In the past, the UIL has enforced the mandatory forfeiture rule to require that a school forfeit all of its contests in which the litigating student participated even though the student's participation was pursuant to a lawful court-ordered injunction.See Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App. — Austin 1990, no writ). (This Court held that the appeal in that case was moot, and therefore the underlying order was vacated. Accordingly, the UIL's determination of ineligibility became final and triggered the enforcement of the mandatory forfeiture rule).
Here, because C.J.'s and Mathew's period of ineligibility has expired, and because C.J. has graduated, this appeal is now moot. See id., at 760-61; Tex. Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no writ) (court determined appeal was moot because the football season had ended); Fink v. Hinson, 243 Ga. 337, 253 S.E.2d 757, 758 (1979) (holding that the validity of injunctive relief sought by students was mooted by football season's end). Accordingly, the issue of whether C.J. and Mathew moved to Pilot Point for athletic purposes is now moot.
When a temporary injunction becomes inoperative due to a change in status of the parties or the passage of time, the issue of its validity is also moot. See Parr v. Stockwell, 159 Tex. 440, 322 S.W.2d 615, 616 (1959); Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no writ). An appellate court decision about a temporary injunction's validity under such circumstances would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion. See generally Burch, 442 S.W.2d at 833; Texas Educ. Agency, 797 S.W.2d at 369.
When a temporary injunction becomes inoperative due to a change in status of the parties or the passage of time, the issue of its validity is also moot. See Parr v. Stockwell, . . . 322 S.W.2d 615, 616 ([Tex.] 1959); Tex[.] Educ. Agency v. Dall[.] Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex. App.- Austin 1990, no writ). An appellate[-]court decision about a temporary injunction's validity under such circumstances would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion.
Moreover, any argument pertaining to the temporary injunction that was granted would be moot as the terms of that order have expired. See Faddoul v. Oaxaca, 52 S.W.3d 209, 212 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.) ("A temporary injunction becomes moot when it becomes inoperative due to a change in status of the parties or the passage of time, or because it has expired."); Tex. Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ). In any event, it is undisputed that neither of Christensen's requests was verified by an affidavit executed by the applicant.
When a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is moot. See Texas Education Agency v. Dallas Independent School District, 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App. 1990, no writ). Ordinarily, we would dismiss the underlying case as well as the appeal. See Texas Education Agency, 797 S.W.2d at 369 (noting general rule that the trial court's judgment must be vacated and cause dismissed when case is moot).
When a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is moot. See Texas Education Agency v. Dallas Independent School District, 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App. 1990, no writ). Ordinarily, we would dismiss the underlying case as well as the appeal. See Texas Education Agency, 797 S.W.2d at 369 (noting general rule that the trial court's judgment must be vacated and cause dismissed when case is moot).
Because the hiring freeze at issue in the original action has expired and no current hiring freeze exists, this Court is of the opinion that no current controversy between the parties exists. Courts are created not for purposes of deciding abstract or academic questions of law or to render advisory opinions, but solely for judicial determination of presently existing disputes between parties in which effective judgment can be rendered. Brownsville Independent School Dist. Bd. of Trustees v. Brownsville Herald 831 S.W.2d 537, 538-39 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi,1992, no pet.); University Interscholastic League v. Jones, 715 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821, 108 S.Ct. 81, 98 L.Ed.2d 43 (1987); see Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ). When a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is moot.
Courts are created not for purposes of deciding abstract or academic questions of law or to render advisory opinions, but solely for judicial determination of presently existing disputes between parties in which effective judgment can be rendered. University Interscholastic League v. Jones, 715 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821, 108 S.Ct. 81, 98 L.Ed.2d 43 (1987); see Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App. — Austin 1990, no writ). When a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is moot.
There are two exceptions that confer jurisdiction regardless of mootness: (1) the issue is "capable of repetition yet evading review"; and (2) the collateral consequences doctrine. Gen. Land Office of State of Tex. v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990); see Tex. Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ). The "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception has only been used to challenge allegedly unconstitutional acts performed by the government.