Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-CV-1005-WKW
01-31-2017
TERRANCE REASER, #265 571, Plaintiff, v. LARRY MCCOVERY, Defendant.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims of excessive force and a failure to be decontaminated after being sprayed with a chemical agent. Previously, the court denied Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and referred this matter to the undersigned for review of Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. Doc. 3. Upon review of the motion and the pleadings in this matter, the court concludes that the motion for preliminary injunction is due to be denied.
I. DISCUSSION
The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction "is within the sound discretion of the district court." Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002). This court may grant a preliminary injunction only if Plaintiff demonstrates each of the following prerequisites: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will occur absent issuance of the injunction; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the potential damage the requested injunction may cause the non-moving parties; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Id.; McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998); Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1185 (11th Cir. 1983); Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 1983). In the Eleventh Circuit, "[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the "burden of persuasion'" as to the four prerequisites. McDonald's, 147 F.3d at 1306; All Care Nursing Service, Inc. v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp. Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a preliminary injunction is issued only when "drastic relief" is necessary); Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the grant of a preliminary injunction "is the exception rather than the rule," and movant must clearly carry the burden of persuasion). The moving party's failure to demonstrate a "substantial likelihood of success on the merits" may defeat the party's claim, regardless of the party's ability to establish any of the other elements. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that "the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper"). "'The chief function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the controversy can be fully and fairly adjudicated.'" Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Northeastern Fla. Ch. of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1284 (11th Cir. 1990)).
In denying Plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order, this court determined "Plaintiff [] failed to establish that a 'TRO . . . is necessary to prevent irreparable injury.'" Doc. 3 at 1 (quoting Parker v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032, 1035 (11th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief is also devoid of any allegation he will suffer specific and irreparable harm if an injunction is not issued, which requires a showing of harm that "cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy" through the ordinary course of litigation. See Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3rd Cir. 1989) ("The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm"). Finally, it is impossible to determine what Plaintiff's requested relief would entail, preventing the court from determining what burden an injunction would have on the Alabama Department of Corrections and whether issuing one would harm the public interest. For all of these reasons, a preliminary injunction is not warranted.
II. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:
1. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff (Doc. 1) be DENIED; and
2. This case be referred to the undersigned for additional proceedings.
It is ORDERED that on or before February 14, 2017, Plaintiff may file an objection to the recommendation. Any objection filed must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall "waive the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions" except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).
DONE on this 31st day of January, 2017.
/s/ Gray M . Borden
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE