Territory v. Ebarra

20 Citing cases

  1. State v. Cummings

    49 Haw. 522 (Haw. 1967)   Cited 43 times
    In Cummings, the defendant at trial objected to the admission of his statement to police on the basis of his irregular arrest and illegal detention.

    Defendant attacks the findings of the trial judge by attempting to reconcile the conflicting evidence in his favor while disregarding the unfavorable portions thereof. Territory v. Ebarra, 39 Haw. 488, 492, points out that to test the sufficiency of the evidence an appellate court "will not attempt to reconcile conflicting evidence" for as State v. Carvelo, 45 Haw. 16, 33, 361 P.2d 45, so well asserts: "* * * it is established law in this jurisdiction that a * * * verdict in any case involving conflicting evidence and depending on the determination of credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence is invulnerable when attacked on appeal if there is any substantial evidence amounting to more than a mere scintilla tending to support the findings necessary to the verdict rendered."

  2. State v. Kekaualua

    50 Haw. 130 (Haw. 1967)   Cited 33 times
    Holding that in a trial by jury, the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses

    When a jury verdict involves conflicting evidence and depends on the determination of credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence, the test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury. Territory v. Ebarra, 39 Haw. 488, 492; State v. Carvelo, supra at 33; State v. Tamanaha, 46 Haw. 245, 251, 377 P.2d 688, 692; State v. Arena, 46 Haw. 315, 324, 379 P.2d 594, 601; State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522, 533, 423 P.2d 438, 445. There is substantial evidence on the record to warrant the verdict against the defendant. Judgment affirmed.

  3. State v. Carvelo

    45 Haw. 16 (Haw. 1961)   Cited 40 times
    In Carvelo, supra, there were several burglaries purportedly committed by the defendant and others prior to the offense charged, however, all of these other offenses were committed in the same district of the city and within a one-hour span of time. 361 P.2d at 48.

    See also Commonwealth v. Lavery, 255 Mass. 327, 333, 151 N.E. 466, 468; People v. Martin, 128 Cal.App.2d 361, 364, 275 P.2d 635, 637; 12 C.J.S. Burglary § 29, p. 688. Applicable also is the language in Territory v. Ebarra, 39 Haw. 488, at page 491, as follows: "It has been held sufficient that one jointly charged who accompanied and departed with the others to and from the scene, and who was present at the scene when the robbery was committed and acquiesced therein, is guilty of the crime of robbery." In the instant case, in ruling on the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the prosecution's case, the trial court stated: "To the Court it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow a man to participate by original agreement, as the evidence shows, continuing up to and including the time they walked out to do this particular job. He doesn't know that they are going into Pacific Motors but he did have to have some inference that they were going into some place, not any particular place, with intent to steal and his job was as before, to get away in the event of trouble.

  4. State v. Flores

    131 Haw. 43 (Haw. 2013)   Cited 54 times
    Looking to MPC Commentary to Section 212.1 and noting that the Hawai‘i Penal Code makes distinctions between "unlawful imprisonment" and "kidnapping" in a manner similar to the MPC’s distinctions between "unlawful restraint" and "kidnapping"

    It is well-established that "[t]he law permits an inference of the requisite intent from evidence of the words or conduct of the defendant." State v. Stuart, 51 Haw. 656, 657, 466 P.2d 444, 445 (1970) (citing Territory v. Ebarra, 39 Haw. 488, 490 (Terr.1952) ) (other citations omitted). See also In Interest of Doe, 3 Haw.App. 325, 332, 650 P.2d 603, 608 (App.1982) (stating that circumstantial evidence could be used to assess the intent to terrorize, or reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing, for the offense of terroristic threatening). From the testimony adduced at trial, a jury could infer that Flores acted in restraining Aaron with the intent to terrorize him.

  5. Nakamura v. State, University of HAWAI`I

    98 Haw. 263 (Haw. 2002)   Cited 43 times
    Recognizing that a doctor's report identifying symptoms and behaviors attributable to claimant's pre-existing illness as the source of claimant's "work-related difficulties" constitute "more than a mere ‘generalized medical opinion’ concerning [claimant's] pre-existing condition."

