Tele-Vue Systems, Inc. v. County of Contra Costa

8 Citing cases

  1. Morse Signal Devices of California, Inc. v. Los Angeles County

    199 Cal. Rptr. 711 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 1 times

    Since the contracts involved at bar are not leases with options to purchase but are installation and service agreements, the inquiry and rationale of the court in Collins is not germane. Tele-Vue Systems, Inc. v. County of Contra Costa (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 340, 101 Cal.Rptr. 789, is not dispositive in the manner Morse contends. In our view, Morse has misinterpreted the case.

  2. Morse Signal Devices v. County of Los Angeles

    161 Cal.App.3d 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 5 times

    (3) It is well settled that the definition of property contained in the Revenue and Tax Code controls the classification of property for tax purposes. ( Trabue Pittman Corp. v. County of L.A. (1946) 29 Cal.2d 385, 393 [ 175 P.2d 512]; Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 924, 933 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 904]; Tele-Vue Systems, Inc. v. County of Contra Costa (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 340, 343 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 789].) (4a) The relevant tax statutes define real property to include "Improvements" (Rev.

  3. Continental v. Roseville

    430 Mich. 727 (Mich. 1988)   Cited 21 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the term "accessions" "implies a transfer of ownership and control over the property attached"

    Petitioner argues that listing house drops on the company books as depreciable assets and deducting their value for income tax purposes is not controlling as to the issue of ownership. See Tele-Vue Systems, Inc v Contra Costa Co, 25 Cal.App.3d 340; 101 Cal.Rptr. 789 (1972); Bylund v Dep't of Revenue, 9 Or Tax Rptr 76 (1981). "[T]he classification of property for purposes of ad valorem taxation, and the income tax laws and regulations relating to depreciation deductions, are based on entirely different concepts."

  4. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. City and County of San Francisco

    174 Cal.App.4th 1201 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 11 times
    In JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. City and County of San Francisco (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1201, 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 906 (JPMorgan), the court relied on Lantzyin refusing to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to extend the appellant's time for filing an administrative claim for a tax refund.

    Finally, we are unpersuaded by Chase's reliance upon a line of cases standing for the proposition that when a tax refund is sought based on a void assessment that should never have been made in the first place, as opposed to a dispute over the valuation of the property, the taxpayer may file a lawsuit without first seeking relief from the board of equalization. ( Tele-Vue Systems, Inc. v. County of Contra Costa (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 340 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 789] [no remand to equalization board necessary in lawsuit for refund based on nonownership of cable television equipment]; Pacific Grove-Asilomar Operating Corp. v. County of Monterey (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 675 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 874] [superior court should hold a trial de novo on the issue of void assessment and is not limited to a review of the administrative record presented to the assessment board]; Parr-Richmond Industrial Corp. v. Boyd (1954) 43 Cal.2d 157 [ 272 P.2d 16] [refund claim based on theory that taxpayer did not own the property assessed was properly presented to court without first seeking administrative remedies].) Chase suggests that because the issues in this case are not, strictly speaking, matters of valuation, it was not required to seek relief before the AAB and cannot be faulted for having brought this suit without filing a claim or exhausting its administrative remedies.

  5. Kaiser Center, Inc. v. County of Alameda

    189 Cal.App.3d 978 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 14 times
    In Kaiser Center, Inc. v. County of Alameda (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 978, the trial court found that the wrong valuation methodology was used and remanded the matter to the assessment appeals board to redetermine the fair value of the property.

    In Parr-Richmond Industrial Corp. v. Boyd (1954) 43 Cal.2d 157 [ 272 P.2d 16] and Pacific Home v. County of Los Angeles (1953) 41 Cal.2d 844 [ 264 P.2d 539], the parties basically agreed to value but disagreed with method or property interest held. In Tele-Vue Systems, Inc. v. County of Contra Costa (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 340 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 789], the issue concerned taxation of real property or of fixtures — not differing appraiser valuations. Thus, questions of law were at issue, not questions of fact.

  6. T-V Transmission v. County Bd. of Equal

    338 N.W.2d 752 (Neb. 1983)   Cited 9 times
    In T-V Transmission, we held that for purposes of property tax assessment, installed house drops for cable television transmission constituted fixtures to the realty and not tangible personal property upon which an entity providing cable television service could be taxed.

    Cook v. Beermann, 201 Neb. 675, 679, 271 N.W.2d 459, 462 (1978). Research discloses but three reported decisions similar in nature to the instant case, all of which recognized the three-prong test of Cook v. Beermann, supra: Tele-Vue Systems, Inc. v. County of Contra Costa, 25 Cal.App.3d 340, 101 Cal.Rptr. 789 (1972); Bylund v. Depart. of Rev., 9 Or. T.R. 76 (1981); and Hoppe, King County Assessor, v. Televue Systems, Inc., Nos. 13386-13390, Board of Tax Appeals, State of Washington, decided July 20, 1976. The latter two administrative agencies ruled that the entire system, from the utility pole to the television set, was a fixture.

  7. State Department v. Metrovision

    607 A.2d 110 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992)   Cited 5 times
    Following the Schofer fixtures test

    As for depreciation, a certified public accountant employed by Metrovision testified that the IRS requires depreciation of the drop cables and that absent the IRS requirement, it would have been advantageous from a tax savings perspective for Metrovision to expense the drop cables instead of depreciating them. See Hoppe v. Televue Systems, Inc. (State of Washington Board of Tax Appeals 1976) (cable company's depreciation of drops for income tax purposes did not disqualify company from claiming a "nontaxable status," since "[t]he income tax deduction is based on a business investment concept, a matter wholly distinguishable from the concept of ownership"); Tele-Vue Systems, Inc. v. County of Contra Costa, 25 Cal.App.3d 340, 101 Cal.Rptr. 789, 792 (1972) ("the classification of property for purposes of ad valorem taxation, and the income tax laws and regulations relating to depreciation deductions, are based on entirely different concepts"). As these cases indicate, the conclusions reached by the Tax Court here are in accord with a number of out-of-state decisions on the issue.

  8. Bylund v. Department of Revenue

    9 OTR 76 (Or. T.C. 1981)   Cited 2 times
    In Bylund v. Dept. of Rev., 9 OTR 76 (1981) this court considered the classification of "housedrops," which are television cable and related hardware running from a utility pole to and into a cable subscriber's home and terminating in a wall outlet.

    The amount of value can readily be determined and should, as a matter of course, be included in each individual appraisal as many other fixtures are regularly noted (fireplace, bath fixtures, kitchen built-ins, and the like). This is apparently a case of first impression in Oregon but the court is partially supported by a California decision, Tele-Vue Systems v. County of Contra Costa, 25 Cal.App.3d 340, 101 Cal Rptr 789 (1972), and is fully supported by an administrative decision in the State of Washington, Harley H. Hoppe, King County Assessor v. Televue Systems, Inc., Docket Nos. 13386-13390, Board of Tax Appeals, State of Washington, July 20, 1976. The defendant's Order No. VL 78-668 is affirmed.