Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-0929 SECTION "N"
November 17, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are the following issues: (1) the appropriateness of declaratory and/or injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); (2) the appropriateness of liquidated damages pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 260; (3) the applicable statute of limitations under 29 U.S.C. § 255(a); and (4) the merits of defendant's Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which was the only Rule 50 motion submitted at the close of trial.
A. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief :
In its answers to the interrogatories contained in the Jury Verdict Form, dated February 21, 2003, the jury found that pregnancy was a motivating factor that prompted defendant to change plaintiffs job assignment and that this change in job assignment was an adverse employment action. Because the jury also found that defendant would have changed plaintiffs job assignment for other reasons even in absence of her pregnancy, the jury was not permitted to award plaintiff damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii). Under such circumstances, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), the Court may grant the plaintiff "declaratory relief, injunctive relief . . ., and attorney's fees and costs." The issue of attorneys' fees and costs already has been determined. See Rec. Docs. 94 and 95. Considering that plaintiff no longer works for defendant and that no evidence has been presented regarding any pervasive and/or ongoing pregnancy discrimination in defendant's workplace, the Court does not find injunctive relief to be appropriate. However, the Court agrees with plaintiff that she is entitled to a judgment declaring that defendant violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, by considering pregnancy as a motivating factor in taking an adverse employment action against plaintiff.
B. Liquidated Damages and Statute of Limitations :
In addition to the questions with which it was charged as finder of fact, the jury was asked to answer two interrogatories in an advisory capacity: 1) whether defendant acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds for believing that its acts or omissions with regard to plaintiff's overtime pay were not in violation of the FLSA; and 2) whether in failing to pay plaintiff overtime, defendant knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited under the FLSA. The advisory jury answered yes to both of these questions. Having considered the evidence presented at trial, as well as the advisory jury's answers, the Court finds that the defendant acted in good faith only with respect to its obligations during the period that plaintiff worked as an accounting assistant, not during the time that she worked as a receptionist. With respect to the time plaintiff worked as a receptionist, defendant had no reasonable grounds for believing that its actions did not violate the FLSA. Further, with respect to the time periods during which plaintiff worked as a receptionist, the Court finds that the defendant showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited under the FLSA.
Accordingly, the Court is unpersuaded that defendant should be excused from paying liquidated damages, as provided in 29 U.S.C. § 216. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ("Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee . . . affected in the amount of. . . . their unpaid overtime compensation . . . and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages."); 29 U.S.C. § 260 ("In any action . . . to recover unpaid . . . overtime compensation . . ., if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the [FLSA], the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 2.6. . . ."). Further, the Court finds that the appropriate statute of limitations under 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) is three years. Thus, plaintiff is entitled to recover her unpaid compensation, as determined by the jury, for the entire time that she worked as a receptionist ($5,692.40), plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, for a total of $11,384.80.
C. Defendant's Motion under Rule 50 :
The Court finds that there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis at trial for a reasonable jury to find in plaintiffs favor on each of her FLSA claims. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs Fair Labor Standards Act Claim is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter judgment:
(1) declaring that defendant, Hard Rock Construction Company, violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, by considering pregnancy as a motivating factor in changing the job assignment of plaintiff, Tiffany Templet, from Accounting and Administrative Assistant to Receptionist; and
(2) in favor of plaintiff, Tiffany Templet, and against defendant, Hard Rock Construction Company, in the amount of $11, 384.80, plus attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $17,441.85, with legal interest thereon from date of judgment.