Lardas has presented no factual basis upon which a finding of waiver or estoppel could be supported. Lardas relies heavily on Terpeluk v. Insurance Company of North America, 189 Pa. Super. 259, 150 A.2d 558 (1959). Even if Terpeluk were controlling authority, which it is not,Terpeluk factually is completely inapposite.
The claim was not formally denied until January 29, 1975, on the ground that the loss resulted from burglary, which was beyond the coverage of the policy. Various legal precedents have established the principle that the one year contractual limitation is enforceable, Satchell v.Insurance Placement Facility of Pennsylvania, 241 Pa. Super. 287, 361 A.2d 375 (1976); Ercole v. Metropolitan Life InsuranceCo., 155 Pa. Super. 549, 39 A.2d 293 (1944); but that it may be avoided, waived, suspended, or what not, if the insurance company does things which induce the insured to delay filing suit, Terpeluk v. I.N.A., 189 Pa. Super. 259, 263, 150 A.2d 558 (1959); Commonwealth v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 462 Pa. 268, 341 A.2d 74 (1975). Whether the circumstances of this case constitute a waiver avoidance or suspension of the one year contractual provision of the policy should be determined initially by the fact-finder and the court when all relevant testimony has been presented.
ped from asserting as a defense to an action on a policy standard or statutory provisions incorporated therein which limit the time within which to commence an action thereunder. Thus, it has been held that such a waiver or estoppel is established by an insurer's request for delay to permit further investigation, 29A Am. Jur., Insurance, ยง 1803; or to obtain additional proofs of loss which cannot be furnished until after or near the expiration of the limitation period, Meekins v. Aetna Ins. Co. 231 N.C. 452, 57 S.E.2d 777, 15 A.L.R. 2d 949; Bloodgood v. Massachusetts Benefit Life Assn. 19 Misc. 460, 44 N.Y. S. 563; or by its express or implied admissions of liability, coupled with prolonged negotiations through adjusters during which insured is led to believe that his claim will be settled. Insurance Co. v. Brodie, 52 Ark. 11, 11 S.W. 1016; Allemania Fire Ins. Co. v. Peck, 133 Ill. 220, 24 N.E. 538; Little v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 123 Mass. 380, 25 Am. R. 96. See, also, 41 Yale L. J. 1071; Terpeluk v. Insurance Co. of North America, 189 Pa. Super. 259, 265, 150 A.2d 558, 561; Killips v. Putnam Fire Ins. Co. 28 Wis. 472, 482, 9 Am. R. 506, 512. This court has expressed a like viewpoint.
While Pennsylvania courts have applied the principles of waiver and estoppel to suit limitation provisions, the use of waiver and estoppel has been limited to instances in which the insurer is responsible for the delay. See Gen. State Auth. v. Planet Ins., 346 A.2d 265 (1975); Lardas v. Underwriters Ins., 231 A.2d 740 (1967); Terpeluk v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 150 A.2d 558 (1959); see Selden v. Metro. Life Ins., 47 A.2d 687 (1946) (beneficiary's ignorance of existence of policy does not excuse failure to comply with suit limitation clause); see also Reinhart v. Erie Ins., No. 2034 MDA 2014, 2015 WL 6159391, at *7 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2015) (citing Lardas and Gen. State Auth. for the proposition that under Pennsylvania law, one-year limitations will be enforced unless conduct by the insurer leads the insured to believe the limitation period will not be relied on). Plaintiff argues that Diamon v. Penn Mutual Life Ins., 372 A.2d 1218 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977), is the "seminal case on estoppel and waiver of the suit limitations provision."
29 ALR2d 636, 650 (1953); Sherwood Jewelers-Newark, Inc. v. Philadelphia National Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 103 (D.N.J. 1952) (suit filed 13 days after expiration of the period held barred, plaintiff having had 10 days remaining in the period after defendant's disclaimer was mailed); General Ins. Co. v. Lee Chocolate Co., 97 Ga. App. 588, 103 S.E.2d 632 (1958). But see Terpeluk v. Insurance Company of North America, 189 Pa. Super. 259, 150 A.2d 558 (1959). The record discloses no genuine issue as to any material fact.
While the evidence here does not establish a waiver of the 12-month clause, it is sufficient to excuse the plaintiffs from strict compliance therewith. Terpeluk v. Insurance Company of North America, 189 Pa. Super. 259, 150 A.2d 558 (1959); Sudnick v. Home Friendly Ins. Co. of Maryland, 149 Pa. Super. 145, 27 A.2d 468 (1942); O'Connor v. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 128 Pa. Super. 336, 194 A. 217 (1937); O'Brien v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., 122 Pa. Super. 39, 184 A. 546 (1936); 19 P.L.E., Insurance, ยง 421; and see Insurance Co. of North America v. Board of Education, 196 F.2d 901 (10th Cir. 1952), containing comment on the Pennsylvania cases. In the Sudnick case, an attorney represented the claimant in the negotiations.
Nevertheless, an insurer can, in effect, toll this contractually imposed limitations period if, by its actions, it induces an insured to forbear bringing suit within the prescribed period. Schreiber v. Pennsylvania Lumberman's MutualInsurance Co., 498 Pa. 21, 24-25, 444 A.2d 647, 649 (1982) (citation omitted); Diamon v. PennMutual Fire Insurance Co., 247 Pa. Super. 534, 542-48, 372 A.2d 1218, 1222-25 (1977) (citations omitted); Terpeluk v. InsuranceCo. of North America, 189 Pa. Super. 259, 265-66, 150 A.2d 558, 561 (1959). The defendant insurers initially paid for the services Samuels received at the Hahnemann Hospital.
This court affirmed the lower court's judgment for defendant n.o.v., holding that: Commonwealth v. Transamerica Company, 462 Pa. 268, 341 A.2d 74 (1975); Arlotte v. National Liability Insurance Company, 312 Pa. 442, 167 A. 295 (1933); Terpeluk v. Insurance Company ofNorth America, 189 Pa. Super. 259, 150 A.2d 558 (1959). See alsoMcMeekin v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 348 Pa. 568, 36 A.2d 430 (1944); Sudnick v. Home Friendly InsuranceCompany, 149 Pa. Super. 145, 27 A.2d 468 (1942).