Texas Education Agency v. Dallas Independent School District

3 Citing cases

  1. Univ Interscholast Legue v. Buchanan

    848 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App. 1993)   Cited 41 times
    Recognizing the public interest exception

    In the past, the UIL has enforced the mandatory forfeiture rule to require that a school forfeit all of its contests in which the litigating student participated even though the student's participation was pursuant to a lawful court-ordered injunction.See Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App. — Austin 1990, no writ). (This Court held that the appeal in that case was moot, and therefore the underlying order was vacated. Accordingly, the UIL's determination of ineligibility became final and triggered the enforcement of the mandatory forfeiture rule).

  2. HATTEN v. UIL

    No. 13-06-313-CV (Tex. App. Sep. 27, 2007)   Cited 4 times
    Identifying the types of cases to which exception applies and noting that the appellant's consequences were "minuscule when compared to the stigmatizing consequences inherent in involuntary mental commitments, juvenile adjudications, protective orders, and contempt orders"

    Here, because C.J.'s and Mathew's period of ineligibility has expired, and because C.J. has graduated, this appeal is now moot. See id., at 760-61; Tex. Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no writ) (court determined appeal was moot because the football season had ended); Fink v. Hinson, 243 Ga. 337, 253 S.E.2d 757, 758 (1979) (holding that the validity of injunctive relief sought by students was mooted by football season's end). Accordingly, the issue of whether C.J. and Mathew moved to Pilot Point for athletic purposes is now moot.

  3. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Jones

    1 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. 1999)   Cited 335 times
    Holding that an appeal of a temporary injunction against the NCAA, prohibiting enforcement of NCAA rules that would have cost a football player his eligibility for one season, was not moot after the season ended because "NCAA Operating Bylaw 19.8 (the `Restitution Rule') . . . authorizes the NCAA to impose retroactive sanctions if an ineligible student-athlete competes under an injunction that is later voluntarily vacated, stayed or reversed, or found by the courts to have been improperly granted"

    When a temporary injunction becomes inoperative due to a change in status of the parties or the passage of time, the issue of its validity is also moot. See Parr v. Stockwell, 159 Tex. 440, 322 S.W.2d 615, 616 (1959); Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no writ). An appellate court decision about a temporary injunction's validity under such circumstances would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion. See generally Burch, 442 S.W.2d at 833; Texas Educ. Agency, 797 S.W.2d at 369.