Substantially the same objections were made to the explanation given by the court in connection with special issue No. 2. In the case of Texas Employers' Ass'n v. Olesky, 288 S.W. 245, by the Beaumont Court of Civil Appeals, Olesky sued the association upon a policy of insurance contracting to indemnify him for alleged injuries to his foot, bones, ligaments, muscles, etc., and the court submitted among other issues the following, together with its accompanying explanatory charge: "Special issue No. 1. Has the plaintiff sustained the permanent loss of the use of his foot by reason of the injuries complained of in his petition? Answer `Yes' or `No' as you may find the facts to be.
We believe appellant's position is without merit in this respect. Traders General Ins. Co. v. Porter, Tex.Civ.App., 124 S.W.2d 900 (writ refused); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Olesky, Tex.Civ.App., 288 S.W. 244 (writ dismissed); E. K. Local Ins. Co. No. 1 of Seymour v. Lilly, Tex.Civ.App., 1 S.W.2d 490 (N.W.H.). The Porter case just cited was submitted on both a general injury and a specific injury. The exact definition in connection with the specific injury in that case was given as the one we are here considering in this case.
' In Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Olesky, Tex.Civ.App., 288 S.W. 244 (Dis. W. O. J.), there were findings that the claimant had sustained total permanent loss of the use of a foot and that he had sustained a total loss of the use of his foot for 250 weeks and that the percentage of the loss of the use of his foot was 100 per cent.
The matter is rendered immaterial by our conclusions upon appellant's fifth and sixth propositions, but, nevertheless the definition may be said to be substantially correct under the decisions. E. K. Local Ins. Co. v. Lilly, Tex. Civ. App. 1 S.W.2d 490; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Olesky, Tex. Civ. App. 288 S.W. 244. In its eighth and ninth propositions appellant complains of the form of the eighth and tenth special issues submitted to the jury, as follows:
It should be further said that a question in the form requested by appellant would have been duplicitous. Fifth. Appellant complains that the court erred in refusing to define the term "total permanent loss of the use" of appellee's right hand. It would seem, from the definitions approved in E. K. Local Insurance Co. v. Lilly (Tex.Civ.App.) 1 S.W.2d 490, and Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Olesky (Tex.Civ.App.) 288 S.W. 244, 245, that this term has a legal meaning peculiarly applicable to the Compensation Law. We believe it should have been defined upon request of appellant.