Opinion
15-24-00018-CV
11-07-2024
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant v. REYNALDO IGNACIO FLORES, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Austin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 23CV-6583
Before Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
April Farris Justice
Appellant Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) challenges an administrative decision dismissing DPS's license suspension case against Appellee Reynaldo Flores with prejudice. See Tex. Transp. Code § 524.041. In its single issue on appeal, DPS contends that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) abused its discretion when the ALJ dismissed DPS's license suspension case against Flores with prejudice when DPS filed a notice of nonsuit without prejudice. Because we find no evidence or other reasonable basis in the record substantiating the ALJ's decision to dismiss DPS's license suspension case against Flores with prejudice, and because the decision to do so prejudiced DPS's right to seek suspension of Flores's license, we reverse the county court's order affirming the ALJ's dismissal with prejudice and render judgment dismissing the case without prejudice to refiling.
Background
DPS sought to suspend Flores's license after he was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Flores requested a hearing with an ALJ at the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) to contest the suspension. Tex. Transp. Code §§ 524.031, -.033.
On October 3, 2023, DPS served Flores with notice that his license suspension hearing would commence before an ALJ on October 23, 2023. However, just two hours after the notice of hearing went out, DPS filed a "Notice of Non-Suit Without Prejudice," requesting that the ALJ "nonsuit this case and have it dismissed without prejudice from [SOAH's] docket[.]" (emphasis added). Later the same day, the ALJ granted DPS's nonsuit, but the ALJ ordered (the Order) the case "DISMISSED from SOAH's docket with prejudice." (emphasis added). The Order further stated that "Defendant's license shall not be suspended."
Assuming that the ALJ had inadvertently dismissed the case with prejudice instead of without prejudice, DPS filed a motion to correct the Order. The ALJ denied the motion.
DPS sought judicial review in Austin County. DPS argued that the ALJ erred in dismissing with prejudice rather than without prejudice as requested because Texas law grants a plaintiff an absolute right to nonsuit its case before the plaintiff has introduced all of its evidence. Flores argued that the ALJ had discretion whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice.
The trial court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice. This appeal followed.
Analysis
DPS raises a single point of error-that the ALJ abused its discretion when it dismissed DPS's license suspension case against Flores with prejudice, rather than without prejudice as DPS had expressly requested in its notice of nonsuit.
I. Standard of review
We review administrative license suspension decisions for substantial evidence. Tex. Gov't Code § 2001.174; see Tex. Transp. Code § 524.002 (incorporating Tex. Gov't Code ch. 2001 (Administrative Procedures Act or APA) and authorizing SOAH to administer license suspension hearings).
Under substantial evidence review, we may reverse the ALJ's decision only if DPS's substantial rights have been prejudiced because the ALJ's decision was:
(A) in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision;
(B) in excess of the agency's statutory authority;
(C) made through unlawful procedure;
(D) affected by other error of law;
(E) not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the reliable and probative evidence in the record as a whole; or,
(F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.Tex. Gov't Code § 2001.174(2).
Whether there is substantial evidence to support an agency's decision is a question of law. Tex. Comm. on Env. Quality v. Maverick Cty, 642 S.W.3d 537, 547 (Tex. 2022). Our review of an agency's decision is deferential and constrained to the record-any evidence or some reasonable basis for the action taken by the agency is enough to withstand scrutiny. Id. at 544, 547. An agency's "findings, inferences, conclusions, and decisions . . . are presumed to be supported by substantial evidence, and the burden is on the contestant to prove otherwise." Tex. Health Facilities Comm'n v. Charter Med.-Dall., Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 453 (Tex. 1984).
II. The dismissal with prejudice was an abuse of discretion that prejudiced DPS's substantial rights.
DPS asserts the ALJ's dismissal with prejudice was an abuse of discretion because DPS had the right to, and did, nonsuit its case without prejudice before the evidentiary hearing. Flores responds that the ALJ's dismissal order was not legally erroneous because the ALJ had discretion to dismiss the case with prejudice.