    Kekaualua, 50 Haw. at 133, 433 P.2d at 132 ("When a jury verdict involves conflicting evidence and depends on the determination of credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence, the test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury." (Citing, inter alia, Territory v. Ebarra, 39 Haw. 488, 492 (1952); State v. Carvelo, 45 Haw. 16, 33, 361 P.2d 45, 54-55 (1961);State v. Tamanaha, 46 Haw. 245, 251, 377 P.2d 688, 692 (1962), reh'g denied, 46 Haw. 345, 379 P.2d 592 (1963).)). For, presuming the validity of the Board's decisions as to credibility and weight, or because of its "expertise," undermines the clearly erroneous rule imposed by statute, see HRS § 91-14(g)(5) (establishing that a finding of fact is subject to a determination of whether it is "[c]learly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record"), and confirmed in our case law, see, e.g., Korsak v. Hawaii Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 94 Haw. 297, 302-03, 12 P.3d 1238, 1243-44 (2000); Tate v. GTE Hawaiian Tel. Co., 77 Haw. 100, 102-03, 881 P.2d 1246, 1248-49 (1994); Chung, 63 Haw. at 651-52, 636 P.2d at 727.

  6. State v. Yabusaki

    58 Haw. 404 (Haw. 1977)   Cited 45 times
    Holding that mere presence is insufficient to establish criminal intent

    Considering all of the circumstances surrounding this case, we believe that the state had marshalled sufficient evidence to have enabled the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was present at the scene of the crime with the conscious object of promoting or facilitating the commission of burglary. State v. Carvelo, 45 Haw. 16, 361 P.2d 45 (1961); cf. State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522, 423 P.2d 438 (1967); Territory v. Ebarra, 39 Haw. 488 (1952); The King v. I, 3 Haw. 237 (1870). Under these circumstances, it would be highly unlikely that appellant was unaware of the impending burglary and that through circumstances beyond his control he happened to be innocently present at the scene of its commission.

  7. State v. Stuart

    51 Haw. 656 (Haw. 1970)   Cited 26 times
    Stating that the jury could have inferred that defendant meant to deceive, and it was a function of the jury to determine whom to believe

    This contention is without merit. It is true that no direct evidence of intent was introduced; but such evidence is not required. The law permits an inference of the requisite intent from evidence of the words or conduct of the defendant. Territory v. Ebarra, 39 Haw. 488, 490 (1952), Territory v. Palai, 23 Haw. 133 (1916), Lo Toon v. Territory, 16 Haw. 351 (1904). Furthermore, a motion for a directed verdict must be considered on the basis of all the evidence, viewed in the light most advantageous to the opponent of the motion, including reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence.

  8. State v. Johnston

    51 Haw. 195 (Haw. 1969)   Cited 9 times

    We also stated in State v. Kekaualua, supra, at 132: "[w]hen a jury verdict involves conflicting evidence and depends on the determination of credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence, the test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury." See also, Territory v. Ebarra, 39 Haw. 488, 492 (1952); Territory v. Gagarin, 36 Haw. 1, 5 (1941). The record shows that there was substantial evidence to support a guilty verdict against defendant.

  9. State v. Butler

    51 Haw. 180 (Haw. 1969)   Cited 4 times

    Therefore, the trial court is in error if it denies a motion for judgment of acquittal in such circumstances. This approach does not require the appellate court to reconcile conflicting evidence, a practice proscribed by Territory v. Ebarra, 39 Haw. 488, 492 (1952), nor does it require us to interfere with a jury decision based on the determination of the credibility of witnesses or the weight of conflicting evidence, State v. Carvelo, 45 Haw. at 33, 361 P.2d at 54. It looks only to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to meet the required standard, assuming full weight is given to the evidence most favorable to the prosecution. I recognize that this court has always shown a healthy respect for stare decisis and that the argument can be made that the scintilla rule has been given eternal life. I think this court should reject any "doctrine of disability at self-correction."

  10. State v. Ornellas

    375 P.2d 1 (Haw. 1962)   Cited 1 times

    In the light of the clear evidence in this case and of the plethora of judicial precedents on the point in this jurisdiction alone, the trial court did not err in giving the said instructions. See Territory v. Bollianday, 39 Haw. 590; Territory v. Ebarra, 39 Haw. 488; State v. Carvelo, 45 Haw. 16, 361 P.2d 45; State v. Yoshida, 45 Haw. 50, 361 P.2d 1032; State v. Jones, supra, 45 Haw. 247, 365 P.2d 460. The last three assignments Nos. 10, 11 and 12 are without merit.