We also find that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a triable issue of fact in this regard. The notice of nonrenewal, which stated that the subject property did "not meet underwriting criteria" and that "loss information [was] available upon written request" was, under the circumstances presented, sufficiently specific ( see, Insurance Law § 3426 [e] [2]; McCleavey v Physicians Reciprocal Insurers, 232 A.D.2d 381; Tennenbaum v Insurance Corp., 179 A.D.2d 589; Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Yung Shik Na, 123 A.D.2d 873; Butterman v. Physicians Reciprocal Insurers, 166 Misc.2d 21; cf., Messing v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 42 A.D.2d 1030). For these reasons, Royal's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it should have been granted.

Rescission is an available remedy even if the material misrepresentation was innocently or unintentionally made. Curanovic v. New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 307 A.D. 2d 435, 436-437; 762 N.Y. S. 2d 148, 150 (N. Y. A. D. 2003) ( citing Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Pascarella, 993 F. Supp. 134, 136 (1998) [citation omitted]; see Holloway v. Sacks Sacks, 275 A.D.2d 625, 713 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N. Y. A. D. 2000), lv. denied 95 N.Y. 2d 770, 745 N.E.2d 394 (N. Y. 2000); Meagher v. Executive Life Insurance Company of New York, 200 A.D.2d 720, 720, 607 N.Y.S.2d 361 (N.Y.A.D. 1994); Tennenbaum v. Insurance Corporation of Ireland, 179 A.D.2d 589, 592, 579 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y.A.D. 1992); see also Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company v. JMR Electronics, 848 F.2d 30, 32 (2nd Cir. 1988)). Under MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK ANNOTATED § 3204, statements made on an application for insurance by a prospective insured are deemed representations.

An insurance contract may be voided on innocently made factual misrepresentations provided knowledge of the facts misrepresented would have stopped the insurer from entering into the insurance contract. N.Y. Ins. L. § 3105(b) (McKinney 2000); Tennenbaum v. Ins. Co., 579 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1st Dep't 1992). When the insurer's questions calls for the applicant's opinion, the applicant's response is a misrepresentation only if "the applicant has not truthfully portrayed his or her mental state."

In those circumstances, the applicant's response cannot be said to be a misrepresentation unless the applicant has not truthfully portrayed his or her mental state. E.g., Tennenbaum v. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 179 A.D.2d 589, 592, 579 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352 (1st Dept. 1992); see Jackson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 113 F.3d 367, 370 (2d Cir. 1997); N YINS.L. § 3105 (McKinney 1985).E.g., Tennenbaum, 179 A.D.2d at 592, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 352.

Nor is there ambiguity in the phrase "eviction proceedings." Even if plaintiff thought his eviction proceeding did not qualify as an eviction proceeding for purposes of the question asked on the insurance application, a misrepresentation need not be fraudulent to be material (see Tennenbaum v Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 179 AD2d 589, 592 [1st Dept 1992]). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

material is generally a question of fact for the jury ( see Schirmer v. Penkert, 41 A.D.3d 688, 690, 840 N.Y.S.2d 796;Process Plants Corp. v. Beneficial Natl. Life Ins. Co., 53 A.D.2d 214, 216, 385 N.Y.S.2d 308,affd.42 N.Y.2d 928, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 366 N.E.2d 1361). “To establish materiality as a matter of law, the insurer must present documentation concerning its underwriting practices, such as underwriting manuals, bulletins, or rules pertaining to similar risks, which show that it would not have issued the same policy if the correct information had been disclosed in the application” ( Parmar v. Hermitage Ins. Co., 21 A.D.3d at 540, 800 N.Y.S.2d 726;seeInsurance Law § 3105[c]; Curanovic v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 307 A.D.2d 435, 437, 762 N.Y.S.2d 148). “[E]ven innocent misrepresentations, if material, are sufficient to allow an insurer to defeat recovery under the insurance contract” ( Meagher v. Executive Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 200 A.D.2d 720, 720, 607 N.Y.S.2d 361;see Tennenbaum v. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 179 A.D.2d 589, 592, 579 N.Y.S.2d 351;Abulaynain v. New York Merchant Bakers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 128 A.D.2d 575, 576, 513 N.Y.S.2d 5;Kulikowski v. Roslyn Sav. Bank, 121 A.D.2d 603, 503 N.Y.S.2d 863;Barrett v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 49 A.D.2d 856, 373 N.Y.S.2d 1000,affd.44 N.Y.2d 872, 407 N.Y.S.2d 478, 378 N.E.2d 1047,cert. denied 440 U.S. 912, 99 S.Ct. 1226, 59 L.Ed.2d 461). “[M]aterial misrepresentations ... if proven, would void the ... insurance policy ab initio ” ( Taradena v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 239 A.D.2d 876, 877, 659 N.Y.S.2d 646;see Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767). Here, the defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on its counterclaim for rescission ( see Meah v. A. Aleem Constr., Inc., 105 A.D.3d 1017, 1020, 963 N.Y.S.2d 714;Schirmer v. Penkert, 41 A.D.3d 688, 690–691, 840 N.Y.S.2d 796;Roudneva v. Bankers Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 35 A.D.3d 580, 581, 827 N.Y.S.2d 213).

