consider their own pocket books in rendering their verdict. On the question of improper jury argument see Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Hacker, 448 S.W.2d 234 (Fort Worth, Tex.Civ.App., 1969, ref., n.r.e.) and Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Butler, 287 S.W.2d 198 (Fort Worth, Tex.Civ.App., 1956, ref., n.r.e.). The error complained of was not rendered 'harmless' nor was it 'curable' by the type of instruction given by the learned trial judge.