Tenet Healthcare Corporation v. Gilbert

10 Citing cases

  1. Cantrell v. AU Med. Ctr.

    358 Ga. App. 41 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)

    The mere mention of the relevant statutes, without any description of the alleged deficiency, is not sufficient to identify an inadequacy in an expert affidavit "with specificity." See Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Gilbert , 277 Ga. App. 895, 901 (3), 627 S.E.2d 821 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Giles v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. , 330 Ga. App. 314, 319 (2), n.2, 765 S.E.2d 413 (2014) (failure to allege in motion to dismiss that expert was incompetent to testify because he had failed to set forth any expertise in the field of nursing waived issue below and precluded raising argument on appeal). And the fact that AU Medical argued during the motion to dismiss hearing that the expert affidavit was inadequate because the affidavit did not properly set out the nurse's qualifications or experience during the relevant time period did not obviate the requirement that they assert such argument in their motion to dismiss.

  2. Giles v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.

    765 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)

    ne place in opinion, other portion misstates the rule); Milton v. Goins, 309 Ga.App. at 866–867(2), 711 S.E.2d 415 (2011); Moreno v. Naylor, 305 Ga.App. 504, 505(1), 699 S.E.2d 838 (2010), overruled in part on other grounds, Ragan v. Mallow, 319 Ga.App. 443, 447(2), 744 S.E.2d 337 (2012); Scanlan v. Tate Supply Co., 303 Ga.App. 9, 11(b), 692 S.E.2d 684 (2010); Akuoko v. Martin, 298 Ga.App. 364(1), 680 S.E.2d 471 (2009); Atcheson v. Cochran, 297 Ga.App. 568, 569, 677 S.E.2d 749 (2009); Abimbola v. Pate, 291 Ga.App. 769, 771(2), 662 S.E.2d 840 (2008); Montague v. Godfrey, 289 Ga.App. 552, 554(1), 657 S.E.2d 630 (2008) (physical precedent only); Green v. Cimafranca, 288 Ga.App. 16, 17(1), 653 S.E.2d 782 (2007); B & B Quick Lube, Inc. v. G & K Svcs. Co., 283 Ga.App. 299, 301, 641 S.E.2d 198 (2007); Duffy v. Lyles, 281 Ga.App. 377, 636 S.E.2d 91 (2006); Patterson v. Lopez, 279 Ga.App. 840, 842(2), 632 S.E.2d 736 (2006); In the Interest of A.H., 279 Ga.App. 77, 81(2), 630 S.E.2d 587 (2006); Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Gilbert, 277 Ga.App. 895, 903(5), 627 S.E.2d 821 (2006); Lee v. Kim, 275 Ga.App. 891, 892, 622 S.E.2d 99 (2005); Wells v. The Drain Doctor, Inc., 274 Ga.App. 127, 128, 616 S.E.2d 880 (2005); Neely v. Jones, 271 Ga.App. 487, 488(1), 610 S.E.2d 133 (2005) Feinour v. Ricker Co., 269 Ga.App. 508, 510, 604 S.E.2d 588 (2004); Poteate v. Rally Mfg., 260 Ga.App. 34, 36(4), 579 S.E.2d 44 (2003); Carmody v. Hill, 248 Ga.App. 437, 438, 546 S.E.2d 545 (2001); Busby v. Webb, 247 Ga.App. 781, 782, 545 S.E.2d 132 (2001); Heard v. Hart, 241 Ga.App. 441, 443, 526 S.E.2d 908 (1999); Pringle v. Jaganauth, 240 Ga.App. 65, 66(2), 522 S.E.2d 560 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds, Farrie v. McCall, 256 Ga.App. 446, 568 S.E.2d 603 (2002); Bailey v. Lawrence, 235 Ga.App. 73, 77–78(2), 508 S.E.2d 450 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds, Ragan, supra; Wade v. Whalen, 232 Ga.App. 765(1), 504 S.E.2d 456 (1998); Wilson v. Ortiz, 232 Ga.App. 191, 192(1)(a), 501 S.E.2d 247 (1998); Waits v. Gil, 232 Ga.App. 186, 187, 501 S.E.2d 30

