Courts are created not for purposes of deciding abstract or academic questions of law or to render advisory opinions, but solely for judicial determination of presently existing disputes between parties in which effective judgment can be rendered. University Interscholastic League v. Jones, 715 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821, 108 S.Ct. 81, 98 L.Ed.2d 43 (1987); see Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App. — Austin 1990, no writ). When a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is moot.
The State contends that in such circumstances as in the case before us the appropriate relief is to dismiss the cause of action. See e.g., City of Garland v. Louton, 691 S.W.2d 603, 604-05 (Tex. 1985) (election rendered mandamus action moot); Brownsville Indep. School Dist. Board of Trustees v. Brownsville Herald, 831 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (appeal moot because meeting already held); Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 368-69 (Tex.App. — Austin 1990, no writ) (injunction rendered moot because it related to 1988 championship game long since passed). A three-judge federal district court in the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the state, preclearing the state's legislatively-enacted senate redistricting plan, referred to as S.B. 1, under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
In the past, the UIL has enforced the mandatory forfeiture rule to require that a school forfeit all of its contests in which the litigating student participated even though the student's participation was pursuant to a lawful court-ordered injunction.See Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App. — Austin 1990, no writ). (This Court held that the appeal in that case was moot, and therefore the underlying order was vacated. Accordingly, the UIL's determination of ineligibility became final and triggered the enforcement of the mandatory forfeiture rule).
Appellants' third point in the severed cause claims that the Commission's issuance of fee guidelines is an act "capable of repetition yet evading review," an exception to the mootness doctrine. See General Land Office v. Oxy USA, 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990); Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App. — Austin 1990, no writ). Appellants claim the emergency extension of Rule 42.110 for six months shows the Commission's willingness to use its emergency powers to extend rules indefinitely.
It is established that when a temporary injunction is inoperative, and of no force and effect, the issue of the injunction's validity is moot. Parr v. Stockwell, 159 Tex. 440, 441, 322 S.W.2d 615, 616 (1959). Also, see Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App. — Austin 1990, no writ); Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Reynolds, 764 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ). Furthermore, when an appeal is moot, the judgment ( i.e., the temporary injunction in this instance) must be set aside and the appeal dismissed. Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Reynolds, 764 S.W.2d at 18, supra.
When a temporary injunction becomes inoperative due to a change in status of the parties or the passage of time, the issue of its validity is also moot. See Parr v. Stockwell, 159 Tex. 440, 322 S.W.2d 615, 616 (1959); Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no writ). An appellate court decision about a temporary injunction's validity under such circumstances would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion. See generally Burch, 442 S.W.2d at 833; Texas Educ. Agency, 797 S.W.2d at 369.
See id. A temporary injunction becomes moot when it becomes inoperative due to a change in status of the parties or the passage of time, or because it has expired. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999) (citing Parr v. Stockwell, 159 Tex. 440, 322 S.W.2d 615, 616 (1959); Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no writ)). Because the first part of the temporary injunction order is moot and the second part of the order, requiring the deposit of funds into the registry of the court, is not injunctive relief and not subject to an interlocutory appeal, we sustain Appellees' Cross- Point Two. B. Sanctions
Because the hiring freeze at issue in the original action has expired and no current hiring freeze exists, this Court is of the opinion that no current controversy between the parties exists. Courts are created not for purposes of deciding abstract or academic questions of law or to render advisory opinions, but solely for judicial determination of presently existing disputes between parties in which effective judgment can be rendered. Brownsville Independent School Dist. Bd. of Trustees v. Brownsville Herald 831 S.W.2d 537, 538-39 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi,1992, no pet.); University Interscholastic League v. Jones, 715 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821, 108 S.Ct. 81, 98 L.Ed.2d 43 (1987); see Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ). When a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is moot.
When a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is moot. See Texas Education Agency v. Dallas Independent School District, 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App. 1990, no writ). Ordinarily, we would dismiss the underlying case as well as the appeal. See Texas Education Agency, 797 S.W.2d at 369 (noting general rule that the trial court's judgment must be vacated and cause dismissed when case is moot).
When a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is moot. See Texas Education Agency v. Dallas Independent School District, 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App. 1990, no writ). Ordinarily, we would dismiss the underlying case as well as the appeal. See Texas Education Agency, 797 S.W.2d at 369 (noting general rule that the trial court's judgment must be vacated and cause dismissed when case is moot).