Judge Whitbeck also noted that the prosecution added "modus operandi," "corpus delicti," and "corroboration" as new theories at the Court of Appeals. 236 Mich. App. 19-20, n 10. I first note that Engleman, in turn, cites Templin v Nottawa Twp, 362 Mich. 257; 106 N.W.2d 825 (1961), and Plec v Liquor Control Comm, 322 Mich. 691; 34 N.W.2d 524 (1948) . . . . Templin, however, does not deal with an evidentiary rule and stands only for the time-honored proposition that a reviewing court will not disturb the conclusions of a lower court that reached the right conclusion regardless of the reasons it cites for reaching that conclusion. Templin, supra at 261. The decision in Plec rests on the same basis . . . . At best, therefore, it seems to me that Engleman stands for the proposition that the fact that a trial court may have erred in assigning a proper purpose for accepting the other acts testimony is not fatal on appeal, if a proper purpose existed and was articulated at trial.

Our inquiry is not ended simply because the theories of admissibility advanced by the prosecutor or accepted by the trial court ultimately are found incorrect. While it is the prosecution's duty "to identify, with specificity, the purpose for which such evidence is admissible," Golochowicz, supra, p 314, for the benefit of the trial court, its failure to advance the correct theory at that time is not alone grounds for reversal; likewise, the trial court's own misidentification of the grounds for admission of the evidence in and of itself does not merit overturning its decision to allow it. See, e.g., Templin v Nottawa Twp, 362 Mich. 257; 106 N.W.2d 825 (1961); Plec v Liquor Control Comm, 322 Mich. 691; 34 N.W.2d 524 (1948). Evidence of motive "can . . . be relevant to prove the commission of the actus reus."

The prosecutor cites People v Engelman, 434 Mich. 204, 223, n 27; 453 N.W.2d 656 (1990), for the proposition that the failure to advance the correct theory for admission of other-acts evidence does not justify automatic reversal of a conviction. I first note that Engelman, in turn, cites Templin v Nottawa Twp, 362 Mich. 257; 106 N.W.2d 825 (1961), and Plec v Liquor Control Comm, 322 Mich. 691; 34 N.W.2d 524 (1948), for its observation that the prosecutor's "failure to advance the correct theory at that time [the time of the trial] is not alone grounds for reversal; likewise, the trial court's own misidentification of the grounds for admission of the evidence in and of itself does not merit overturning its decision to allow it." Templin, however, does not deal with an evidentiary rule and stands only for the time-honored proposition that a reviewing court will not disturb the conclusions of a lower court that reached the right conclusion regardless of the reasons it cites for reaching that conclusion.

The fact that the trial court reached the right result for the wrong reason is not grounds to reverse on appeal. Templin v Nottawa Twp, 362 Mich. 257, 261; 106 N.W.2d 825 (1961). Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the tribe to intervene and in transferring jurisdiction to the tribal court.

Likewise, in Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 ( 38 S Ct 495, 62 L ed 1154), the United States Supreme Court upheld this Court's decision holding that, although the plaintiff's property was probably assessed higher than other properties within the same county, there was nothing to show an intent to discriminate. See, also, Templin v. Township of Nottawa, 362 Mich. 257, 260. To overturn a determination of the tax commission, we must find that it applied illegal principles or fraud. Copper Range Co. v. Adams Township, 208 Mich. 209, 217; Kingsford Chemical Company v. City of Kingsford, 347 Mich. 91, 111; Templin v. Township of Nottawa, supra.

We do not reverse when the trial court reaches a correct result although for a wrong reason. See Templin v. Township of Nottawa, 362 Mich. 257, and cases therein cited. The judgment of the court below affirming the decision of the appeal board and the decision of the referee is affirmed.

Court Rule No 67, § 6 (1945),fn_ was designed to accommodate not only the bar, but also the requirements of this Court. See Templin v. Township of Nottawa, 362 Mich. 257, and other cases cited therein. As added and amended.