Opinion
HFHCV166001224S
09-14-2016
Adam Teller, Administrator of the Estate of George R. Brennan v. Thomas M. Brennan
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON SUMMARY PROCESS COMPLAINT
Nicola E. Rubinow, J.
This memorandum of decision addresses the issues raised through the summary process action brought by Adam Teller, the Administrator d.b.n.c.t.a. of the Estate of George R. Brennan, seeking to secure possession of the residence and premises located at 140 Forest Street, East Hartford, CT (the premises). In his two-count complaint, Teller alleges: that George R. Brennan (the decedent) was the record owner and in possession of the premises at the time of his death on February 18, 2014; that the decedent's son Thomas M. Brennan (T. Brennan) entered into occupancy and possession of the premises on or before January 2015 and still resides there; and that Teller is entitled to a judgment of possession as the administrator of the decedent's estate because, alternatively, T. Brennan never had a right or privilege to possess or occupy the premises, or any right or privilege T. Brennan had to occupy the premises has terminated. This memorandum of decision also addresses the issues raised through T. Brennan's special defenses asserting that he is lawfully eligible to reside at the premises due to " inheritance, " " ownership, " " an oral contract" with the decedent, " a sover[eig]n right, " and/or defects in the process of probating his father's estate or in the summary process proceedings. (Special Defenses, 3/30/16.)
Teller is represented by counsel; T. Brennan appeared on his own behalf. Over the course of two days, testimonial and voluminous documentary evidence, including retails receipts and probate court documents, was received in support and in opposition to the complaint, and in support of the Brennan's special defenses; all evidence was tested by vigorous cross examination. After hearing, the court took judicial notice of the summary process file and of the civil file relating to the status of the property known as Town of East Hartford v. George Brennan and Deloris Brennan, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. HHD-CV14-050196. The court has also taken judicial notice of certain documents produced by the East Hartford Probate Court.
The plaintiff Administrator bears the burden of proving the operative allegations of the complaint by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Brennan bears like burden of proof insofar as his special defenses are concerned.
The standard of proof, a fair preponderance of the evidence, is " properly defined as the better evidence, the evidence having the greater weight, the more convincing force in your mind." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 394, 440 A.2d 952 (1981). " The general burden of proof in civil actions is on the plaintiff, who must prove all the essential allegations of the complaint." Gulycz v. Stop & Shop Cos., 29 Conn.App. 519, 523, 615 A.2d 1087, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 923, 618 A.2d 527 (1992), citing Lukas v. New Haven, 184 Conn. 205, 211, 439 A.2d 949 (1981).
See Civil Jury Instructions Civil Jury Instructions, 2.6-2 Burden of Proof--Affirmative Defenses.
For the following reasons, the court finds the second count in favor of the plaintiff and orders judgment of immediate possession for Teller, as Administrator of the Estate of George R. Brennan.
I
FACTUAL FINDINGS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The court has reviewed the pleadings and considered the evidence in its entirety using the applicable principles of law. The facts set forth throughout this decision have been proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
" The [fact-finding] function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cavolick v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, 870 A.2d 1147, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 906, 876 A.2d 1198 (2005). " It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to the given specific testimony . . . It is the quintessential function of the factfinder to reject or accept certain evidence . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). " Although each witness must stand or fall upon his own testimony, the trier is nevertheless free to disbelieve even unimpeached and uncontradicted testimony." Shipman v. Carr, 38 Conn.Supp. 393, 395, 449 A.2d 187 (1982); see also Sullivan v. Lazzari, 135 Conn.App. 831, 846, 43 A.3d 750, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 925, 47 A.3d 884 (2012). The trial court's function as the factfinder " is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Christine F., 6 Conn.App. 360, 366, 505 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808, 809, 508 A.2d 769, 770 (1986).
T. Brennan, the decedent's son, moved into and began occupying the premises in approximately 2006. When T. Brennan took possession of the premises, both his father George R. Brennan and his mother Deloris Brennan were alive and also in residence at 140 Forest Street, East Hartford, CT. However, The court received no credible evidence of the nature or extent of caretaking services T. Brennan may have provided to his mother and/or his father while they lived at the premises with him. From 2005 through April 24, 2016, T. Brennan made approximately 108 visits to various shops purchasing a total of approximately $5, 427.80 worth of home repair, maintenance or improvement supplies. (Ex. B; Tes. T. Brennan.) The court received no credible evidence sufficient to establish whether the decedent requested or directed T. Brennan to engage in these shopping trips or to make any of the purchases; whether the purchases were made for the benefit of the decedent; or whether T. Brennan engaged in this conduct as performance or partial performance of any conditions for his continued residence at, occupancy and possession of the during the decedent's lifetime or after the death of George R. Brennan.
The evidence presented by T. Brennan reflects, among other things, an estimate from East Hartford Electric dated May 11, 2011 with proposed charge of $1, 100. (Ex. B.) As this estimate does not indicate whether the work described was performed, who paid for it or when it was paid for, the court finds insufficient basis for attributing any weight to the exhibit. The evidence also reflects T. Brennan's submission of an invoice for $650 from Buckland Hardwood Flooring dated October 15, 2011, ostensibly for sanding and refinishing of living room, hall & one flight of stairs at the premises. (Ex. B.) As this invoice does not indicate whether it was paid, when or by whom, the court finds insufficient basis for attributing any weight to the exhibit. (Ex. B.) In addition, T. Brennan's evidence included a statement from A& K Painting, LLC for $600 worth of work, again ostensibly related to the premises. (Ex. B.) Although this statement indicates it was paid by T. Brennan, in the absence of credible indication of the date when the services were performed or paid for, the court finds insufficient basis for attributing any weight to this exhibit. (Ex. B.)
In the past, insurance claims were filed by or on behalf of the decedent due to claimed damages to the premises. As the result of a loss affecting " the dwelling" on February 3, 2011, The Standard Fire Insurance Company issued a check in the amount of $1, 409.46 to George Brennan. (Ex. B.) Thereafter, as the result of losses that occurred on June 26, 2011, The Standard Fire Insurance Company issued check in the amount of $2, 485.30 to George Brennan. (Ex. B.) The court received no credible evidence sufficient to establish whether the decedent requested or directed T. Brennan to utilize these insurance proceeds in any way, or whether T. Brennan used the insurance proceeds as performance or partial performance of any conditions for his continued residence at, occupancy and possession of the premises during the decedent's lifetime or after the death of George R. Brennan.
This insurance payments, totaling $3, 984.76, were intended to cover: tear out, removal and disposal of tree structures; carpentry, electrical, pressure-washing and painting services; and purchase of a wood fence rail, a window screen, wood shingles, cedar siding, and cedar fascia. (Ex. B.) The evidence reflects a paid " Contractor's Invoice" for $1, 250 dated June 20, 2011 and stating: " To: Mr. George Brennan. Customer Supplied Materials for vendor to paint gazebo, wheelchair ramps, garage face, deck posts and outside railing." (Ex. B.) The evidence also reflects a paid " Contractor's Invoice" for $1, 500, dated July 16, 2011 and stating: " To: Mr. George Brennan. Removed Black Steel Gas Pipe, replaced with track pipe. Removed and capped downstairs gas line. Removed brass sprinkler line, replaced with Aquapex. Installed Garaged hose bib . . . through garage. Installed shower diverter and rough plumbing for shower and sink (downstairs) and upstairs sink with (abs) piping. Moved copper piping into ceiling joist (downstairs). Installed maintenance valves per fixture (downstairs). Installed 8' steel baseboard heater (downstairs). Changed Packing in 2nd floor shower." (Ex. B.) The evidence is insufficient to establish whether the insurance proceeds were used as intended, or even whether the proceeds were used for the benefit of the decedent, at his direction or request, or in performance or partial performance of any conditions under which T. Brennan remained in residence at, in occupancy and possession of the premises. However, these contractor's invoices from 2011 totaled $2, 750, leaving $1, 144.76 available from insurance proceeds for and restoration of the repair premises. (Ex. B.)
On July 3, 2012, a " Contractor's Invoice" was delivered to George Brennan for removal of two trees and one tree stump. (Ex. B.) The court received no credible evidence sufficient to establish whether the decedent requested or directed performance of this work, or whether it was conducted for the benefit of the decedent.
It is uncontested that Hurricane Sandy affected the state of Connecticut from October 27, 2012 to November 8, 2012, and that a Major Disaster for Hartford County, in which the premises are located, was declared in late October 2012 related to that storm. T. Brennan claims that certain structures at the premises, such as fencing, sustained damages as the result of Hurricane Sandy; however, the court received no credible evidence related to the specific nature or extent of any such damage related to the fall 2012 hurricane. Despite his exhaustive presentation of documents and testimony, the court received no credible evidence sufficient to establish the nature or extent of any purchases or work performed, paid for, or coordinated by T. Brennan to repair any damage to the premises due to Hurricane Sandy.
See http://www.fema.gov/disaster/3353; http://www.fema.gov/disaster/4087 .
In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledges the evidence establishing that T. Brennan made one visit to a shop on December 15, 2012, following the impact of Hurricane Sandy, on which visit he purchased approximately $590 of home repair items. (Ex. B.) The evidence was insufficient to establish that these items were purchased or used for storm repair purposes, at the direction or request of the decedent, for the benefit of the decedent, or in performance or partial performance of any conditions under which T. Brennan remained in residence at, in occupancy and possession of the premises.
At some time in early 2013, after any immediate impact of Hurricane Sandy, it came to the attention of the Town of East Hartford (the town) that portions of the soil upon the premises are subject to provisions of the General Statutes affecting inland wetland upland review areas; a permit must be procured before said soil is disturbed. On May 8, 2013, having learned that construction was being conducted upon the premises and that such soil was being disturbed without a permit, East Hartford delivered a Cease and Desist Order to George R. Brennan and Deloris Brennan. After the death of Deloris Brennan on May 8, 2013, George R. Brennan owned the premises in fee simple. (Tes. Teller, T. Brennan.) The evidence is insufficient to establish whether the construction work alleged by the town was directed by or performed at the behest of George R. Brennan, by T. Brennan, or by any particular person. However, that construction work continued. On August 21, 2013, in view of the named defendants' failure to comply with the Cease and Desist Order, East Hartford delivered a Notice of Violation to George R. Brennan and Deloris Brennan. See Town of East Hartford v. George Brennan, supra, Docket No. HHD-CV14-050196.
George R. Brennan died six months later, on February 18, 2014. T. Brennan then resided at, occupied and was in possession of the premises; he still remains in occupancy, in full possession of and in full control of the residential structure and the real property located at 140 Forest Street, East Hartford, CT. (Tes. Teller, Brennan.)
In April 2014, after the death of George R. Brennan but while T. Brennan resided at, occupied and possessed the premises, the town filed Town of East Hartford v. George Brennan, supra, Docket No. HHD-CV14-050196 seeking temporary and permanent injunctions due to continued construction activities and disturbance of the protected soil at 140 Forest Street, East Hartford, CT without a permit. In this civil lawsuit, the town sought money damages, penalties and an order for remediation; the town also filed an Application for Temporary Injunction and Order to Show Cause. On May 5, 2014, apparently having learned of the death of George Brennan and before the show cause hearing was held, the town moved to substitute James Brennan, identified as the Executor of the Estate of George Brennan, as a party defendant in the civil action. The court (Robaina, J.) granted that motion on August 19, 2014, but court records reflect no further action in Town of East Hartford v. George Brennan, supra, Docket No. HHD-CV14-050196.
James M. Brennan, the decedent's son and T. Brennan's brother, was not formally appointed the Executor of his father's estate until May 15, 2014.
After hearing on February 3, 2016, in lieu of James M. Brennan, the East Hartford Probate Court appointed Atty. Adam Teller as the Administrator d.b.n.c.t.a., to serve as the successor representative of the Estate of George Brennan. The estate has minimal value; the premises are the estate's primary asset. Part of Teller's responsibility as the estate's fiduciary is to liquidate all assets, including the premises, to pay accumulated financial obligations including unpaid taxes. As a part of the liquidation process, Teller reasonably determined that Brennan, who resided at the premises, would have to cease possession and occupancy, either voluntarily or through summary process, so that 140 Forest Street, East Hartford, CT could be properly appraised and sold. (Tes Teller.)
Teller has not been named a party defendant in Town of East Hartford v. George Brennan, supra, Docket No. HHD-CV14-050196.
The court received no credible or reliable evidence concerning the specific value of the premises.
Soon after his appointment, Teller wrote to Brennan in an effort to secure the defendant's cooperation in the estate liquidation process; Brennan did not timely respond. Instead, Brennan has prohibited Teller, the estate's lawful fiduciary, from entering the premises; under these circumstances, Teller cannot even secure an adequate appraisal of the premises, a necessary feature of his obligation as the fiduciary of the estate. (Tes. Teller.)
When George R. Brennan died, T. Brennan was not occupying the premises under the terms of a written lease; T. Brennan has never occupied or possessed the premises pursuant to a written lease, and no extant written lease permits Brennan to reside there. Despite the defendant's protests to the contrary, the court received no credible evidence establishing the existence of any oral lease or oral agreement that permitted Brennan to reside at the premises before or after the death of George R. Brennan, whether gratis or conditioned upon performance of services. The decedent left no specific bequest with regard to the premises, or with regard to Brennan's right or privilege to occupy the premises under any circumstances. The court fully credits Teller's testimony establishing that after George Brennan's death, Brennan had no right or privilege to occupy the premises. (Tes. Teller.)
On March 1, 2016, Teller caused a state marshal to serve Brennan with a notice to quit. The notice to quit indicated that Brennan was to leave 140 Forest Street East Hartford on or before March 21, 2016 because he never had a right or privilege to occupy the premises and/or any right or privilege to occupy the premises has terminated. As Brennan did not quit, but remained in possession of the premises, on March 22, 2016 Teller had him served with the pending summary process complaint, raising two grounds in the alternative, General Statutes § 47a-23(a)(2) and (3). On March 30, 2016, Brennan filed an appearance on his own behalf, and filed several special defenses in the alternative.
No party contested the " presumption of truth afforded to the statements in the marshal's return. Knipple v. Viking Communications Ltd., 236 Conn. 602, 607 n.9, 674 A.2d 426 (1996)." Donnie Dickerson, Adminstrator v. Jayne F. Pincus, 154 Conn.App. 146, 153, 105 A.3d 338 (2014).
§ 47a-23(a) provides grounds for summary process and " [w]hen the owner or lessor, or the owner's or lessor's legal representative . . . desires to obtain possession or occupancy of any land or building . . . and (2) when such premises, or any part thereof, is occupied by one who never had a right or privilege to occupy such premises . . . [and/or] (3) when one originally had the right or privilege to occupy such premises but such right or privilege has terminated; . . ." (Emphasis added.)
In a civil case, where the complaint sets forth separate counts presenting " alternative theories of recovery, " the plaintiff may prevail if the burden of proof has been met on one count alone. See Milford Bank v. Phoenix Contracting Group, Inc., 143 Conn.App. 519, 523 n.2, 72 A.3d 55 (2013). See also Civil Jury Instructions 3.6-10 Specifications of Negligence--Complaint (explaining that the plaintiff in a civil matter may prevail if it has met " just one of the ways claimed" as the basis for its cause of action). Similarly, if a defendant has met his burden of proof one of several special defenses that sound in the alternative, he may be found to have overcome the plaintiff's proof. See, e.g., Civil Jury Instructions § 3.5-2.
On April 7, 2016, after the notice to quit and the summary process action has been served upon Brennan, the East Hartford Probate Court (Darby, J.) found and decreed that the estate of George R. Brennan was insolvent, and that the " assets of said estate . . . will not be more than sufficient to pay the funeral expenses, the expenses of settling said estate, the expenses of last sickness, and the lawful taxes and claims due the State of Connecticut and the United States . . ." (Ex. 2.) After the East Hartford Probate Court's determination, Brennan gave Teller an offer to purchase the premises. However, as the estate's fiduciary, Teller reasonably declined to accept Brennan's offer, which was too low to satisfy the estate's financial obligations to those individuals and entities who have been identified by the East Hartford Probate Court as validated creditors. (Ex 2; Tes. Teller.)
The court acknowledges the East Hartford Probate Court records indicating that after hearing on April 7, 2016, Teller was authorized to proceed with the eviction process against Thomas Brennan. Brennan takes issue with the East Hartford Probate Court's decision to exclude him from the list of identified and validated creditors. Fully crediting the testimony establishing that Atty. Adam Teller is the successor representative of the decedent's estate and that the East Hartford Probate Court has already made that determination, this court lacks jurisdiction to resolve any dispute Brennan may have with his exclusion. (Tes. Teller. See Ex. 2.)
II
RESOLUTION OF THE SUMMARY PROCESS COMPLAINT
The facts as found in Part I support the court's conclusion that the plaintiff Administrator has proved, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant Thomas M. Brennan, has never held title to 140 Forest Street, East Hartford, CT. T. Brennan took possession of and had permissive use of the premises at issue in this summary process case at the grace of his mother Deloris Brennan and his father George R. Brennan. When Deloris Brennan died on May 8, 2013, any right or privilege she had extended to the defendant was extinguished. Similarly, when George R. Brennan died on February 18, 2014, any right or privilege he had extended to the defendant was extinguished.
The facts as found in Part I also support the court's conclusion that the plaintiff Administrator has proved, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that at the Administrator's behest on March 1, 2016, the defendant Thomas M. Brennan was served with a notice to quit possession of the premises. Service of this notice to quit clearly and unequivocally notified the defendant that any right or privilege he may have had to occupy and posses the premises had been terminated by the successor representative of George R. Brennan's Estate, lawfully appointed by the East Hartford Probate Court. Thomas M. Brennan thus had no continuing right to occupy the premises, and his tenancy was subject to termination at any time by the lawful representative of the Estate of George R. Brennan. Pollansky v. Pollansky, 144 Conn.App. 188, 194, 71 A.3d 1267 (2013). This notice to quit was sufficient to terminate any extant right or privilege that Thomas M. Brennan may claim entitled him to occupy or possess the premises. Thereafter, the defendant Thomas M. Brennan has held possession of and has occupied the premises when he had no extant right or privilege to occupy the premises, as contemplated by General Statutes § 47a-23(a)(3). In addition, the facts as found in Part I also support the court's conclusion that the plaintiff Administrator has proved, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that although starting in 2005 and continuing through April 24, 2016, the defendant Thomas M. Brennan from time to time visited shops and purchased home repair items, the evidence is insufficient to support any reasonable inference that these items were purchased at the request or direction of, or even for the benefit of, Deloris Brennan or George R. Brennan. The evidence is similarly insufficient to support any reasonable inference that Thomas M. Brennan procured these items to fulfill, in part or as whole any performance obligations imposed by Deloris Brennan and/or George R. Brennan as a condition of the defendant's relation to the premises. To the contrary, the evidence, as a whole, supports the conclusion that after the death of George R. Brennan on February 18, 2014, although the defendant Thomas M. Brennan resided at, occupied and possessed 140 Forest Street, East Hartford, CT any right or privilege was lawfully extinguished through the Administrator of the estate's service of the notice to quit on March 1, 2016.
" If a notice to quit [pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-23(a)(1)] can be sufficient to terminate a lease, it follows, a fortiori, that a notice to quit can be sufficient under [§ 47a-23](a)(3) where an occupant has no continuing right to occupy and an owner can decide to terminate a tenancy at any time." (Footnote omitted.) Pollansky v. Pollansky, supra, 144 Conn.App. 194-95.
Accordingly, the plaintiff Administrator has met its burden of proof on the Second Count of his summary process complaint, sounding in termination of any right or privilege to occupy the premises.
III
RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL DEFENSES
The evidence is insufficient to support the special defenses Brennan has raised to either the first and/or the second counts of the complaint. Accordingly, the defendant has failed to meet his burden of proving any of the special defenses as alleged.
The court has considered T. Brennan's special defenses in the alternative. See Civil Jury Instructions § 3.5-2, supra . The court has also considered T. Brennan's special defenses as having raised issues related to equity, as General Statutes § 47a-33a provides, in pertinent part: " In any action of summary process . . . the tenant may present any affirmative legal, equitable or constitutional defense that the tenant may have." (Emphasis added.) Nonetheless, the evidence is insufficient to support any cognizable equitable claims.
In defense of the second count of the complaint, alleging that any right or privilege he once had to occupy the premises has terminated, Brennan alleged: " The administrator has overstepped his authority and denied me due process of law. This filing was not given me proper time to respond. I also object to the administrator himself and will cha[lle]nge his appointment." (Special Defense, 3/30/16.) Again, T. Brennan has failed to meet his burden of proving any aspect of this special defense. Although he asserts that he was not provided with proper time to respond to Teller's summary process complaint, the procedural history of this case viewed in the context of Brennan's submission of numerous historical documents in evidence, impels the contrary conclusion. As found in Part I, the notice to quit was duly served on March 1, 2016 and the writ, summons and complaint were served on March 22, 2016; the summary process summons, Form JD-HM-32, fully informed T. Brennan of his obligations as a defendant in this case. T. Brennan personally appeared in the matter on March 30, 2016, on which date the court first provided Brennan with notice that he was to attend and participate in housing session proceedings on at 9:30 a.m. on April 11, 2016. In addition, T. Brennan filed his answer and special defenses on March 30, 2016, using Form JD-HM-5 to inform the plaintiff of exactly the position the defendant planned to take, and did take, at trial of the summary process case.
Moreover, as the matter did not resolve at the first assigned date, the court notified Brennan on April 13, 2016 that the summary process trial would commence at 9:30 a.m. on May 9, 2016. At the agreement of the parties, trial was continued until May 23, 2016; on May 12, 2016, the court provided T. Brennan with formal notice that the summary process case would be tried on May 23, 2016, nearly two months after he had been served with the notice to quit. The evidence continued and concluded on June 1, 2016; during the course of evidence, the court received extensive testimony from T. Brennan and received a very large collection of receipts, invoices, estimates and other paperwork proffered in an effort, albeit unsuccessful, to establish work the defendant claimed to have performed or coordinated at the premises from 2005 through 2016. Under the totality of the circumstances, with the underlying probate action well known to T. Brennan, with the Housing Session's provision of adequate notice to prepare for the summary process trial, and with T. Brennan's submission of myriad exhibits for the court's consideration, he cannot prevail on the special defense that he " was not given . . . proper time to respond" to Teller's complaint seeking possession of the premises. (Special Defenses, 3/30/16.)
As a minimum, the court's JDNO specifically informed Brennan that at trial on May 9, 2016, his " witnesses, if any MUST be in court with you with all other EVIDENCE you wish to present, such as bills, receipts invoices, etc. If a party not represented by an attorney seeks to compel attendance of a witness with a subpoena, an Application for Subpoena (Form JD-CL-136) must be submitted to the Clerk's Office at least three business days prior to the TRIAL date." The court file does not reflect any request for subpoenas from Brennan.
On May 23, 2016, when the summary process trial started, T. Brennan filed a Motion for Stay of Proceedings (#103.00) to allow him to file " an appellate action"; the court denied that motion without prejudice. No credible evidence of any such appellate action has been brought to the attention of this trial court.
T. Brennan has further failed to meet his burden of proving the aspect of his special defenses to the second count that asserts the summary process claim is in some way infirm because Teller's participation in the probate action is subject to challenge. He has not met his burden of proving that as alleged Teller's pursuit of the summary process claim is beyond his authority as the Administrator of the estate of George R. Brennan or that Teller's actions have in any way resulted in denial of due process of law. On June 1, 2016, on the second day of the summary process trial, T Brennan filed a Motion to Open Judgment, using Form JD-CV-107, related to the " Estate of Mr. George R. Brennan" and directed to the " Court of Probate East Hartford District 5." (Ex. A.) This court has no jurisdiction over any of the issues raised by Brennan in that Motion to Open. Viewed in the context of the totality of these circumstances, the court received insufficient evidence to support this aspect of Brennan's special defense, so that it provides no benefit to the defendant.
The court received no record or credible evidence establishing that T. Brennan had presented his concerns about Teller's appointment to the East Hartford Probate Court or that he had challenged Teller's appointment in that forum. Even if this court had jurisdiction over these Probate Court issues, the evidence at the summary process trial, as a whole, alone or in conjunction with documents produced by the East Hartford Probate Court, contradicts T. Brennan's claims about Teller's alleged misconduct. (Ex. 2; Tes. Teller.)
The court has also carefully considered the claims raised by T. Brennan in defense of the first count, although the plaintiff has prevailed only on the second count of his complaint, as Brennan also generally claims that he cannot be subject to summary process because: " The premises are my inheritance. I have lived there for over 10 years. My father wanted me to live there and have ownership of this premises. I have a sover[eig]n right to this premises and an oral contract with my father." (Special Defense, 3/30/16.) To the extent it may be relevant, his special defense also must fail for several reasons.
First, the court received no evidence sufficient to establish T. Brennan's claim that he has a valid legal ownership interest in the premises. The court credits the evidence, provided through the Administrator of the Estate of George R. Brennan, establishing that no will or other documents identify the premises as an asset to be inherited by T. Brennan; to the contrary, although the matter has been the subject of considerable attention of the East Hartford Probate Court, T. Brennan has not been identified as an heir for this asset, and has been expressly excluded as a creditor. (Ex. 2; Tes. Teller.) Second, Brennan has not identified any authority upon which the court could find in his favor on his special defense either that he has a " sover[eig]n right" to the premises or that, as he argued, the premises belong to him pursuant to " natural law"; accordingly, he cannot prevail on this aspect of his ownership claim. Third, the court has considered Brennan's allegations that he has " lived there for over ten years" for equitable purposes in balancing the interests of the parties to the summary process action. The court is not aware of any legal ownership interest that derives from length of occupancy of real property and, again, the defendant has provided no authority upon which the court could find in his favor on this aspect of his special defense.
Fourth, Brennan ostensibly bases his first special defense upon his allegation that his " father wanted [him] to live there and have ownership of this premises" and that this ownership interest derives from " an oral contract with [his] father." Even if it were relevant to the issue of " ownership" of the real property, a conclusion not reached by this court, no credible or reliable evidence was presented to support T. Brennan's claim that the decedent intended to allow his continued residence at 140 Forest Street, East Hartford, CT post-mortem. To the contrary, the evidence as a whole supports the determination that: there never was any agreement between the decedent and T. Brennan to this effect; that even if T. Brennan purchased some items, coordinated with vendors, and performed or procured some repairs and/or improvements to the premises over time, the evidence is insufficient to support the inference that he did so at the direction or request of George R. Brennan and/or in consideration for an opportunity, right or privilege to reside at the premises after the death of George R. Brennan; and even if Brennan may have performed some personal caretaking tasks and/or coordinated health care for his father, the evidence is insufficient to support the inference that he did so at the direction or request of George R. Brennan and/or in consideration for an opportunity, right or privilege to reside at the premises after the death of George R. Brennan.
