Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-3471.
September 22, 2004
ORDER
And now this 22nd day of September, 2004, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
A motion for summary judgment will only be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(c). In a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of proving no genuine issue of material fact is in dispute and the court must review all of the evidence in the record and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its initial burden, the nonmoving party must then "come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita 475 U.S. at 587 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). A motion for summary judgment will not be denied because of the mere existence of some evidence in support of the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find for them on that issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
Sandra Tenney took medical leave from her employment as an Intergovernmental Relations Officer for the City of Allentown, suffering from vertigo, stress, anxiety disorder and clinical depression in March 2000. On June 13, 2000 and July 7, 2000 Tenney's counsel advised Allentown that Tenney was covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On August 31, 2000 Allentown cut off Tenney's health insurance, in retaliation, Tenney believes, for her claim to be covered by the ADA and/or on account of her age in violation of the ADEA. The City says Tenney purchased her health care benefits while she was on leave and the City resumed paying for them when she returned to work.
The City says Tenney received 12 weeks of Family Medical Leave and another nine months of leave before returning to work under conditions Tenney herself set: a change of supervisor, a change of office, part-time. The City says Tenney returned to work in April, 2001 and that the City attempted to mitigate the stress Tenney felt working for her former supervisor Heidi Baer by giving Tenney her choice of another supervisor. (There is a well-documented history from 1998 to 2000 regarding Baer's complaints about Tenney's work and absenteeism and Tenney's complaints about Baer's supervision. That seems to be out of time for the complaint here.)
Tenney complained to the Mayor, William Heydt, a defendant here, that the City was not paying overtime to her and other employees as required in violation of the FLSA. On October 5, 2001 Tenney was fired, in retaliation, she claims, for exercising her rights under the FMLA. The City claims Tenney's position was eliminated as part of a budget reduction and she was lad off as of October 19, 2001.
Taking as we must all factual allegations in favor of the nonmoving party, this court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the disability, the discrimination and the retaliation alleged.
A final pre-trial conference will be held November 30, 2004, at 8:00 at the Federal Courthouse, Philadelphia, Courtroom TBA, before which the parties will file and submit joint questions for voir dire, neutral statement of the case, requested points for charge and verdict slip. Each party shall also file and submit a pretrial memorandum. The above captioned case is assigned to the trial pool for December 6, 2004. Jury selection will be held in Philadelphia and the trial will continue in the Reading station of the Eastern District Court.