Opinion
C. A. PC-2020-03863
12-18-2024
DENNIS TETREAULT, Plaintiff, v. SUZANNE BUTLER and DAVID BUTLER, Defendants.
For Plaintiff: Timothy J. Robenhymer, Esq. For Defendant: Suzanne Butler, pro se David Butler, pro se
For Plaintiff:
Timothy J. Robenhymer, Esq.
For Defendant:
Suzanne Butler, pro se
David Butler, pro se
DECISION
CRUISE, J.
This matter comes before the Court for decision after a bench trial on Plaintiff Dennis Tetreault's (hereinafter "Plaintiff") adverse possession claim. Plaintiff asks this Court to find that he has acquired title to Suzanne Butler and David Butler's (collectively "Defendants") property (hereinafter "Disputed Area") and is now its rightful owner. The Court held a bench trial on this matter on November 18, 2024. This Court's decision follows.
I
Findings of Fact
Plaintiff has owned and resided at 131 Rock Avenue, Pascoag, Rhode Island since 1970. (Hr'g Tr. 63:16-18, Nov. 18, 2024 (Hr'g Tr.); Pl.'s Ex. 1.) In September 2010, Defendants acquired 0 Shore Road and 88 Shore Road, Pascoag, Rhode Island. (Pl.'s Ex. 2.) Defendants' properties, specifically 0 Shore Road, share a common border with Plaintiff's home. See Pl.'s Exs. 3, 6. This dispute concerns 1,140 square feet of Defendants' property that Plaintiff claims to have adversely possessed. See Pl.'s Ex. 5.
Throughout the years, several surveys were conducted on Plaintiff's property. See Pl.'s Exs. 3-5. Three surveys, spanning from 1997 through 2022, show the boundary lines between the properties and indicate a wooden shed on Defendants' property. Id. At trial, Plaintiff attested that he erected and used the wooden shed located on the Disputed Area since 1973. (Hr'g Tr. 69:22-25.) He also stated that he uses and maintains the area where a metal shed previously stood for about twenty years. Id. at 70:4-8. According to Plaintiff, despite the destruction of the metal shed during a storm, the area still is used for storage and has been continuously maintained over the years. Id. at 72:1-8; 75:2-17. This is evidenced by photos of a car and other materials under a tarp on the Disputed Area. Id. at 74:9-17. At trial, Defendant Suzanne Butler consistently voiced her disapproval of the Disputed Area's current state. Id. at 38:22-23; 44:5; 59:1-5; 83:7-9. This was evidenced by her statements referring to the storage as "trash" or "debris." Id.
In 1997, Plaintiff considered the possibility of filing a separate adverse possession claim for title to Parcels A and B. Id. at 27:4-7. The land was surveyed so that Plaintiff was aware of his boundary lines should he wish to move forward with an adverse possession claim. Id. at 22:1-11; 27:20-24. In 2010, however, Plaintiff reached an agreement with the then-abutter regarding the parcels. As a result of this agreement, Plaintiff purchased Parcel A rather than acquiring title through adverse possession. Id. at 26:3-9; 28:3-23. The land surveyor once again went to the property to assist in preparing the administrative subdivision. Id. at 19:2-9. Upon conducting his fieldwork, he noted that the wooden shed was still on the land. Id. at 19:21-25. The 2022 survey indicates that the metal shed is no longer standing on the Disputed Area. (Pl.'s Ex. 5.) However, photographs throughout the years show Plaintiff's use of this disputed 1,140 square feet. (Pl.'s Exs. 9-11.)
II
Standard of Review
Nonjury trials are governed by Rule 52(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that "the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon[.]" Super. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The trial justice "weighs and considers the evidence, passes upon the credibility of the witnesses, and draws proper inferences." Hood v. Hawkins, 478 A.2d 181, 184 (R.I. 1984). The Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized that "[a] decision in a nonjury civil trial does not require exhaustive analysis of the evidence[.]" Connor v. Sullivan, 826 A.2d 953, 960 (R.I. 2003).
