Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n v. Charles

9 Citing cases

  1. Barnes v. United Parcel Serv. Inc.

    395 S.W.3d 165 (Tex. App. 2012)   Cited 18 times
    Noting that "party asserting the [collateral estoppel] doctrine must prove that: the facts sought to be litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the first action; the facts were essential to the judgment in the first action, and the party against whom collateral estoppel is sought was a party in the first action."

    There may be more than one producing cause of an injury, incapacity, or death in a typical workers' compensation case, even when the claimant suffers from a pre-existing condition. Marts v. Transp. Ins. Co., 111 S.W.3d 699, 703 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied); Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund v. Simon, 980 S.W.2d 730, 736 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.); Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Degollado, 844 S.W.2d 892, 897 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, writ denied); Tex. Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Charles, 381 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Flores, 74 S.W.3d at 549. If a claimant establishes that his work was a producing cause of his injury, he has satisfied his burden of proof on the causation issue and is entitled to receive benefits, unless the insurer establishes a defense to liability.

  2. Barnes v. Un. Pa.

    No. 01-09-00648-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 23, 2011)

    There may be more than one producing cause of an injury, incapacity, or death in a typical workers' compensation case, even when the claimant suffers from a pre-existing condition. Marts v. Transp. Ins. Co., 111 S.W.3d 699, 703 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied); Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund v. Simon, 980 S.W.2d 730, 736 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.); Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. Cas. Co. v. Degollado, 844 S.W.2d 892, 897 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied); Tex. Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Charles, 381 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Flores, 74 S.W.3d at 549. If a claimant establishes that his work was a producing cause of his injury, he has satisfied his burden of proof on the causation issue and is entitled to receive benefits, unless the insurer establishes a defense to liability.

  3. Transcon. Ins. v. Crump

    274 S.W.3d 86 (Tex. App. 2008)   Cited 13 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Crump, the insurance carrier did not prevail on judicial review of a worker's compensation award, and was held liable for the claimant's attorney's fees under section 408.221(c).

    It is settled law in Texas that in a workers' compensation case, there may be more than one producing cause of an injury, incapacity, or death. Marts v. Transp. Ins. Co., 111 S.W.3d 699, 703 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied); Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund v. Simon, 980 S.W.2d 730, 736 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.); Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. and Cas. Co. v. Degollado, 844 S.W.2d 892, 897 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, writ denied); Tex. Employers' Ins. Assoc. v. Charles, 381 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Here, the trial court defined "producing cause" as "an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause that, in a natural sequence, produces the death in question.

  4. Flores v. E.R.S. of Texas

    74 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. App. 2002)   Cited 66 times
    Holding that in making changes to adjudicative facts, board was not entitled to "reweigh" evidence or make findings that were "not supported by any evidence"

    That is, the workplace injury need not be the primary cause of the employee's disability; rather, as long as the occupational injury is a producing cause of the disability, there is a sufficient causal link under the workers' compensation scheme. See INA of Tex. v. Howeth, 755 S.W.2d 534, 536-37 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Charles, 381 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.). An unrelated condition or injury may be the primary factor in causing the employee's disability, but unless the carrier can prove that such unrelated factor was the sole cause of the employee's incapacity, an employee remains eligible for workers' compensation benefits.

  5. In re Lynch

    35 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. App. 2000)   Cited 3 times
    Holding that right to twelve-person jury was waived when jury of six was impaneled without objection

    In determining whether the court erred in this regard, the question is whether it abused its discretion by refusing to submit the question. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Charles, 381 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); W. Wendell Hall, Revisiting Standards of Review in Civil Appeals, 24 St. Mary's L.J. 1045, 1111 (1993). The question in reviewing such a contention is whether the request was reasonably necessary to enable a jury to reach a proper verdict.

  6. General Resources Organization, Inc. v. Deadman

    907 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. App. 1995)   Cited 18 times
    Holding appellate court cannot review trial court's denial of motion for summary judgment after trial on the merits

    The standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Charles, 381 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Appellants have failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion. The numerous requested instructions were unnecessary to enable the jury to render a proper verdict.

  7. Lone Star Fd. v. Mccormick

    838 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App. 1992)   Cited 30 times

    When the refusal is based on a determination that the request is unnecessary, the abuse of discretion standard should apply. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Charles, 381 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1964, writ refused n.r.e.). In the present case, Lone Star's request was unnecessary.

  8. Kirk v. State

    651 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. App. 1983)

    To inform a jury of the effect of its answer is to inform the jury of the legal consequences of its answers to the submitted issue. Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Charles, 381 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana, 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.). As noted by the Supreme Court in Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1978), Section 17.46 of the Texas Consumer Protection Act largely covers what should be submitted. That section provides, "a. False, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful."

  9. Export Insurance Company v. Johnson

    401 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)   Cited 8 times

    We must follow the rule that no judgment will be reversed on appeal unless the error complained of amounted to such a denial of appellant's rights as was reasonably calculated and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in the case, Rule 434, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Numerous cases have held under the records there presented, it was not reversible error to mention or refer to the amount and number of compensation payments recoverable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Escalera (Tex.Civ.App.) 385 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Ref. N.R.E.); Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. . Charles (Tex.Civ.App.) 381 S.W.2d 664 (Ref. N.R.E.); Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Rubush (Tex.Civ.App.) 337 S.W.2d 501 (Ref. N.R.E.); Argonaut Insurance Company v. Titus (Tex.Civ.App.) 347 S.W.2d 372; Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Jackson (Tex.Civ.App.) 366 S.W.2d 599 (Ref. N.R.E.); Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Logsdon (Tex.Civ.App.) 278 S.W.2d 893 (Ref. N.R.E.). After viewing the whole record we cannot say that but for the error a different verdict or judgment would probably have been rendered. Condra Funeral Home v. Rollin, 158 Tex. 478, 314 S.W.2d 277. Appellant's first point of error is overruled.