. . ." See American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, 412 F. Supp. 1077, 1081-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Moldenhauer v. Provo, 326 F. Supp. 480, 482 (D.Minn. 1970); Tennessee Public Serv. Comm'n v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 87, 91 (W.D.Tenn. 1967); 11 Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2957. Section 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101, provides that no United States court shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute except in strict conformity with the provisions of the Act.
Rule 65(c) does not mandatorily provide that a Court require the posting of security in all cases before a preliminary injunction may issue. See Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 338 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir. 1964); Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665, 675 (2d Cir. 1961); Magidson v. Duggan, 180 F.2d 473, 479 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 965, 70 S.Ct. 1000, 94 L.Ed. 1374 (1950); Bivins v. Bd. of Public Educ. Orphanage for Bibb Co., 284 F. Supp. 888, 899 (M.D.Ga. 1967); Tennessee Public Service Comm'n v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 87, 91 (W.D.Tenn. 1967); 7 J. Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 65.09, pp. 65-92 (1972 ed.). For the reasons set forth hereinabove, this Court hereby enjoins the plaintiffs herein from taking, after the filing of this opinion, any further action of any nature whatsoever in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland, in this case until one or more further Orders of this Court or of any appellate Court having jurisdiction over this Court have issued.
See, also, Tennessee Public Service Comm. v. United States (W.D.Tenn. 1967) 275 F. Supp. 87, 91. Therefore, an order is being entered today restraining the I.C.C. from implementing the orders herein complained of.
It should be noted that courts have held that security is not necessary where requiring security would have the effect of denying the plaintiffs their right to judicial review of administrative action. Powelton Civic Home Owners' Ass'n v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 284 F. Supp. 809, 840 (E.D.Pa. 1968); Tennessee Public Service Comm'n v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 87, 91 (W.D.Tenn. 1967); City of Williamsport v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 899, 904 (M.D.Pa. 1967); Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 340, 343 (M.D.Fla. 1964). To require the plaintiffs in the case at bar to post security in the amount requested by the Government to cover the alleged losses would have the effect of denying three nonprofit environmental organizations from obtaining judicial review of the defendant's actions under NEPA. Congress has indicated that private environmental organizations should assist in enforcing NEPA.
Several cases have added to this requirement of irreparable harm, a requirement that the movant show that it has a "reasonable possibility" of prevailing on the merits. E.g., Tennessee Public Service Commission v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 87, 90 (W.D.Tenn. 1967). However, without a showing of irreparable harm, no matter how reasonable the possibility that the movant might prevail on the merits, a temporary restraining order should not issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(3).
Two other district courts in this circuit have eroded this requirement to demand only a reasonable possibility of ultimate success. Cincinnati, New Orleans Texas Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, D.C.Ohio (1963), 220 F. Supp. 46, 46-47, approved in Tennessee Public Service Commission v. United States, D.C.Tenn. (1967), 275 F. Supp. 87, 89-90. Opinion by Honorable John W. Peck, now a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.