Opinion
No. CV 04 0834999S
February 3, 2005
DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE
The Court has reviewed the arguments of the parties in connection with Defendants' July 13, 2004, Motion to Strike the complaint and concluded that the motion should be granted.
Plaintiffs claim in their May 18, 2004 complaint to have been injured as a consequence of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on Main Street in Agawam, Massachusetts, outside the entrance and parking lot of Six Flags New England. This case is not brought against the driver of the other vehicle. Defendants are Riverside Park Enterprises, Inc., and Six Flags, Inc., d/b/a Six Flags New England, owners and operator of the Six Flags amusement park in Agawam, Mass. Defendants have moved to strike the entire complaint on the grounds that defendants have no duty to persons injured outside property they own or control. If there is no duty owed, there can be no liability.
The Court agrees with the defendants that Massachusetts law should apply. Connecticut courts have adopted the "most significant relationship test" as its choice of law rule in tort actions. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 229 Conn. 359, 64 A.2d 783 (1994). See Section 145 of the Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law. The injuries alleged occurred in Massachusetts. Plaintiffs are Connecticut residents, but defendants are Massachusetts corporations located in Massachusetts. The "relationship" between the parties, such as it was, centered in Massachusetts. Evaluating the factors listed in the Restatement, most importantly the location of the accident, the Court concludes that Massachusetts has the most significant relationship to the alleged accident.
The issue before the Court then becomes whether Six Flags had a duty under Massachusetts law to maintain or keep safe a public road abutting its property. Plaintiffs claim that defendants were negligent in that they failed to employ the services of a traffic control officer to direct the flow of traffic at the intersection where the accident allegedly occurred; failed to utilize the services of available Agawam police officers for use as private duty traffic control officers; and failed to take other steps to control the flow of traffic outside the amusement park. See paragraph five of first count of complaint. Massachusetts cases have held, under the facts of various cases, that a business owner generally owes no duty to injured parties with respect to injuries occurring on adjacent public roads. See, e.g., Davis v. Westwood Group, 420 Mass. 739, 652 N.E.2d 567 (1995); David v. Urban Retail Properties, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 1106, 796 N.E.2d 896, 2003 WL 22299533 (Mass.App.Ct.); Herbert v. Kearns, 61 Mass.App.Ct. 1106, 808 N.E.2d 1257, 2004 WL 1124727 (Mass.App.Ct.). The general principle for which these cases stand suggests that the motion to strike ought to be granted.
Plaintiffs argue in their January 27, 2005 submission, filed in response to the Court's order, that this general proposition does not apply to this case because the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has not addressed the precise situation alleged here. That is true. But the above cases — most particularly Davis — do stand unambiguously for the proposition that although a landowner or possessor must exercise reasonable care in the use of his land so as not to injure a traveler on the highway, he "typically is not held to any duty with respect to public highways adjacent to or crossing his land." 652 N.E.2d at 570. To hold a landowner liable for injuries occurring on adjacent land, said the court in Davis, would ". . . significantly expand the scope of a landowner or possessor's duties with respect to adjacent public roads and would make the line which cuts off landowner liability `nearly impossible to draw.'" (Citation omitted.) Id. The imposition of such a duty on landowners would be "unreasonably onerous." Id. At 572.
It is true that Six Flags seeks to attract large numbers of patrons, including people across the border in Connecticut, most of whom will enter the amusement park by vehicle. But the same was true in the Davis case, which involved a greyhound racing park. Having reviewed this matter in light of the controlling cases, I can discern no principled reason to conclude that the factual differences between this case and the controlling Massachusetts cases, particularly the Davis case, remove this case from the general rule annunciated in those cases. In the instant case, it is conceded that the accident alleged occurred on a public road — Main Street in Agawam, Massachusetts, outside of the Six Flags parking lot. See paragraphs 3 and 4 of the first count of the complaint. Defendants therefore owed plaintiffs no duty under controlling Massachusetts law. The motion to strike is granted.
Douglas S. Lavine Judge, Superior Court