III
Analysis
A
Adverse Possession
In Rhode Island, the law is well settled "that land may be acquired through the doctrine of adverse possession ...." Clark v. Buttonwoods Beach Association, 226 A.3d 683, 690 (R.I. 2020). The Court has held that '"to obtain property by adverse possession . . . a claimant must prove 'actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive use of [said] property under a claim of right for at least a period of ten years."' Id. (quoting DiPippo v. Sperling, 63 A.3d 503, 508 (R.I. 2013)). As such, '"upon ten years of 'uninterrupted, quiet, peaceful and actual seisin and possession' of the land, 'good and rightful title' vests immediately in the adverse claimant."' Id. at 691 (quoting Carnevale v. Dupee, 783 A.2d 404, 412 (R.I. 2001)). Accordingly,
"to establish adverse possession, claimants must show that their use of the land was sufficiently open and notorious to put a reasonable property owner on notice of their hostile claim. No particular act or acts on the part of the claimant is required to put the world on notice
of the adverse claim-[i]t is sufficient for the claimant to go upon the disputed land and use it adversely to the true owner. The owner then becomes chargeable with knowledge of whatever occurs on the land in an open manner." Tavares v. Beck, 814 A.2d 346, 352 (R.I. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In addition, an adverse possession claimant '"must establish the required elements by strict proof, that is, proof by clear and convincing evidence."' Clark, 226 A.3d at 690 (quoting DiPippo, 63 A.3d at 508).
1
Actual and Continuous Possession
To establish the elements of actual and continuous possession, a claimant must show that "the use to which the land has been put is similar to that which would ordinarily be made of like land by the owners thereof." Anthony v. Searle, 681 A.2d 892, 897 (R.I. 1996) (citations omitted). When considering the first element of adverse possession, the Supreme Court has found that the "determination of what acts amount to actual possession of property, for purposes of adverse possession, depends upon and varies with the nature, character, and location of the property." 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 18. While some authority holds that "regular mowing of a property constitutes cultivation for purposes of adverse possession," other authority holds that it is not sufficient. Id. § 28 (citing Lewis v. Aslesen, 635 N.W.2d 744 (S.D. 2001)). Regardless, "[a]though the cultivation of land is evidence of actual possession, cultivation generally is not necessary to establish actual possession for purposes of adverse possession." Id. § 28.
To prevail on an adverse possession claim, a claimant's use of the property must be continuous for a period of at least ten years. See Clark, 226 A.3d at 690. During these ten years of continuous use, the claimant must be '"in the uninterrupted, quiet, peaceful and actual seisin and possession ...."' Gammons v. Caswell, 447 A.2d 361, 366 (R.I. 1982) (quoting G.L. 1956 § 34-7-1). Constant use is not required when the property is one that precludes such continuous occupation. See Walsh v. Cappuccio, 602 A.2d 927, 931 (R.I. 1992). '"It is necessary that [the use] be continuous only in the sense that the claimant exercised a claim of right without interference at such times as it was reasonable to make a proper use of the land."' See Russo v. Stearns Farms Realty, Inc., 117 R.I. 387, 392, 367 A.2d 714, 717 (1977) (quoting LaFreniere v. Sprague, 108 R.I. 43, 52-53, 271 A.2d 819, 824 (1970)). Continuous possession, however, must be "sufficient to provide notice to the world" that a claim of title contrary to the true owner is being asserted. Id. at 392, 367 A.2d at 717.
This Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the actual element of adverse possession because of the nature, character, and location of the property. Plaintiff mowed the lawn and weed whacked the area surrounding both the wooden and metal sheds for the past forty years. The location of this Disputed Area is directly over the boundary line. The closeness of the properties and the manner in which the land was used indicate that Plaintiff's actions surmount to actual possession of property for purposes of adverse possession.
Further, the Court finds that Plaintiff has maintained the upkeep of the wooden shed and the land surrounding it from when it was built in 1973. (Hr'g Tr. 75:6-17.) Although Plaintiff suffered from medical issues in 2020, he used the 1,140 square feet of land in question continuously and without interruption from when it was built. Id. at 76:4-25. No testimony or evidence introduced at trial indicate otherwise. Photographs from 2011 introduced by Plaintiff at trial show that the shed was used and maintained by Plaintiff at that time. (Pl.'s Exs. 9-11.) Furthermore, credible testimony from Plaintiff's daughter, Beth Brown, indicates that his use was continuous and uninterrupted as she always saw her father mowing the lawn or storing his belongings in the shed. (Hr'g Tr. 54-56.) She stated that the wooden shed was in the same location for her entire life and that she always observed Plaintiff there. Id. at 54:19-24. Brown moved out of the home in 1998 after living on the property for nearly thirty years. Id. at 50:20-25. Brown remembered her father continuously maintaining the shed since at least 2000. Id. at 55:20-24. This is clearly over the required ten-year statutory period. The Court finds that Plaintiff's use of the shed was uninterrupted and continuous, as it has been erected for nearly forty years. This Court is further persuaded by the 1997 land survey showing that the shed was in the same place at that time as well. See Pl.'s Ex. 3.
