Opinion
2:20-cv-00118-CL
05-03-2021
VICTOR A. TEJEDA, JR., Petitioner, v. SUSAN WASHBURN, Superintendent, Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution, Respondent.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
MARK D. CLARKEUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner brings an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and challenges his state court convictions on grounds that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient and his guilty plea was coerced and involuntary. For the reasons explained below, petitioner fails to show that the Oregon courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, petitioner's claim of an involuntary plea is untimely and barred from federal review through procedural default. Accordingly, the Amended Petition should be denied.
BACKGROUND
In January 2014, petitioner was charged by Information with coercion, fourth-degree assault constituting domestic violence, strangulation, and two counts of contempt of court for violating a restraining order. Resp't Ex. 114. The charges arose from petitioner's assault of his estranged wife on January 13, 2014, after she had obtained a restraining order against him. Resp't Exs. 115, 141.
On February 23, 2014, the court released petitioner pursuant to a release agreement that forbid him from contacting his wife in any manner. Resp't Ex. 129. On February 25, 2014, petitioner was arrested for failing to comply with the release agreement by repeatedly contacting his wife. Resp't Ex. 141 at 26-29. The State filed an Amended Information and added six counts of contempt of court arising from petitioner's violations of the release agreement. Resp't Ex. 116.
The State offered a plea agreement under which petitioner would plead guilty to coercion, fourth-degree assault, and three counts of contempt of court, and the State would stipulate to a combined sentence of thirty-six months and dismiss the remaining counts. Resp't Ex. 118. The prosecutor indicated that the State would seek the maximum departure sentence and consecutive sentences if petitioner did not stipulate to the terms of the plea offer. Id.
On March 9, 2014, petitioner was released pursuant to another release agreement prohibiting contact with his estranged wife. Resp't Ex. 131. On March 11, 2014, trial counsel requested additional time to consult with petitioner about the State's plea offer. Resp't Ex. 106 at 5. At a status hearing on March 28, 2014, trial counsel informed the court that, “after having several discussions, ” petitioner instructed counsel “to enter a plea of not guilty on his behalf.” Resp't Ex. 107 at 4.
Several months later, on July 30, 2014, a grand jury returned an Indictment charging petitioner with first-degree kidnapping, fourth-degree assault constituting domestic violence, strangulation, three counts of coercion, three counts of first-degree rape by forcible compulsion, and five counts of first-degree sodomy by forcible compulsion. Resp't Ex. 102. The kidnapping and assault charges and one coercion charge arose from petitioner's assault of his wife on January 13, 2014. The rape and sodomy charges and two coercion charges arose from petitioner's alleged assaults of his wife before January 13, 2014; petitioner's wife reported these offenses to the police on that date. Resp't Exs. 115.
On July 31, 2014, petitioner arrived at the Marion County courthouse for a status hearing, and, after seeing the charges in the Indictment, fled with his mother to California. Resp't Exs. 128, 133-34. Eventually, petitioner was arrested and charged with first-degree failure to appear, and his mother was charged with hindering prosecution. Resp't Exs. 102 at 4, 122. Petitioner's mother pled guilty and was sentenced to probation; however, she was detained on a material witness warrant. Resp't Exs. 122-23, 128, 134.
On February 25, 2015, petitioner and the State entered into a plea agreement under which petitioner agreed to plead guilty to three counts of coercion, fourth-degree assault constituting domestic violence, and strangulation. Resp't Exs. 103, 109. The parties stipulated to a sentence of 180 months' imprisonment, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges against petitioner. Resp't Ex. 103. The trial court accepted the plea and imposed consecutive sentences totaling 180 months. Resp't Ex. 101.
Petitioner filed a state petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) and alleged that his counsel was ineffective by failing “to discuss the state's initial, 36-month plea offer with petitioner before rejecting that offer” and evaluate the possibility that the State would pursue “additional charges, sentences, and prison time if petitioner rejected the offer.” Resp't Ex. 111 at 8. Petitioner also alleged that his plea was “was coerced by the knowledge that his mother had been held in jail as a material witness” and would be released upon entry of his plea. Id. The PCR court denied relief, the Oregon Court of Appeals summarily affirmed, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. Resp't Exs. 145, 149, 151.
Petitioner now seeks federal habeas relief.
DISCUSSION
A. Ground One: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In Ground One of his Amended Petition, petitioner claims that his trial counsel failed to adequately advise him of the State's initial plea offer of thirty-six months. Am. Pet. at 4 (ECF No. 31). Petitioner argues that counsel's deficient advice caused prejudice, because petitioner rejected the offer and received a much harsher sentence after he pled guilty to offenses charged in the subsequent Indictment. The PCR court rejected this claim, finding that counsel discussed the terms of the offer with petitioner and that petitioner would not have accepted a plea in any event. Resp't Ex. 145. Respondent maintains that the PCR court's decision is reasonable and entitled to deference.
A federal court may not grant a habeas petition regarding any claim “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, unless the state court ruling “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state court decision is “contrary to” established federal law if it fails to apply the correct Supreme Court authority, or if it reaches a different result in a case with facts “materially indistinguishable” from relevant Supreme Court precedent. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if the state court identifies the correct legal principle but applies it in an “objectively unreasonable” manner. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002) (per curiam); Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08, 413. State court decisions may be set aside “only if they are not merely erroneous, but ‘an unreasonable application' of clearly established federal law, or are based on ‘an unreasonable determination of the facts.'” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 11 (2002) (per curiam).