Chapter 524 of the Texas Transportation Code sets out the procedures for suspending driver's licenses and challenging such suspensions. If a person is arrested for driving while intoxicated, DPS may suspend the person's driver's license. Tex. Transp. Code § 524.012. Individuals may contest suspensions of their licenses by requesting a hearing, which is administered by an administrative law judge appointed by SOAH. Id. § 524.031, -.033, -.035; see Tex. Admin. Code ch. 159 (SOAH's rules of procedure governing administrative license suspension hearings). However, the driver is not the plaintiff in the case. DPS is the plaintiff and bears the burden of proving its case by a preponderance of the evidence. Tex. Transp. Code § 524.035.
It is undisputed that DPS nonsuited its case before the administrative hearing was held and before any evidence was taken. In Texas, a plaintiff may nonsuit its case at any time before all the evidence is entered. Tex.R.Civ.P. 162; see Tex. Admin. Code § 155.503(a) (authorizing party with burden of proof to take nonsuit any time before close of record). The entry of a nonsuit in the docket is a ministerial task. Tex.R.Civ.P. 162; Shadowbrook Apartments v. Abu-Ahmed, 783 S.W.2d 210, 211 (Tex. 1990). A nonsuit generally entitles the plaintiff to dismissal of its cause of action without prejudice. Aetna Casualty &Surety Co. v. Specia, 849 S.W.2d 805, 806 (Tex. 1993). When a case is nonsuited without prejudice, res judicata does not bar the plaintiff from re-filing claims for the same relief. Id.; Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado, 892 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 2008) (nonsuit is without prejudice to those issues not decided on the merits); see also Klein v. Dooley, 949 S.W.2d 307, 307-08 (Tex. 1997).
This is not so when a suit is dismissed with prejudice. A nonsuit with prejudice immediately alters the legal rights of the parties. "The res judicata effect of a non-suit with prejudice works a permanent, inalterable change in the parties' legal relationship to the defendant's benefit: the defendant can never again be sued by the plaintiff . . . for claims arising out of the same subject matter." Epps v. Fowler, 351 S.W.3d 862, 868-69 (Tex. 2011).
We agree with DPS that the ALJ abused its discretion by dismissing the case with prejudice. A review of the record reveals no evidence or other reasonable basis upon which the ALJ based its decision to dismiss DPS's case with prejudice just hours after the case was added to the ALJ's docket. At the time the ALJ dismissed the suit with prejudice-the same day that the suspension hearing had been set on the docket-no hearings had occurred nor had any evidence been offered into the record. The record contains only two documents prior to the Order: DPS's notice of hearing, and DPS's notice of nonsuit filed two hours later. Taken together, this evidence does not offer any basis for the ALJ's decision to dismiss the case with prejudice rather than without prejudice.
Even so, Flores argues that the ALJ still retained discretion to dismiss the case with prejudice. We disagree. Although Flores argues that the ALJ might have dismissed the case for failure to prosecute, see § Tex. Admin. Code 155.503(c), the order contains no findings regarding any failure to prosecute.
The Administrative Code grants an ALJ discretion to dismiss license suspension cases with prejudice in one specific circumstance-if, without good cause, DPS fails to appear at a scheduled suspension hearing. Tex. Admin. Code § 159.213(e). A license suspension hearing never occurred in Flores's case, so DPS did not have a chance to appear, much less forfeit its right to prosecute this case entirely.
Here, the erroneous dismissal with prejudice functioned as an adjudication on the merits that permanently altered the legal relationship between DPS and Flores. As the ALJ aptly noted in its Order, dismissal with prejudice meant that "Defendant's license shall not be suspended." It also meant that DPS could never again assert that license suspension against Flores. See Epps, 351 S.W.3d at 86869. Because the erroneous order prejudiced DPS's rights, we sustain DPS's issue on appeal.
Conclusion
Having sustained DPS's issue on appeal, we reverse the order of the trial court and render judgment that the case is dismissed without prejudice to refiling.