Opinion
No. 05-04-01026-CV
Opinion issued August 31, 2005.
On Appeal from the 191st District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 02-03295-J.
Affirmed.
Before Justices WRIGHT, BRIDGES, and FITZGERALD.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
William Ross Teter appeals the trial court's judgment permanently enjoining him from making certain court filings. In eight issues, Teter argues the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; Dallas County lacked standing and had no justiciable interest; dominant jurisdiction existed in another court; the evidence is legally insufficient to support the judgment and the permanent injunction; and the trial court abused its discretion in rendering judgment and issuing the permanent injunction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Teter, an attorney, initiated the underlying suit on April 14, 2003 by filing a class action against the Dallas County sheriff, clerk, and treasurer. In the original petition, Teter stated the plaintiffs were seeking to be certified as a class of more than 20,000 persons who were entitled to recover bail bond deposits delivered to the sheriff, plus all interest earned on those deposits and certain additional fees. The petition named approximately 500 individuals as plaintiffs. On June 30, 2003, the defendants filed answers, a motion to compel Teter to show his authority to prosecute the suit on behalf of each of the named plaintiffs, and a motion for expedited discovery. The same day, Dallas County filed its original third-party petition and application for a temporary restraining order seeking to prevent Teter from filing any further claims regarding the refund of bond deposits. The County alleged Teter was filing frivolous and fraudulent claims because he did not have the authority to represent the plaintiffs in the class action.
On July 11, 2003, the putative class nonsuited the defendants and removed the case to federal court. The County's third-party claim went forward with the County cast as plaintiff and Teter as defendant. In July 2004, the case came to trial before the court. The trial court permanently enjoined Teter from filing or participating in suits to obtain refunds of bond deposits or cash receipts without proof he represents the claimant. The court also awarded the County attorney's fees. This appeal followed.
In his first, second, and third issues, which he addresses together, Teter argues the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and the County did not have standing or a justiciable interest sufficient to invoke the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Teter argues neither the County nor Teter were parties to the original action, the County did not intervene prior to the trial court's granting of a nonsuit, and the County did not have a justiciable interest in the subject matter of the suit.
By suing the county officials in their official capacities, Teter was effectively suing the County. See Scott v. Britton, 16 S.W.3d 173, 180 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) ("A suit against a state official in his official capacity is not a suit against the official but the official's office and the state for which the official is an agent"). At any time after the commencement of an action, a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a citation and petition to be served upon a person not a party to the action. Tex. R. Civ. P. 38(a). Thus, the County, as the actual defending party, was authorized to bring a third party, Teter, into the suit. See Scott, 16 S.W.3d at 180; Tex. R. Civ. P. 38(a). In addition, the record shows the County filed its third-party petition on June 30, 2003, but the county officials were not nonsuited until July 11, 2003.
Without citing the record or supporting authorities, Teter further argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over special bills of review or motions to refund cash bonds. However, the County did not need to show that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over these procedures. The County had to show the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a claim made pursuant to the relevant chapters of the civil practice and remedies code, and that appears to be undisputed.
Regarding Teter's interrelated arguments that the County lacked standing and did not have a justiciable interest in the underlying suit, we conclude these arguments also lack merit. To establish standing, one must show a justiciable interest by alleging an actual or imminent threat of injury peculiar to one's circumstances and not suffered by the public generally. Voice of Cornerstone Church v. Pizza Prop. Partners, 160 S.W.3d 657, 665 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.). Here, the County clearly has a justiciable interest in maintaining the integrity of its court system and in preventing the remittance of County funds to improper parties. Thus, we conclude the County had standing in this case because it had a justiciable interest in the underlying suit. See id. We overrule Teter's first, second, and third issues.
In his fourth issue, Teter argues the Dallas County criminal courts had dominant jurisdiction over the underlying case because that is where he filed his special bills of review and motions to refund cash bonds. Neither case cited by Teter supports his argument that the criminal courts had dominant jurisdiction over the County's suit against Teter. See Booth v. Malkan, 858 S.W.2d 641, 644 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied); Herrmann Andreas Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Appling, 800 S.W.2d 312, 320 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ). Further, the record shows the County's claim against Teter was specifically intended to control Teter's actions in filing unauthorized claims and was not related to an action affecting any individual's recovery of a refund. We overrule Teter's fourth issue.
In his fifth and sixth issues, Teter challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's judgment and the permanent injunction. The Texas Supreme Court recently analyzed in detail the standards of no-evidence review (including legal sufficiency and motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict) in City of Keller v. Wilson, No. 02-1012, 2005 WL 1366509 (Tex., June 10, 2005). In conducting a no-evidence review, "appellate courts must view the evidence in the light favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not." City of Keller, slip op. at 1-2, 2005 WL 1366509, at *1. Here, the record shows several of the named plaintiffs in the class action testified they had never hired Teter even though he filed lawsuits as their attorney. Teter himself admitted filing thousands of these lawsuits without having a signed power of attorney from thousands of named plaintiffs. We conclude this evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court's judgment and the temporary injunction preventing Teter from filing similar claims in the future. See City of Keller, slip op. at 1-2, 2005 WL 1366509, at *1. We overrule Teter's fifth and sixth issues.
In his seventh and eighth issues, Teter argues the trial court abused its discretion in rendering judgment and issuing its permanent injunction. Specifically, Teter argues the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence was legally insufficient to support the judgment or the injunction. Having concluded the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court's judgment and injunction, however, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in entering a judgment and injunction based on that evidence. We overrule Teter's seventh and eighth issues.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.