Under well-established Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel extends to “the plea-bargaining process” and the decision whether to accept or reject a plea offer. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012) (“During plea negotiations defendants are entitled to the ‘effective assistance of competent counsel.'”); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) (holding that “defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused”). To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that 1) “counsel's performance was deficient, ” and 2) counsel's “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To show deficient performance, a petitioner “must show that counsel's representations fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. To establish prejudice, a petitioner “must show the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 163. In this case, petitioner must show that, but for the ineffective advice of counsel, there is a reasonable probability he would have accepted the initial plea offer and received a sentence less severe than the sentence imposed. Id. at 164.
In denying this claim, the PCR court cited trial counsel's assertion that he and petitioner “had several discussions” about the State's offer and petitioner “did not want to accept the plea offer.” Resp. Ex. 145 at 2; Resp't Ex. 127 at 1. The PCR court found counsel's explanation credible and rejected petitioner's testimony that counsel did not review the plea offer in detail.
The PCR court found:
The record of the March 11, 2014 hearing reflects that [trial counsel] Coran asked for more time to discuss the plea offer with Petitioner. Coran testified in his affidavit that he had several discussions with Petitioner and his family about the plea offer and that Petitioner decided to not accept the plea offer. This is also what Coran told the court in the March 28, 2014 hearing. Petitioner was present and gave no indication to the court that this was not correct. Petitioner's testimony suggesting that Coran either did not discuss the plea offer with him or did so for only a few minutes is not credible. Petitioner's claim that attorney Coran should have advised him that the state would charge him with more serious charges if he rejected the plea is also without merit. There is no evidence that the state ever indicated to Coran that additional charges would be filed if the plea offer was rejected. Petitioner has also failed to prove that he would have accepted the 36-month plea offer if he had been properly advised by his attorney. After being adequately advise[d], he instructed his attorney to reject the plea offer and enter a not guilty plea.Id. at 2-3. Based on the record before the court, petitioner fails to show that the PCR court's decision was an unreasonable application of Strickland or Frye.
As the PCR court noted, petitioner was present when counsel informed the trial court that he had several conversations with petitioner and petitioner had instructed him to reject the State's initial plea offer. Resp't Ex. 107 at 4. Petitioner did not dispute counsel's assertion or give any indication that counsel failed to explain the plea offer or petitioner's options.
Further, the State did not agree to forgo additional charges in exchange for petitioner's acceptance of the plea and gave no indication that it would pursue additional charges if petitioner rejected the initial offer. Rather, the State represented that it would seek the maximum departure sentence and consecutive sentences for the charged offenses, and petitioner was not indicted on additional charges until July 30, 2014, four months later. Resp't Ex. 118. In these circumstances, counsel was not deficient in failing to advise petitioner that the State could seek more serious charges if petitioner rejected the initial plea offer. As respondent points out, the rape and sodomy charges arose from a separate criminal episode and were not encompassed by the February 2014 plea offer, and the State likely could have brought such charges against petitioner regardless of whether he accepted the offer.
Accordingly, petitioner fails to show that the PCR court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in finding no deficient performance by counsel.
B. Ground Two: Involuntary Plea
In Ground Two, petitioner alleges that his plea was involuntary, because his mother was being detained as a material witness and he felt coerced into pleading guilty in order to obtain her release. Respondent maintains that this claim is untimely and barred from federal review by procedural default.
A petitioner must file a federal habeas petition within one year after the challenged conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Generally, a conviction is final and the statute of limitations begins to run when the time for seeking direct review expires. Id. The limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review.” Id. § 2244(d)(2).
On February 25, 2015, judgment of conviction was entered, and petitioner's conviction became final when the deadline for filing an appeal expired thirty days later, on March 27, 2015. Resp't Ex. 101 at 11; see Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.071(1). On February 2016, after 319 days had elapsed, petitioner filed his PCR petition, and the limitations period was tolled during the pendency of his PCR proceeding. Resp't Ex. 110.
On November 29, 2019, the PCR appellate judgment was entered, and the statute of limitations again began to run. Resp't Ex. 152. On January 2, 2020, thirty-four days later, petitioner signed his original federal habeas petition, and the limitations period was tolled, per agreement by the State, until the record was filed on June 24, 2020. Another 138 days elapsed before petitioner moved to amend his Petition on November 9, 2020, for a total of 491 days. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274-75 (2005) (explaining that “the filing of a petition for habeas corpus in federal court does not toll the statute of limitations”). Accordingly, petitioner's amended claim is untimely unless it relates back to his original Petition. It does not.
Ground One of the original Petition alleged that counsel failed to properly advise petitioner about the State's plea offer in February and March of 2014. In contrast, newly-added Ground Two arises from petitioner's guilty plea in February 2015 and the allegedly coercive effect of his mother's detention as a material witness. These claims do not share a “common ‘core of operative facts' uniting the original and newly asserted claims.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 659 (2005). Accordingly, Ground Two is untimely and barred by the statute of limitations.
Further, Ground Two is barred by procedural default. “Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, thereby giving the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to exhaust available state remedies, a petitioner must present his federal constitutional claims to the State's highest court before seeking federal habeas relief. Id.; Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Exhaustion requires the petitioner to ‘fairly present' his claims to the highest court of the state.”). If a claim was not fairly presented to the state courts and no state remedies remain available for the petitioner to do so, the claim is barred from federal review through procedural default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 735 n.1 (1991).
In his PCR petition, petitioner alleged that his plea was involuntary due to the coercive effect of his mother's detention. Resp't Ex. 111 at 8-9. However, petitioner did not present this claim to the Oregon appellate courts after the PCR court denied relief. Resp't Ex. 146. Petitioner can no longer raise Ground Two before the Oregon appellate courts, and it is barred by procedural default. See Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A procedural default may be caused by a failure to exhaust federal claims in state court.”).
CONCLUSION
The Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 31) should be DENIED. A Certificate of Appealability should be DENIED on grounds that petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
This Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. If objections are filed, any response is due fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of the objections. Petitioner is advised that the failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's final order. Martinez v. Ylst , 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).