Opinion
No. CV06-5001104S
June 19, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A "motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Provencher v. Enfield, 284 Conn. 772, 793, 936 A.2d 625 (2007). "Summary judgment is an attempt to dispose of cases involving sham or frivolous issues in a manner which is speedier and less expensive for all concerned than a full-dress trial . . . One of the goals advance by the summary judgment process is judicial efficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Provencher v. Enfield, 98 Conn.App. 271, 273 n. 3, 908 A.2d 1126 (2006), rev'd on other grounds, 284 Conn. 772, 936 A.2d 625 (2007).
"Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stokes v. Lyddy, 75 Conn.App. 252, 258, 815 A.2d 263 (2003) "[S]ummary judgment procedure is especially ill-adapted to negligence cases, where . . . the ultimate issue in connection involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maffucci v. Royal Park Ltd. Partnership, 42 Conn.App. 563, 568, 680 A.2d 333 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 243 Conn. 552, 707 A.2d 15 (1998). "A determination of negligence is necessarily one of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maffucci v. Royal Park Ltd. Partnership, supra, 42 Conn.App. 568-69. However, "[t]he issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 904, 823 A.2d 1221 (2003). "[O]nly if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In the present case, Teixeira alleges in the fourth count of his complaint that Mad River owes him a duty of care under General Statutes § 30-102, more commonly referred to as the Dram Shop Act, because Mad River served Leuko-Anderson alcohol while she was intoxicated and was a proximate cause of the accident. On the contrary, Mad River argues that it owes no duty to Teixeira under the Dram Shop Act because Teixeira did not provide sufficient evidence that Mad River served alcohol to Leuko-Anderson when she was allegedly a patron of the restaurant. "Connecticut's Dram Shop Act . . . authorizes a cause of action against a person who sells alcoholic liquor to an intoxicated person who causes injury to another person as a result of his or her intoxication." Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 314, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003). The Dram Shop Act "establishes a cause of action that did not exist at common law . . . It creates a new tort liability which is based upon a specified course of conduct and the consequences of such conduct . . . The delict defined by [General Statutes § ]30-102 is not the sale of liquor to create a condition of intoxication. It is rather the sale of liquor to one who is already intoxicated. No causal relation between the sale and the injury is required." (Citations omitted.) Sanders v. Officers Club of Connecticut, Inc., 196 Conn. 341, 348-49, 493 A.2d 184 (1985).
The Dram Shop Act provides in pertinent part that "[i]f any person . . . sells any alcoholic liquor to an intoxicated person, and such purchaser, in consequence of such intoxication, thereafter injures the person or property of another, such seller shall pay just damages to the person injured . . . or to persons injured in consequence of such intoxication . . . provided the aggrieved person or persons shall give written notice to such seller within one hundred twenty days of the occurrence of such injury to person or property of such person's or persons' intention to bring an action under this section . . .
From the documents submitted by both parties, the court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact does exist as to whether Mad River served Leuko-Anderson alcoholic beverages while she was intoxicated on their premises. The documents submitted by the defendants, Leuko-Anderson's deposition testimony and the police report, contradicted each other. In her deposition, Leuko-Anderson adamantly contends that she was not at Mad River on the night of March 24, 2005, and that the police report was incorrect. The investigating officer recorded in the police report that Leuko-Anderson admitted she had been drinking at Mad River, but denied hitting anything on her way home. There is no reasonable explanation provided by Leuko-Anderson with regards to the discrepancy in her account of whether she was at Mad River on the night of March 24.
"It is frequently stated in Connecticut's case law that . . . party opposing a summary judgment motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact . . . An important exception exists, however, to the general rule that a party opposing summary judgment must provide evidentiary support for its opposition, and that exception has been articulated in our jurisprudence with less frequency than has the general rule. On a motion by [the] defendant for summary judgment, the burden is on [the] defendant to negate each claim as framed by the complaint . . . It necessarily follows that it is only [o]nce [the] defendant's burden in establishing his entitlement to summary judgment is met [that] the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of fact exists justifying a trial . . . Accordingly, [w]hen documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vitale v. Kowal, 101 Conn.App. 691, 696, 923 A.2d 778, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 904, 931 A.2d 268 (2007). The movants, Mad River and Milton, for summary judgment have not met their burden of proof, and thus, the nonmoving party, Teixeira, is not required to provide any evidentiary documentation, even though he has provided such documentation in opposition of the motion. Therefore, it is ordered that the motion for summary judgment is denied.