Opinion
05-24-01234-CV
12-18-2024
RANDAL TERRELL, Appellant v. STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F18-75437
Before Justices Reichek, Nowell, and Carlyle
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ERIN A. NOWELL JUSTICE
Pro se appellant Randal Terrell appeals the trial court's October 22, 2024 order recommitting him to twelve months of extended inpatient mental health services. In three issues, he argues the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) accepting the "waiver of hearing" document on October 18, 2022 without his signature; (2) failing to give him notice of the October 17, 2024 hearing thereby depriving him of his due process rights; and (3) failing to comply with Texas Health and Safety Code section 574.009. We affirm.
Background
On March 28, 2018, appellant killed Adane Weldekiros in the parking lot of a Holiday Inn. The State indicted him for murder with a deadly weapon, a firearm.
On August 9, 2018, the court ordered an examination regarding appellant's competency to stand trial. Dr. Michael Pittman submitted his evaluation to the court on August 17, 2018 in which he concluded appellant was competent to stand trial despite "a potentially severe mental illness, most notably a psychotic disorder not otherwise specified, and he is taking antidepressant and antipsychotic/mood-stabilizing medicines, necessary to maintain his competency." Despite this report, appellant filed his "notice of intent to raise insanity defense."
After considering appellant's mental illness and the issue of insanity, the trial court signed an order for examination pursuant to chapter 46B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. On March 25, 2021, Dr. Kristi Compton filed her insanity evaluation and concluded appellant "meets legal criteria for not guilty by reason of insanity." Her evaluation noted a past diagnosis of major depressive disorder with psychotic features, but his current symptoms met the criteria "for schizoaffective disorder-bipolar type, with a history of alcohol use disorder, in remission, in a controlled environment."
On February 1, 2022, appellant waived his right to a jury and entered an uncontested plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court found appellant not guilty by reason of insanity and ordered him committed to the North Texas State Hospital, Vernon Campus, for a period not to exceed thirty days. The requirement that appellant be committed to the Vernon Hospital was waived, and on April 4, 2022, appellant was admitted to the Terrell State Hospital.
On April 20, 2022 and May 10, 2022, the trial court entered orders extending his 180-day inpatient treatment at the Terrell Hospital. The trial court entered annual orders renewing the order for inpatient commitment on October 20, 2022, October 20, 2023, and October 22, 2024. Appellant appeals the trial court's October 22, 2024 order.
Applicable Law
Commitment proceedings for a person found not guilty by reason of insanity are civil in nature. Campbell v. State, 85 S.W.3d 176, 180 (Tex. 2002).
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 46C governs the raising of the insanity defense, the determination of a defendant's sanity, and the disposition of a defendant after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity ("an acquitted person"), the trial court shall determine whether the charged offense involved conduct that (1) caused serious bodily injury to another person, (2) placed another person in imminent danger of serious bodily injury, or (3) consisted of a threat of serious bodily injury to another person through the use of a deadly weapon. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46C.157. If, as in the present case, the court determines the offense involved a deadly weapon, the court retains jurisdiction over the acquitted person until either the court discharges the person and terminates its jurisdiction or the cumulative total period of institutionalization and outpatient or community-based treatment and supervision equals the maximum term provided by law for the offense of which the person was acquitted by reason of insanity. Id. art. 46C.158.
A trial court that orders an acquitted person committed to inpatient treatment shall determine on an annual basis whether to renew the order. Id. art. 46C.261(a). At least thirty days before the order is scheduled to expire, the institution to which the acquitted person is committed or the State may request that the commitment order be renewed. Id. art. 46C.261(b). The request must explain in detail the reasons for requesting renewal and the reasons why outpatient or community-based treatment and supervision is not appropriate. Id. The request must be accompanied by a certificate of medical examination for mental illness signed by a physician who examined the person during the thirty-day period preceding the date on which the request is filed. Id. art. 46C.261(c).
Once a renewal request is filed, the court "shall" set the matter for hearing and appoint an attorney to represent the person. Id. art. 46C.261(d)(1)-(2). "If a hearing is held, the person may be transferred from the facility to which the acquitted person was committed to the jail for purposes of participating in the hearing only if necessary." Id. art. 46C.261(f). During the hearing, if no objection is made, the court may admit into evidence the certificate of medical examination for mental illness, which constitutes competent medical testimony. Id. art. 46C.261(g). The court may make its findings solely from the certificate and the detailed request for renewal. Id.
