The scope of a deed restriction is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Terrien v Zwit, 467 Mich 56, 60-61; 648 NW2d 602 (2002). III.

Therefore, the interpretation of restrictive covenants is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Terrien v. Zwit , 467 Mich. 56, 60-61, 648 N.W.2d 602 (2002). This means that we review the legal issue with fresh eyes, without any required deference to the courts below. Courts review restrictive covenants with a special focus on determining the restrictor’s intent.

See Mahoney v. Lincoln Brick Co. , 304 Mich. 694, 706, 8 N.W.2d 883 (1943).Terrien v. Zwit , 467 Mich. 56, 67, 648 N.W.2d 602 (2002). As the dissent is well aware, see post at 745–46, and despite its intermittent protestations to the contrary, see post at 750–52, under Michigan law, public policy may be grounded in the common law.

"The interpretation of restrictive covenants is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo." Johnson Family Ltd. Partnership. v. White Pine Wireless, LLC , 281 Mich. App. 364, 389, 761 N.W.2d 353 (2008), citing Terrien v. Zwit , 467 Mich. 56, 60–61, 648 N.W.2d 602 (2002). Our Supreme Court has confirmed that restrictive covenants are contracts with a particular value:

Thus, the answer to defendant's freedom of contract argument is simple: the freedom to contract does not permit contracting parties to impose obligations upon and waive the rights of third parties in the absence of legally cognizable authority to do so. See Terrien v. Zwit, 467 Mich 56, 71; 648 NW2d 602 (2002) ("`The general rule [of contracts] is that competent persons shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and that their agreements voluntarily and fairly made shall be held valid and enforced in the courts.'"), quoting Twin City Pipe Line Co v. Harding Glass Co, 283 US 353, 356; 51 S Ct 476; 75 L Ed 1112 (1931).

By determining public policy on the basis of a close reading of the statutes, their operation, and textual history—which is all that is needed in this case—I would avoid the danger of allowing the subjective preferences of judges to create public policy. See Terrien ν Zwit, 467 Mich. 56, 66, 648 N.W.2d 602 (2002) ("In defining ‘public policy,' it is clear to us that this term must be more than a different nomenclature for describing the personal preferences of individual judges, for the proper exercise of the judicial power is to determine from objective legal sources what public policy is, and not to simply assert what such policy ought to be on the basis of the subjective views of individual judges.").Soaring Pine Capital accuses Park Street Group of fraud in the inducement of the contract, arguing that Park Street Group never intended to use the money to flip houses.

. In Terrien v Zwit, 467 Mich. 56, 66-67; 648 N.W.2d 602 (2002), our Supreme Court provided a framework upon which Michigan's public policy may be ascertained. The Court explained:

As authority for their position, plaintiffs rely on the Michigan Supreme Court's distinction between a covenant requiring residential use and one prohibiting business or commercial use and its determination that activity complying with the former may nevertheless violate the latter. Terrien v Zwit, 467 Mich 56, 63; 648 NW2d 602 (2002). For support of their opposing position, defendants rely on City of Livonia.

Second, appellees rightly recognize that MRPC 1.8(c) expressly prohibits the conduct at issue here. Based principally on (1) the adoption of this provision, (2) the fact that our Supreme Court has ruled that “public rules of professional conduct may also constitute definitive indicators of public policy,” Terrien v. Zwit, 467 Mich. 56, 67 n. 11, 648 N.W.2d 602 (2002), (3) the fact that contracts entered into in violation of the MRPC have been found unenforceable, Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 251 Mich.App. 187, 189, 650 N.W.2d 364 (2002), and (4) the enactment by the Legislature of MCL 700.7410(1) and MCL 700.2705, appellees argue, separate and apart from the Karabatian decision, that the devises to appellant and his children were void as against public policy. If appellees were correct that MCL 700.7410(1) and MCL 700.2705, together with MRPC 1.8(c), make it clear that the public policy of this state prohibits an attorney or specified relative from receiving a devise from an instrument prepared by the attorney for a client, this case might be distinguishable from Powers.

Second, appellees rightly recognize that MRPC 1.8(c) expressly prohibits the conduct at issue here. Based principally on (1) the adoption of this provision, (2) the fact that our Supreme Court has ruled that “public rules of professional conduct may also constitute definitive indicators of public policy,” Terrien v. Zwit, 467 Mich. 56, 67 n. 11, 648 N.W.2d 602 (2002), (3) the fact that contracts entered into in violation of the MRPC have been found unenforceable, Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 251 Mich.App. 187, 189, 650 N.W.2d 364 (2002), and (4) the enactment by the Legislature of MCL 700.7410(1) and MCL 700.2705, appellees argue, separate and apart from the Karabatian decision, that the devises to appellant and his children were void as against public policy. If appellees were correct that MCL 700.7410(1) and MCL 700.2705, together with MRPC 1.8(c), make it clear that the public policy of this state prohibits an attorney or specified relative from receiving a devise from an instrument prepared by the attorney for a client, this case might be distinguishable from Powers.