As such, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has satisfied the actual and continuous elements required for a successful adverse possession claim.
2
Open and Notorious
In turning to the next elements required for a successful adverse possession claim, the Court considers the open and notorious elements together. Clark, 226 A.3d at 691. The Court inquires '"whether the party claiming ownership by adverse possession used the property in a manner consistent with how owners of similar property would use such land and whether these uses [were] inclined to attract attention sufficient to place the world on constructive notice."' Id. (quoting Caluori v. Dexter Credit Union, 79 A.3d 823, 830 (R.I. 2013)). Our Supreme Court "previously [has] made clear that 'no particular act to establish an intention to claim ownership is required to give notice to the world of the claim,' and that 'it is sufficient for the claimant to go upon the disputed land and use it adversely to the true owner.'" Id. (quoting McGarry v. Coletti, 33 A.3d 140, 145 (R.I. 2011)). In the past, "[t]hese elements have been satisfied by an adverse claimant cutting the lawn and generally maintaining the property." Id.
Here, Plaintiff testified that he erected a wooden shed on the 1,140 square feet at issue three years after moving into his home. (Hr'g Tr. 69:22-25.) He testified that a metal shed, which he had used, also was previously on this Disputed Area, but a tree destroyed it about eight to ten years ago. Id. at 70:4-12; 72:1-7. He testified that, over the past forty years, he has maintained the area between the wooden shed and the metal shed. Id. at 75:6-17. Accordingly, Plaintiff mowed the lawn and trimmed the surrounding area. Id. He further stated that, while there was very little grass in the area prior to erecting the wooden shed in 1973, he still would mow and maintain the area. Id. at 75:11-17. Plaintiff testified that, while he recently suffered health conditions in 2020 that have caused him to slow down, he maintained the area previously so that he could access the shed. Id. at 75:21-76:14. The Court credits this testimony.
At trial, Beth Brown testified that she lived on the property for about twenty-eight years. Id. at 50:22-51:7. She testified that the wooden shed was on this Disputed Area for her entire life. Id. at 54:5-9. Furthermore, she recalled that the metal shed was present on the property for about ten years before it was damaged in the storm. Id. at 54:10-14. Prior to the damage, Plaintiff would maintain the area surrounding the metal shed, as well. Id. at 54:19-55:15. Brown confirmed that Plaintiff consistently maintained the Disputed Area through mowing and weed whacking. Id. at 55:12-15. The Court credits Brown's testimony.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has consistently maintained the Disputed Area through yardwork over the past forty years. Any reasonable homeowner would maintain their property in a similar manner. As such, having a well-kept yard would provide constructive notice to those around that someone is maintaining the area. It is evident that Plaintiff's use and maintenance through mowing and weed whacking was sufficient to satisfy the open and notorious elements of an adverse possession claim. By going upon the land and using it adversely to Defendants' intended use, as evidenced by Defendants' disapproval of its current state, Plaintiff has used the Disputed Area openly and notoriously. Id. at 38:22-23; 44:5; 59:1-5; 83:7-9.
Considering the testimony and evidence presented by the parties, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has satisfied the elements of open and notorious required for a successful adverse possession claim.
3
Hostile, Exclusive, and Under Claim of Right
Further, to '"require adverse possession under a claim of right is the same as requiring hostility, in that both terms simply indicate that the claimant is holding the property with an intent that is adverse to the interests of the true owner."' Clark, 226 A.3d at 691 (quoting DiPippo, 63 A.3d at 508). Accordingly, a '"possessor's use is hostile if it is 'a use inconsistent with the right of the owner, without permission asked or given, such as would entitle the owner to a cause of action against the intruder for trespass.'" Id. (quoting DiPippo, 63 A.3d at 508). Our Supreme Court further has held that a "claim of right may be proven through evidence of open, visible acts or declarations, accompanied by use of the property in an objectively observable manner that is inconsistent with the rights of the record owner." Tavares, 814 A.2d at 351 (citing Picerne v. Sylvestre, 122 R.I. 85, 91-92, 404 A.2d 476, 479-80 (1979)).