Discussion
In his first issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by accepting the October 18, 2022 "Waiver of Having Cause Heard by District Judge and Referral to Magistrate" without verifying that he "had definitely waived his rights and requested the referral." Thus, any following orders, including the October 17, 2024 Order of Referral and the October 20, 2024 recommitment order, should not have been accepted and entered by the court. The State responds the trial court did not abuse its discretion by approving the waiver signed by appellant's trial counsel and the State.
Once the State hospital superintendent filed a letter and physician's certificate stating "our opinion that further hospitalization is indicated," the court was required to set the matter for hearing and appoint an attorney. Id. art. 46C.261(d). The court complied with both requirements. Appellant was represented by counsel, who waived appellant's presence at both hearings. The word "waived" was handwritten on the line for appellant's signature. During both hearings, counsel stated she was waiving appellant's presence given there would be no testimony.
Even assuming appellant did not give his attorney approval to waive his cause being heard before a district judge, a person's presence at a hearing to extend existing commitment orders is discretionary. Article 46C.260(f) provides that "[i]f a hearing is held, the person may be transferred from the facility . . . for purposes of participating in the hearing only if necessary." Because appellant's presence at the hearing was discretionary and he has failed to argue why his presence would have been necessary, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by accepting the waivers and signing the Orders of Referral. We overrule appellant's first issue.
In his second issue, appellant argues the trial court denied him due process by not providing notice of the October 17, 2024 hearing and not allowing him to attend. The record indicates appellant was afforded due process as required under Chapter 46C. The court held a hearing before the expiration of the existing commitment order and admitted, without objection, the physician's certificate. Id. art. 46C.261(b), (c), (g). Appellant was represented by counsel at the hearing. Id. art. 46C.261(d)(2). The parties agreed and stipulated that "if [the physician] were to testify, he would testify to the information contained in his Form 633 and his psychiatric evaluation of defendant." The court found appellant met the criteria for extended, court-ordered, inpatient mental health services and found by clear and convincing evidence that continued mandatory supervision and treatment were appropriate to protect the safety of others. Id. art. 46C.261(h). Appellant has not challenged the sufficiency of this evidence.
Although appellant contends the court "denied his repeated requests to attend" the hearing, there is no supporting evidence in the record. Additionally, as stated above, appellant's presence at the hearing was discretionary. Id. art. 46C.261(f). Because the trial court adhered to the procedures required under article 46C, the trial court did not violate appellant's due process rights. Appellant's second issue is overruled.
In his third issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by extending his inpatient mental health services without two certificates of medical examination on file with the court pursuant to the Texas Health and Safety Code. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.009(a) ("A hearing on an application for court-ordered mental health services may not be held unless there are on file with the court at least two certificates of medical examination for mental illness completed by two different physicians each of whom has examined the proposed patient during the preceding thirty days."). Appellant is incorrect. The two-certificate requirement is part of subchapter A of the health and safety code, which applies to "application for commitment and prehearing procedures." Compare Id. § 574.001(e) (discussing transfer of criminal defendant "against whom all charges have been dismissed") with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. article 46C.261 (discussing disposition of individuals following acquittal by reason of insanity with a finding of dangerous conduct).Under article 46C.261(c), which controls the procedures for a request to renew an order of inpatient commitment, "the request for renewal must be accompanied by a certificate of medical examination for mental illness signed by a physician who examined the person during the thirty-day period preceding the date on which the request is filed." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. article 46C.261(c).
Those acquitted by reason of insanity are a special class and may be treated differently from those committed under ordinary civil commitment standards. See Tyler v. State, 223 S.W.3d 656, 668 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2007, no pet.).
During the October 17, 2024 hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of the file, including Dr. Hemani's Physicians' Certificate of Medical Examination completed on September 24, 2024, which complied with article 46C.261(c). As such, the State complied with the medical certificate requirement. Appellant's third issue is overruled.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's October 22, 2024 order.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the trial court's October 22, 2024 order is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered .