In the absence of prejudice or surprise, any delay was insufficient to defeat the amendment ( see id.). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs leave to amend the bill of particulars ( see Telsey v County of Nassau, 237 AD2d 428, 429; Becker v City of New York, 106 AD2d 595, 597; cf. Cherebin v Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 43 AD3d at 365). Contrary to the appellant's contention, it failed to satisfy its prima facie burden of establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law ( see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).

However, we reject defendants' suggestion that only the mother may assert negligence in her prenatal care, even where the infant alleges that she was herself harmed as a result. A claim may properly be made on behalf of an infant for injuries allegedly sustained in utero or due to premature birth attributed to defendants' malpractice in their prenatal care of the infant plaintiff's mother (see e.g. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349; Royal v. Booth Mem. Med. Ctr., 270 A.D.2d 243;Telsey v. County of Nassau, 237 A.D.2d 428). Although the complaint and bill of particulars may have been somewhat inartfully drawn so as to merge the allegations in support of the plaintiff's distinct causes of action, dismissal of Christina's causes of action is not warranted.