Plaintiff first argues that New York Central was required to show that any misrepresentation was intentional and material in order to void the policy. An insurer may avoid an insurance contract if the insured made a false statement of fact as an inducement to making the contract and the misrepresentation was material (see Insurance Law § 3105 [a], [b]). "Rescission is available even if the material misrepresentation was innocently or unintentionally made" (Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pascarella, 993 F. Supp. 134, 136 [citation omitted]; see Hollowayv. Sacks Sacks, 275 A.D.2d 625, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 770; Meagher v. Executive Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 200 A.D.2d 720, 720; Tennenbaum v. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 179 A.D.2d 589, 592; see also Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. JMR Elecs., 848 F.2d 30, 32). Despite plaintiff's claims that the misrepresentations were innocent, he signed the application indicating that all information was correct. The signer of a contract is conclusively bound by it regardless of whether he or she actually read it (see Maines Paper Food Serv. v. Adel, 256 A.D.2d 760, 761).

gree. Defendant established that, contrary to the facts stated in the application for insurance, there were major deficiencies in the premises that did not meet defendant's underwriting guidelines and that constituted a material change in the nature and extent of the risk of loss beyond that contemplated by the parties. No evidence was submitted by plaintiffs to demonstrate that the loss control inspection report was inaccurate or that the new conditions did not materially change the nature and extent of the risk of loss. Rather, plaintiffs argued that there were no material changes in the premises between the time the policy of insurance was issued and the notice of cancellation. That argument, however, does not rebut defendant's showing that the conditions that existed at the time of the loss control inspection differed from those stated in the application for insurance and substantially increased defendant's risk of loss. Defendant was, therefore, entitled to summary judgment (see, Tennenbaum v Insurance Corp., 179 A.D.2d 589, 591-592). We further conclude that, although the reason set forth in defendant's notice of cancellation did not mirror Insurance Law § 3426 (c) (1) (E), it satisfied the requirements of the statute and provided plaintiffs with adequate notice of the reason for the cancellation.

Alaz Sportswear v Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 195 AD2d 357 [1st Dept 1993] [finding conclusory affidavit insufficient for summary judgment and stating that movant must also proffer proof of underwriting practices]). An innocent misrepresentation can be material if "it defeats or seriously interferes with the exercise of such a right [i.e., to accept or reject the application]" (In Re Liquidation of Union Indem. Inc. Co. of New York, 89 NY2d 94,107 [1996]; Greer v Union Mut. Life Ins., Co., 273 NY 261, 271 [1937]; Tennenbaum v Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 179 AD2d 589, 592 [1st Dept 1992]). III. GA Has Made a PrimaFacieShowing of Entitlement to Summary Judgment

same policy if the correct information had been disclosed in the application" ( Roudneva v Bankers Life Ins. Co. of New York, 35 AD3d 580, 581 [2d Dept 2006] [finding materiality through affidavit of chief underwriter and relevant portion of underwriting manual]; see also Chester v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 290 AD2d 317, 317 [1 st Dept 2002] [finding misrepresentations on application to be material through affidavit of underwriter and excerpts from underwriting guidelines]; Alaz Sportswear v Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 195 AD2d 357 [1st Dept 1993] [finding conclusory affidavit insufficient for summary judgment and stating that movant must also proffer proof of underwriting practices]). An innocent misrepresentation can be material if "it defeats or seriously interferes with the exercise of such a right [i.e., to accept or reject the application]" ( In Re Liquidation of Union Indem. Inc. Co. of New York, 89 NY2d 94, 107; Greer v Union Mut. Life Ins., Co., 273 NY 261, 271 [1937]; Tennenbaum v Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 179 AD2d 589, 592 [1st Dept 1992]). III. GA Has Made a Prima Facie Showing of Entitlement to SummaryJudgment