Texas Education Agency v. Dallas Independent School District

19 Citing cases

  1. Univ Interscholast Legue v. Buchanan

    848 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App. 1993)   Cited 41 times
    Recognizing the public interest exception

    In the past, the UIL has enforced the mandatory forfeiture rule to require that a school forfeit all of its contests in which the litigating student participated even though the student's participation was pursuant to a lawful court-ordered injunction.See Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App. — Austin 1990, no writ). (This Court held that the appeal in that case was moot, and therefore the underlying order was vacated. Accordingly, the UIL's determination of ineligibility became final and triggered the enforcement of the mandatory forfeiture rule).

  2. HATTEN v. UIL

    No. 13-06-313-CV (Tex. App. Sep. 27, 2007)   Cited 4 times
    Identifying the types of cases to which exception applies and noting that the appellant's consequences were "minuscule when compared to the stigmatizing consequences inherent in involuntary mental commitments, juvenile adjudications, protective orders, and contempt orders"

    Here, because C.J.'s and Mathew's period of ineligibility has expired, and because C.J. has graduated, this appeal is now moot. See id., at 760-61; Tex. Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no writ) (court determined appeal was moot because the football season had ended); Fink v. Hinson, 243 Ga. 337, 253 S.E.2d 757, 758 (1979) (holding that the validity of injunctive relief sought by students was mooted by football season's end). Accordingly, the issue of whether C.J. and Mathew moved to Pilot Point for athletic purposes is now moot.

  3. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Jones

    1 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. 1999)   Cited 335 times
    Holding that an appeal of a temporary injunction against the NCAA, prohibiting enforcement of NCAA rules that would have cost a football player his eligibility for one season, was not moot after the season ended because "NCAA Operating Bylaw 19.8 (the `Restitution Rule') . . . authorizes the NCAA to impose retroactive sanctions if an ineligible student-athlete competes under an injunction that is later voluntarily vacated, stayed or reversed, or found by the courts to have been improperly granted"

    When a temporary injunction becomes inoperative due to a change in status of the parties or the passage of time, the issue of its validity is also moot. See Parr v. Stockwell, 159 Tex. 440, 322 S.W.2d 615, 616 (1959); Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no writ). An appellate court decision about a temporary injunction's validity under such circumstances would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion. See generally Burch, 442 S.W.2d at 833; Texas Educ. Agency, 797 S.W.2d at 369.

  4. WCJ Assets, Ltd. v. U.S. Trinity Bridgeport, LLC

    No. 02-23-00056-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 22, 2023)

    When a temporary injunction becomes inoperative due to a change in status of the parties or the passage of time, the issue of its validity is also moot. See Parr v. Stockwell, . . . 322 S.W.2d 615, 616 ([Tex.] 1959); Tex[.] Educ. Agency v. Dall[.] Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex. App.- Austin 1990, no writ). An appellate[-]court decision about a temporary injunction's validity under such circumstances would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion.

  5. Salas v. Christensen

    No. 10-11-00107-CV (Tex. App. Sep. 14, 2011)   Cited 16 times
    Concluding that notice of trial setting in "open court" was sufficient

    Moreover, any argument pertaining to the temporary injunction that was granted would be moot as the terms of that order have expired. See Faddoul v. Oaxaca, 52 S.W.3d 209, 212 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.) ("A temporary injunction becomes moot when it becomes inoperative due to a change in status of the parties or the passage of time, or because it has expired."); Tex. Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ). In any event, it is undisputed that neither of Christensen's requests was verified by an affidavit executed by the applicant.

  6. Providian Bancorp SVCS v. Garcia

    No. 08-04-00187-CV (Tex. App. Jan. 13, 2005)

    When a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is moot. See Texas Education Agency v. Dallas Independent School District, 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App. 1990, no writ). Ordinarily, we would dismiss the underlying case as well as the appeal. See Texas Education Agency, 797 S.W.2d at 369 (noting general rule that the trial court's judgment must be vacated and cause dismissed when case is moot).

  7. Providian Bancorp SVCS v. Hernandez

    No. 08-04-00186-CV (Tex. App. Jan. 13, 2005)   Cited 3 times
    Dismissing as moot interlocutory appeal from order denying motion to compel arbitration, because trial court entered an order compelling arbitration

    When a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is moot. See Texas Education Agency v. Dallas Independent School District, 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App. 1990, no writ). Ordinarily, we would dismiss the underlying case as well as the appeal. See Texas Education Agency, 797 S.W.2d at 369 (noting general rule that the trial court's judgment must be vacated and cause dismissed when case is moot).

  8. Caddel v. Bright

    No. 08-03-00336-CV (Tex. App. May. 25, 2004)   Cited 1 times

    Because the hiring freeze at issue in the original action has expired and no current hiring freeze exists, this Court is of the opinion that no current controversy between the parties exists. Courts are created not for purposes of deciding abstract or academic questions of law or to render advisory opinions, but solely for judicial determination of presently existing disputes between parties in which effective judgment can be rendered. Brownsville Independent School Dist. Bd. of Trustees v. Brownsville Herald 831 S.W.2d 537, 538-39 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi,1992, no pet.); University Interscholastic League v. Jones, 715 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821, 108 S.Ct. 81, 98 L.Ed.2d 43 (1987); see Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ). When a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is moot.

  9. Brownsville v. Brownsville

    831 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. App. 1992)   Cited 14 times
    Dismissing TOMA dispute as moot where the allegedly improper meeting "has been held" and "[w]e do not see how any decision . . . about the propriety of that meeting can be anything but advisory"

    Courts are created not for purposes of deciding abstract or academic questions of law or to render advisory opinions, but solely for judicial determination of presently existing disputes between parties in which effective judgment can be rendered. University Interscholastic League v. Jones, 715 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821, 108 S.Ct. 81, 98 L.Ed.2d 43 (1987); see Texas Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App. — Austin 1990, no writ). When a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is moot.

  10. Adams Garden Irrigation Dist. # 19 v. Tex. Comm'n On Envtl. Quality

    No. 13-17-00229-CV (Tex. App. Oct. 21, 2021)

    There are two exceptions that confer jurisdiction regardless of mootness: (1) the issue is "capable of repetition yet evading review"; and (2) the collateral consequences doctrine. Gen. Land Office of State of Tex. v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990); see Tex. Educ. Agency v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 797 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ). The "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception has only been used to challenge allegedly unconstitutional acts performed by the government.