Although Kinman contends that his motion to suppress certain evidence of his intoxication should have been granted, we find otherwise and affirm. In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court sits as the trier of fact and the court's findings are analogous to a jury verdict and will not be disturbed when there is any evidence to support them. Temples v. State, 228 Ga. App. 228, 229 ( 491 S.E.2d 444) (1997). When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the evidence must be construed most favorably toward the court's findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous.Ledford v. State, 220 Ga. App. 272, 273 ( 469 S.E.2d 401) (1996).

However, the language was not intended to prevent an officer from making an arrest on additional offenses based upon separate probable cause ascertained through a reasonable inquiry and investigation following the initial stop. Obviously, an officer need not ignore the smell of alcohol emanating from the driver of a vehicle simply because the initial stop of the vehicle was for a seat belt violation." Temples v. State, 228 Ga. App. 228, 230 ( 491 S.E.2d 444). In the case sub judice, Officer Penson testified that, after asking defendant for his driver's license and proof of insurance, he detected an odor of alcohol about defendant's "person and inside of the car."

1 (f) upon which she relies states that "[n]oncompliance with the restraint requirements of this Code section shall not constitute probable cause for violation of any other Code section." In Temples v. State, 228 Ga. App. 228, 230 ( 491 SE2d 444) (1997), the Court of Appeals was faced with a similar assertion and determined the statutory language pertaining to probable cause "was added for the purpose of prohibiting a search of a person or a vehicle based solely on the failure of an occupant of the front seat to wear a seat belt" and "does not preclude an officer from conducting a reasonable inquiry and investigation to insure both [the officer's] safety and that of others." (Emphasis supplied.)

Ciak v. State, 278 Ga. 27, 30 (3) ( 597 SE2d 392) (2004).Temples v. State, 228 Ga. App. 228, 230 ( 491 SE2d 444) (1997).Buffington v. State, 228 Ga. App. 810, 811 ( 492 SE2d 762) (1997).

Accordingly, the trial court was authorized to conclude that the officer had probable cause to arrest Sultan for driving under the influence of alcohol. See id. at 652 (1) ("observations about the suspect's physical appearance, demeanor or behavior, as opposed to the mere presence of alcohol, can support a finding of impairment") (citations omitted); Frederick v. State, 270 Ga. App. 397, 398 ( 606 SE2d 615) (2004) (officer's testimony that defendant smelled of alcohol, admitted that he had been drinking, and had glossy eyes was sufficient to create probable cause for the arrest); Temples v. State, 228 Ga. App. 228, 231 ( 491 SE2d 444) (1997) (odor of alcohol on breath, positive reading on alco-sensor, and bloodshot, watery eyes were sufficient grounds for probable cause); Cann-Hanson v. State, 223 Ga. App. 690, 691 (1) ( 478 SE2d 460) (1996) ("[e]ven in the absence of the field sobriety tests, the officer's observation that [defendant] had bloodshot, watery eyes and exuded an odor of alcohol was sufficient to show probable cause to arrest him for driving under the influence") (citations omitted). 3. Sultan further contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the officer's use of a passive alcohol sensor flashlight violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Frederick v. State, 270 Ga. App. 397, 398 ( 606 SE2d 615) (2004).Temples v. State, 228 Ga. App. 228, 231 ( 491 SE2d 444) (1997).Cann-Hanson v. State, 223 Ga. App. 690, 691 (1) ( 478 SE2d 460) (1996).

(Citations omitted.) Temples v. State, 228 Ga. App. 228, 231 ( 491 SE2d 444) (1997). While the deputy attempted to find out who owned the car, he asked Fernandez whether he had been drinking, whether there were any weapons or drugs in the car, and whether he would consent to a search of his car for drugs.

As there was sufficient evidence of probable cause to arrest, the trial court did not err by denying this ground of Moody's motion to suppress. See Temples v. State, 228 Ga. App. 228, 231 ( 491 SE2d 444) (1997). (b) We also find no merit in Moody's assertion that the officer should have given him Miranda warnings before administering the field sobriety tests.

However, such evidence does not require a finding of impairment. See State v. Batty, 259 Ga. App. 431, 432 ( 577 SE2d 98) (2003); Gray, supra; Burke, supra at 394; Temples v. State, 228 Ga. App. 228, 231 ( 491 SE2d 444) (1997). See Clay v. State, 193 Ga. App. 377, 379 (2) ( 387 SE2d 644) (1989) (insufficient evidence to support DUI conviction where the defendant's eyes "normally appeared red and bloodshot"); Gray, supra (upholding trial court's determination that the defendant's unsteadiness, bloodshot eyes, and dazed appearance were not credible evidence of impairment because they may have been caused by the accident and the release of the airbags).

See Maxwell v. State, 249 Ga. App. 747, 748 ( 549 SE2d 534) (2001). See Cann-Hanson v. State, 223 Ga. App. 690, 691 (1) ( 478 SE2d 460) (1996); Temples v. State, 228 Ga. App. 228, 231 ( 491 SE2d 444) (1997). Lenhardt further maintains that the officer improperly relied upon the alco-sensor numerical result to establish probable cause. It is true that, as a general rule, the numerical results of an alco-sensor test are not admissible in evidence.