In addition, the defendant has not provided the court with sufficient evidence from which it could reasonably be found that any oral agreement was ever entered into by the decedent and Brennan, contemplating T. Brennan's inheritance and/or ownership of the real property located at 140 Forest Street, East Hartford, CT, or of any interest in that real property, after George R. Brennan died. The defendant has not any written agreement or written memorandum of any agreement signed by the decedent, the decedent's agent or his lawful representative establishing any agreement for the sale, transfer, quitclaim, gift or inheritance of that real property or of any interest in that real property; he has not provided any such agreement establishing that any agreement for the sale, transfer, quitclaim, gift or inheritance of the real property was or was not to be performed within one year of its making. See General Statutes § 52-550(a)(4)(5); Dunham v. Dunham, 204 Conn. 303, 528 A.2d 1123 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds, Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 682 A.2d 106. Moreover, despite the vigor of his presentation, the evidence is insufficient to support T. Brennan's assertion that " he invested substantial funds and many hours of his labor making capital improvements [to] the property, anticipating that he would ultimately take title to the property." Dunham v. Dunham, supra, 204 Conn. 314. Even if Brennan's first special defense could reasonably be interpreted as sounding in part performance, this defense must fail in the absence of any credible evidence of an underlying oral agreement between the decedent and the defendant in the summary process action. Id. Finally, even if it could be that the decedent and Brennan actually had an agreement calling for Brennan to acquire and/or maintain an interest in the premises after the death of George R. Brennan, this court concludes that any acts undertaken by Brennan with regard to caretaking for his father, shopping, repair, maintenance and/or improvement of the real property were not sufficiently substantial to constitute the essential " part performance" necessary to support such an agreement. Id., 315. The evidence does not permit reasonable calculation of any particular quantity of labor T. Brennan may have contributed to the premises although, as found in Part I, he made approximately 108 shopping trips to purchase home repair items and spent approximately $5, 427.80 over the course of eleven years, during which time $3, 894.76 in homeowners insurance benefits were remitted for the benefit of the premises. Accordingly, Brennan achieves no succor through his first special defense.
" The doctrine of part performance requires . . . as an essential element, conduct that is preferable to and consistent with [an] oral agreement [between the parties] . . . Without such an agreement, there is no basis for finding that 'the party seeking enforcement, in reasonable reliance on the contract and on the continuing assent of the party against whom enforcement is sought, has so changed his position that injustice can be avoided only by specific enforcement.' (Emphasis added.)" (Internal quotation marks omitted; internal and external citations omitted.) Dunham v. Dunham, supra, 204 Conn. 315. In the absence of documentation, and in view of his retention of myriad other documents related to expenditures ostensibly related to the property, the court does not credit any of Brennan's statements offered to establish that he has an ownership interest in the property because he paid the taxes due on the property. The court finds Exhibit 2 to be far more reliable with regard to the property's tax status; thereupon, the East Hartford Probate Court identified " Collector of Revenue, Town of East Hartford, 750 Main Street, East Hartford, CT 06108" as a validated creditor, supporting the inference that property taxes remain due.
As Brennan has failed to meet his burden of proving any applicable aspect of either or both of his special defenses, he is not entitled to relief from summary process.
IV
CONCLUSION
After trial on the summary process complaint brought by the plaintiff Adam Teller, Administrator d.b.n.c.t.a. of the estate of George R. Brennan, the court has found that any right or privilege T. Brennan previously had to occupy the premises derived only from permission granted by George R. Brennan, which right or privilege was clearly and unequivocally terminated by service of the notice to quit as provided by law, yet that the defendant Thomas M. Brennan held possession or occupancy after the expiration of the time specified in such notice to quit. The court has further found that Thomas M. Brennan never had title to the premises that vested in himself and finds that he has not shown a title in himself existing at the time the notice to quit possession of occupancy was served. Thus, pursuant to § 47a-26d, the court shall forthwith enter judgment that the complainant recover possession or occupancy of the dwelling unit, and execution shall issue accordingly.
WHEREFORE: the plaintiff Adam Teller, Administrator d.b.n.c.t.a. of the Estate of George R. Brennan having met his burden of proof as to the summary process complaint brought against the defendant Thomas M. Brennan for the reasons set forth herein while Thomas M. Brennan has not met his burden of proof on any of his special defenses.
AND WHEREFORE, having found the facts, applied the law and balanced the equities, the court now enters judgment in favor of the plaintiff Adam Teller, Administrator d.b.n.c.t.a. of the Estate of George R. Brennan and against the defendant Thomas M. Brennan, and orders that the plaintiff Administrator shall recover immediate possession of the premises known as 140 Forest Street, East Hartford, CT, from the defendant Thomas M. Brennan subject only to the FINAL STAY OF EXECUTION provided by General Statutes § 47a-35(a).