  3. Giles v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.

    765 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)

    opinion, other portion misstates the rule); Milton v. Goins, 309 Ga.App. at 866 –867(2), 711 S.E.2d 415 (2011) ; Moreno v. Naylor, 305 Ga.App. 504, 505(1), 699 S.E.2d 838 (2010), overruled in part on other grounds, Ragan v. Mallow, 319 Ga.App. 443, 447(2), 744 S.E.2d 337 (2012) ; Scanlan v. Tate Supply Co., 303 Ga.App. 9, 11(b), 692 S.E.2d 684 (2010) ; Akuoko v. Martin, 298 Ga.App. 364(1), 680 S.E.2d 471 (2009) ; Atcheson v. Cochran, 297 Ga.App. 568, 569, 677 S.E.2d 749 (2009) ; Abimbola v. Pate, 291 Ga.App. 769, 771(2), 662 S.E.2d 840 (2008) ; Montague v. Godfrey, 289 Ga.App. 552, 554(1), 657 S.E.2d 630 (2008) (physical precedent only); Green v. Cimafranca, 288 Ga.App. 16, 17(1), 653 S.E.2d 782 (2007) ; B & B Quick Lube, Inc. v. G & K Svcs. Co., 283 Ga.App. 299, 301, 641 S.E.2d 198 (2007) ; Duffy v. Lyles, 281 Ga.App. 377, 636 S.E.2d 91 (2006) ; Patterson v. Lopez, 279 Ga.App. 840, 842(2), 632 S.E.2d 736 (2006) ; In the Interest of A.H., 279 Ga.App. 77, 81(2), 630 S.E.2d 587 (2006) ; Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Gilbert, 277 Ga.App. 895, 903(5), 627 S.E.2d 821 (2006) ; Lee v. Kim, 275 Ga.App. 891, 892, 622 S.E.2d 99 (2005) ; Wells v. The Drain Doctor, Inc., 274 Ga.App. 127, 128, 616 S.E.2d 880 (2005) ; Neely v. Jones, 271 Ga.App. 487, 488(1), 610 S.E.2d 133 (2005)Feinour v. Ricker Co., 269 Ga.App. 508, 510, 604 S.E.2d 588 (2004) ; Poteate v. Rally Mfg., 260 Ga.App. 34, 36(4), 579 S.E.2d 44 (2003) ; Carmody v. Hill, 248 Ga.App. 437, 438, 546 S.E.2d 545 (2001) ; Busby v. Webb, 247 Ga.App. 781, 782, 545 S.E.2d 132 (2001) ; Heard v. Hart, 241 Ga.App. 441, 443, 526 S.E.2d 908 (1999) ; Pringle v. Jaganauth, 240 Ga.App. 65, 66(2), 522 S.E.2d 560 (1999), overruled in part on other grounds, Farrie v. McCall, 256 Ga.App. 446, 568 S.E.2d 603 (2002) ; Bailey v. Lawrence, 235 Ga.App. 73, 77–78(2), 508 S.E.2d 450 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds, Ragan, supra; Wade v. Whalen, 232 Ga.App. 765(1), 504 S.E.2d 456 (1998) ; Wilson v. Ortiz, 232 Ga.App. 191, 192(1)(a), 501 S.E.2d 247 (1998) ; Waits v. Gil, 232 Ga.App. 186, 187, 501

  4. Richardson v. Gilbert

    A12A0816 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2012)

    On January 12, 2009, the Fulton County court granted the remaining defendants' motion to transfer venue to Spalding County pursuant to OCGA § 9-10-31 (d). This court previously addressed the sufficiency of Gilbert's expert affidavits and the legal standard used to determine her diligence in serving the defendants in Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Gilbert, 277 Ga. App. 895 (627 SE2d 821) (2006). "If all defendants who reside in the county in which an action is pending are discharged from liability before or upon the return of a verdict by the jury or the court hearing the case without a jury, a nonresident defendant may require that the case be transferred to a county and court in which venue would otherwise be proper.

  5. Cogland v. Hospital Authority

    290 Ga. App. 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 10 times

    1 (c) (2) (A) (requiring active practice in specialty for "at least three of the last five years"). It follows that the trial court did not err when it found that the 2004 affidavit was insufficient under OCGA §§ 24-9-67.1 and 9-11-9.1, and thus when it granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the Coglands' complaint. See Spacht v. Troyer, 288 Ga. App. at 904 (3) (b) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss where affidavit failed to mention whether expert was employed at time claim arose and "in the five years prior to that"); compare Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Gilbert, 277 Ga. App. 895, 900 (2) ( 627 SE2d 821) (2006) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss when, assuming that OCGA § 24-9-67.1 (c) applied, plaintiff's medical expert was licensed to practice at the time the alleged negligence occurred and "met the other portions of the 2005 enactment designed to upgrade the requirements for expert medical malpractice affidavits").

