The chancery court also recognized that the chancery courts of this state have no jurisdiction, inherent or statutory, to enjoin threatened criminal prosecutions. See Tennessee Downs, Inc. v. Gibbons, 15 S.W.3d 843, 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) ("It is a well-established rule of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity have no jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of state criminal laws."). However, the chancery court also correctly noted that "the Tennessee Court of Appeals has held that the Chancery Court has subject matter jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of a criminal statute as applied to a petitioner."

Pending completion of the transfer of administration, the Memphis City Board of Education has authority to operate the Memphis City Schools, to wind up its business and affairs, and to assist the Shelby County Board of Education in exercising its responsibility for educating Memphis schoolchildren, including transferring Memphis City Schools' assets to the Shelby County Board of Education. See, e.g., KHB Holdings, Inc. v. Duncan, No. E2002-02062-COA-R3CV, 2003 WL 21488268, at *2-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2003); Tenn. Downs, Inc. v. Gibbons, 15 S.W.3d 843, 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Ultimate responsibility for decisions affecting the education of Memphis schoolchildren lies with the Shelby County Board of Education.

The Tennessee General Assembly has "vested exclusive and original jurisdiction of all criminal matters in the circuit and criminal courts of this state." Tenn. Downs, Inc. v. William L. Gibbons, 15 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-10-102 (2021) provides: "The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all crimes and misdemeanors, either at common law or by statute, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or this code."

The Tennessee General Assembly has "vested exclusive and original jurisdiction of all criminal matters in the circuit and criminal courts of this state." Tenn. Downs, Inc. v. William L. Gibbons, 15 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-10-102 (2021) provides: "The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all crimes and misdemeanors, either at common law or by statute, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or this code."

"[A] direct appeal from a criminal conviction . . . petitions for relief under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act and petitions for writ of habeas corpus are the exclusive means by which a prisoner can obtain relief from confinement," Id. at 567 n. 6, and "[c]ourts of equity are not constituted to deal with crime and criminal proceedings." Carter v. Slatery, No. M2015-00554-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 1268110, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2016) (internal citation omitted); Tennessee Downs, Inc. v. Gibbons, 15 S.W.3d 843, 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) ("It is a well-established rule of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity have no jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of state criminal laws."). C. Whether Mr. Rayner's Pending Discovery Motion is Moot

The exercise of the jurisdiction contended for would greatly confuse and embarrass the enforcement of the police power, and, upon sound principles of public policy, it ought not to be favored. 15 S.W.3d 843, 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting J.W. Kelly & Co. v. Conner, 123 S.W. 622, 635, (1909)). --------

The exercise of the jurisdiction contended for would greatly confuse and embarrass the enforcement of the police power, and, upon sound principles of public policy, it ought not to be favored. 15 S.W.3d 843, 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting J.W. Kelly & Co. v. Conner, 123 S.W. 622, 635, (1909). --------

The exercise of the jurisdiction contended for would greatly confuse and embarrass the enforcement of the police power, and, upon sound principles of public policy, it ought not to be favored. 15 S.W.3d 843, 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting J.W. Kelly & Co. v. Conner, 123 S.W. 622, 635, (1909)). --------

In the trial court's Order Denying Petition for Temporary Injunction, entered on April 2, 2003, the trial court stated that "this Court cannot grant an immediate remedy [to plaintiffs]. It does not have the authority to enjoin a district attorney general from prosecuting under the statute at bar." In support of this proposition, the court cites Tennessee Downs, Inc. v. Gibbons, 15 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1999), which states: A district attorney general is answerable to no superior and has virtually unbridled discretion in determining to prosecute and for what offense.

We find that the trial court properly dismissed the action against Harper. First, a court of equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin future criminal prosecutions. Tennessee Downs, Inc. v. Gibbons, 15 S.W.3d 843, 847 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1999) (perm. app. denied September 30, 1999).