As such, it is a component of that question of state law. In Testa v. Clackamas County, 137 Or. App. 21, 903 P.2d 373, rev den 322 Or. 420 (1995), we rejected the argument that the county could permissibly interpret its own zoning ordinance to classify certain property and allow uses on it that differed from the classification and allowable uses — or standards for allowing uses — under controlling state regulatory requirements. Here, as in Testa, "the [county's] decision is contrary to state law, and cannot be saved by the fact that it purports to be an interpretation of local legislation."
The question here is what was acknowledged by LCDC as the city's UGB. That is a pure question of state law, not one about the interpretation or the meaning of acknowledged local legislation or whether an interpretation complies with the state provisions enumerated in ORS 197.829(1)(d). Testa v. Clackamas County, 137 Or. App. 21, 903 P.2d 373 (1995); see also Ramsey v. City of Portland, 115 Or. App. 20, 24, 836 P.2d 772 (1992). Petitioners are correct in their conclusion that we owe no deference to the city's interpretation.