There is a showing of the element of hostility if "a determination is made 'that the possession of the occupier is to a visible line in all events, regardless of the location of the true boundary line.'" Coscina v. DiPetrillo, 186 A.3d 590, 596 (R.I. 2018) (quoting Anthony, 681 A.2d at 898). Therefore, in order to establish "hostility and possession under a claim of right, the pertinent inquiry centers on the claimants' objective manifestations of adverse use rather than on the claimants' knowledge that they lacked colorable legal title." Tavares, 814 A.2d at 351. "Accordingly, even when claimants know that they are nothing more than black-hearted trespassers, they can still adversely possess the property in question under a claim of right to do so if they use it openly, notoriously, and in a manner that is adverse to the true owner's rights for the requisite ten-year period." Id.
Here, Plaintiff's use of the 1,140 square feet was clearly hostile as Defendants did not agree with his use or upkeep of the land. See Hr'g Tr. at 43:19-44:11. At trial, Defendants continuously referred to Plaintiff's storage as "debris" or "trash." Id. at 38:22-23; 44:5; 59:1-5; 83:7-9. The use of the shed and storage under the tarp is adverse to how Defendants would maintain this area had Plaintiff never used it because Defendant Suzanne Butler's testimony indicated that the Disputed Area was full of debris and trash. As such, Defendants did not agree with how Plaintiff was maintaining the land and demanded he remove his belongings from it. Defendants' disdain for this portion of the land shows that Defendants would prefer to maintain this area differently. The current use is clearly inconsistent with Defendants' wishes and without permission. Furthermore, Plaintiff never was prevented from using the Disputed Area and continued to do so for forty years. Therefore, Plaintiff's use of the Disputed Area is hostile.
At trial, Plaintiff sought to prove that his use of the Disputed Area was open and visible, and that Defendants had the opportunity to observe his use when they first moved in. See id. at 38-40; 46:6-25; 47-49. While on the stand, Suzanne Butler testified about the hill or incline on her property that leads up to a plateau. Id. at 37:15-38:2. Visible from the plateau is the Disputed Area. Id. at 40:12-22. She testified that neither she nor her husband were able to walk up to the plateau upon first purchasing 0 Shore Road to see what was at the top. Id. at 38:4-9. She stated that they did not walk up to the plateau until spring of 2012, after purchasing the property in August 2010. Id. at 39:22-23. She testified that, upon her first walk to the plateau in spring of 2012, she was unable to clearly observe what was at the top of the property due to vegetation or snow. Id. at 40:8-11. However, Defendant Suzanne Butler indicated that she saw a wooden shed, a metal shed, and a tarp covering an object next to the metal shed. Id. at 40:8-22. Although Suzanne Butler claimed she was unable to observe Plaintiff's use of the Disputed Area for the first two years of living there, a photograph taken in April 2023 indicates that the shed was visible from 88 Shore Road. Id. at 46:10-12; 49:3; Pl.'s Ex. 24. Upon looking at the photograph, Suzanne Butler admitted that the shed was visible from her home, during that time of year, without climbing up the hill to the plateau. Id. at 47-49.
At trial, Defendants offered evidence that Plaintiff was aware that the Disputed Property was not his own, but that no one ever had prevented him from using it. However, evidence that he knew that the property was owned by Defendants is of no consequence, because a trespasser's knowledge that the property belongs to another does not affect the analysis. See Tavares, 814 A.2d at 351.
In considering this evidence, this Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the elements of hostile and exclusive use required to prove an adverse possession claim.
Having found that Plaintiff holds title to the Disputed Area under the doctrine of adverse possession, it necessarily follows that the Court must deny Defendants' claims for declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment, and trespass.
B
Quiet Title
This Court grants quiet title pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 34-16-4. Section 34-16-4 provides "[a]ny person or persons claiming title to real estate . . . may bring a civil action against all persons claiming, or who may claim, and against all persons appearing to have of record any adverse interest therein, to determine the validity of his, her, or their title or estate therein, to remove any cloud thereon, and to affirm and quiet his, her, or their title to the real estate." Section 34-16-4. As this Court has already determined, Plaintiff has successfully established adverse possession of the Disputed Area by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, judgment shall reflect that claim for quiet title is granted.
IV
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that Plaintiff David Tetreault has established, by clear and convincing evidence, the elements of an adverse possession claim for the 1,140 square feet of the Disputed Area between the parties' properties. Furthermore, this Court grants quiet title to Plaintiff. Having found in Plaintiff's favor as to his adverse possession claim, this Court denies and dismisses Defendants' claims for declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment, and trespass. Accordingly, Defendants' counterclaim is denied and dismissed in its entirety. Counsel for the prevailing party shall prepare and submit the appropriate order and separate judgment consistent with this Decision.