  6. Abramson v. Williams

    281 Ga. App. 617 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 10 times

    Id. at 186 (2). Accepting the allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint and affidavit as true, we review the trial court's application of OCGA § 24-9-67.1 to these facts de novo. Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Gilbert, 277 Ga. App. 895, 898 (2) ( 627 SE2d 821) (2006). OCGA § 24-9-67.

  7. Duffy v. Lyles

    281 Ga. App. 377 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 22 times
    In Duffy v. Lyles, 281 Ga. App. 377, 379 (636 SE2d 91) (2006), we reversed a trial court's finding of sufficient service where there was an unexplained four-month period of inactivity in plaintiff's efforts to perfect service, holding that we were "constrained to find that the trial court abused its discretion."

    (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Gilbert, 277 Ga. App. 895, 903 (5) ( 627 SE2d 821) (2006). Once a plaintiff receives notice of a problem with service of the complaint, some cases hold that the plaintiff must exercise not only reasonable diligence, but the "greatest possible diligence" in perfecting service.

  8. Johnson v. Marsh

    No. CV424-114 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 25, 2024)

    The Northen District of Georgia has made a similar observation, finding the definition of “diligence” under Georgia law to be “far from clear.” Collins, 2022 WL 18584560, at *4 (citing Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Gilbert, 627 S.E.2d 821, 829-30 (Ga.Ct.App. 2006) (reasonable diligence where defendants served within 7, 27, and 44 days of forwarding process papers to sheriff), overruled on other grounds by Giles, 765 S.E.2d at 419; Classic Commercial Servs., Inc. v Baldwin, 784 S.E.2d 44 (Ga.Ct.App. 2016) (remanding for examination of whether 11 months for service was reasonable); Luca v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 637 S.E.2d 86, 90 (Ga.Ct.App. 2006) (remanding because plaintiff exercised due diligence in attempting to serve the defendant twice in ten months); Milton v. Goins, 711 S.E.2d 415, 417 (Ga.Ct.App. 2011) (no diligence where affidavit “describes no more than a single attempt to effect service”), overruled on other grounds by Giles, 765 S.E.2d at 419; Walker v. Culpepper, 742 S.E.2d 144, 146 (Ga.Ct.App. 2013) (no diligence where no attempt to serve between May 2011 and February 2012), overruled on other grounds by Giles, 765 S

  9. Smoot-Lee v. Corizon Health, Inc.

    CASE NO. CV416-184 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 30, 2016)   Cited 1 times

    Many Georgia courts addressing this issue have varying understandings of what it means to be diligent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(c). Compare Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Gilbert, 277 Ga. App. 895, 904-05, 627 S.E.2d 821, 829-30 (2006) (reasonable diligence where defendants served within 7, 27, and 44 days of forwarding process papers to sheriff), overruled on other grounds by Giles, 330 Ga. App. 314; Milton v. Goins, 309 Ga. App. 865, 867, 711 S.E.2d 415, 417 (2011) (no diligence where affidavit "describes no more than a single attempt to effect service"), overruled on other grounds by Giles, 330 Ga. App. 314; Walker v. Culpepper, 321 Ga. App. 629, 630, 742 S.E.2d 144, 146 (2013) (no diligence where no attempt to serve between May 2011 and February 2012), overruled on other grounds by Giles, 330 Ga. App. 314; Classic Commercial Servs., Inc. v. Baldwin, 336 Ga. App. 183, 784 S.E.2d 44 (2016) (remanding for examination of whether 11 months for service was reasonable). This variety indicates that whether a plaintiff is diligent is a highly fact sensitive inquiry.

  10. Richardson v. Gilbert

    733 S.E.2d 783 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 1 times

    On January 12, 2009, the Fulton County court granted the remaining defendants' motion to transfer venue to Spalding County pursuant to OCGA § 9–10–31(d). This court previously addressed the sufficiency of Gilbert's expert affidavits and the legal standard used to determine her diligence in serving the defendants in Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Gilbert, 277 Ga.App. 895, 627 S.E.2d 821 (2006). “If all defendants who reside in the county in which an action is pending are discharged from liability before or upon the return of a verdict by the jury or the court hearing the case without a jury, a nonresident defendant may require that the case be transferred to a county and court in which venue would otherwise be proper.