It is doubtless true that water officials must distribute the waters of a district or division according to adjudicated priorities, but, when they are avowedly attempting to do so, as it is made to appear from the pleadings in this case, their action cannot be interfered with either by interlocutory order or final judgment, unless the real parties in interest are parties to the action. Terrace Irrigation District v. Neff, 19 P.2d 754, Colo. 1933. In a suit to enjoin a water commissioner from diverting water in a stream from the use of prior appropriators to the use of subsequent appropriators, the subsequent appropriators being the persons really interested, are necessary parties, and their absence is fatal to the validity of the decree.
"In an action to enjoin a water commissioner from diverting water from a stream, the persons for whose benefit it is diverted are necessary parties. * * *" In Terrace Irrigation District v. Neff, 92 Colo. 278, 19 P.2d 754, the court uses this language: "The rule which we think is controlling is well stated in McLean v. Farmers' High Line Canal Reservoir Co., 44 Colo. 184, 98 P. 16, 20, from which we quote the following: `It is doubtless true,' the court said, `that water officials must distribute the waters of a district or division according to adjudicated priorities, but, when they are avowedly attempting to do so, as it is made to appear from the pleadings in this case, their action cannot be interfered with either by interlocutory order or final judgment, unless the real parties in interest are parties to the action.'
Thus it is uniformly held that the owners of the water rights are necessary parties to an injunction action against the water commissioner in connection with his duties. (2 Wiel on Water Rights in the Western States (3d ed.), 1110, sec. 1196; Squire v. Livezey, 36 Colo. 302, 85 P. 181; Terrace Irr. District v. Neff, 92 Colo. 278, 19 P.2d 754; Humboldt Land Cattle Co. v. Allen, 14 F.2d 650.) Obviously the water owners are the real parties interested, and notice must therefore be given them of proceedings affecting their rights.
(11) Absent a valid designation as a joint tenancy, with right of survivorship, the opening of an account in the names of "Pietro Manti" "Dominic Gurnari" with the written declaration of ownership, and the oral declaration of intent by Manti that the balance should go to the survivor is sufficient upon death to entitle the survivor to recover the balance; where the acceptance of the trust by the bank as trustee can be shown. (Civ. Code, ยงยง 2221 and 2222; Booth v. Oakland Bank of Sav., supra, 122 Cal. at p. 24; Randall v. Bank of America (1941) 48 Cal.App.2d 249, 253 [ 19 P.2d 754]; Bank of America v. Long Beach Federal Sav. Loan Assn. (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 618, 623 [ 297 P.2d 443].) In Randall v. Bank of America, supra, 48 Cal.App.2d 249, 253, 255, it is held that the validity of such a trust is not negatived because the depositor retains power to withdraw the deposit during his lifetime nor because he retains possession of the bankbook; that the creation of a valid trust is not at all dependent upon the existence of a present right to enjoy the funds beneficially; that the legal title to the remainder vests immediately in the beneficiary, and possession vests at the end of the life estate of the trustor and termination of the trust.