Territory v. Kelley

6 Citing cases

  1. State v. Sunderland

    115 Haw. 396 (Haw. 2007)   Cited 9 times
    Concluding that Petitioner made an argument at trial that "differ[ed] from the argument [he sought] to assert on appeal" and, therefore, the court would not address it (citing HRS § 641-2 (Supp. 2004) ("The appellate court . . . need not consider a point that was not presented in the trial court in an appropriate manner."))

    ; State v. Naeole, 62 Haw. 563, 570, 617 P.2d 820, 826 (1980) (stating that it is well-established that "an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by the reviewing courts"); State v. Kahalewai, 56 Haw. 481, 491, 541 P.2d 1020, 1027 (1975) ("Generally, appellate courts will not consider questions which were not raised in the trial courts."); Territory v. Kelley, 38 Haw. 433, 435 (1949) ("[N]o question of constitutionality of the ordinance was . . . called to the attention of the trial court and ruled upon, nor has any failure to rule been preserved by proper exceptions. No such question, therefore, can be properly raised for the first time in this court."); Onaka, 112 Hawai'i at 386, 146 P.3d at 101 ("[T]he rule in this jurisdiction . . . prohibits an appellant from complaining for the first time on appeal of error to which he has acquiesced or to which he failed to object.") (Ellipses in original.)

  2. State v. Kahalewai

    56 Haw. 481 (Haw. 1975)   Cited 25 times
    Allowing plain error to be noticed although not brought to attention of trial court

    Generally, appellate courts will not consider questions which were not raised in the trial courts. Territory v. Kelley, 38 Haw. 433 (1949). Although this rule may be deviated from, if deviation is required to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights, State v. Bunn, 50 Haw. 351, 440 P.2d 528 (1968), this exception to the general rule is inapplicable here. Since our holding will necessitate remanding this case, defendant will not be denied any fundamental rights because he will have the opportunity to address the question of sufficiency of the complaint to the lower court.

  3. State v. Bunn

    50 Haw. 351 (Haw. 1968)   Cited 23 times
    Engaging in ex post facto analysis in case involving negligent homicide by vehicle

    The rule upon which the prosecution relies for its motion to dismiss is one that is founded on considerations of fairness to the courts and to the parties, and also of the public interest in bringing litigation to an end after fair opportunity has been accorded to litigants to present all issues of law and fact. This court followed the rule in Territory v. Kelley, 38 Haw. 433 (1949); Territory v. Tsutsui, 39 Haw. 287 (1952); and Territory v. Alford, 39 Haw. 460 (1952).

  4. Territory v. Gaudia

    41 Haw. 213 (Haw. 1955)   Cited 6 times

    This court has consistently followed the rule that "courts will not pass upon the validity of a statute in any case unless it is necessary to a decision of the case so to do." ( Schoening Co. v. Miner, 22 Haw. 196, 202, 203; Territory v. Kelley, 38 Haw. 433; Territory v. Sakanishi, 36 Haw. 661; Territory v. Reyes, 33 Haw. 180; Territory v. Miguel, 18 Haw. 402.) Moreover, neither the Territory nor the defendant asserts the unconstitutionality of the statute.

  5. Territory v. Alford

    39 Haw. 460 (Haw. 1952)   Cited 16 times
    In Territory v. Alford, 39 Haw. 460, *4 (1952), the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii held that the statutory law of the territory superseded a common law doctrine.

    Before discussing the objections to the testimony of the wife of defendant, we shall briefly comment on the question raised for the first time on appeal as to the constitutionality of Act 26, Session Laws of Hawaii 1949, which it is alleged is contrary to section 45 of the Organic Act. As the question was not raised in the court below, and at the first opportunity, it cannot be raised for the first time in this court. ( Territory v. Kelley, 38 Haw. 433; Territory v. Tsutsui, 39 Haw. 287.) Objections to the testimony of defendant's wife may be summarized as follows: (1) that the offense of procuring and compelling a wife to practice prostitution was not an offense against the person of the wife and therefore she was not competent to testify against defendant at a trial for such offense; (2) that evidence relating to other offenses, in particular those committed prior to the statute of limitations, was inadmissible and, if admissible, that the witness, who was the wife of defendant, was not competent to testify thereto for reasons set forth under (1) above; and, (3) if procuring the wife to practice prostitution were an offense against the wife and if she were competent to testify relative thereto, yet as to offenses committed prior to coverture the wife was not competent to testify under section 9838, Revised Laws of Hawaii 1945.

  6. Territory v. Tsutsui

    39 Haw. 287 (Haw. 1952)   Cited 8 times

    Inasmuch as these questions were not raised below (and were not argued in this court) the court deems it unnecessary to pass upon the constitutionality of the law. ( Territory v. Kelly, 38 Haw. 433; Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77.) Two additional contentions were made: first, that to constitute gambling, the result of the event or game must be dependent more upon chance or lot than skill and that, second, to constitute gambling as by playing at cards, money or something of value must be won or lost as a result of the game, and that the evidence herein does not prove that money or anything of value was lost or won.