Opinion
No. 05-06-00601-CV.
Opinion Filed February 1, 2007.
On Appeal from the County Court At Law Hunt County, Texas, Trial Court No. CC0500268.
Before Justices Whittington, Moseley, and O'Neill.
Opinion By Justice Moseley.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Freida J. Teel appeals the judgment rendered against her in favor of appellee Deborah Lynn Essary, individually and sole heir-at-law and as executrix of the Estate of Bob Moore, Deceased. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. Rs. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. Because Teel does not attack all the bases for the trial court's judgment, we affirm.
Essary, individually and in her representative capacity, sued to recover funds Teel allegedly obtained from Moore before his death, and for other damages. Essary alleged multiple causes of action against Teel: breach of fiduciary relationship, undue influence, fraud and deceit, lack of capacity, embezzlement, misappropriation of funds, and falsification of records.
After a multi-day bench trial, the trial judge indicated he would enter a judgment in favor of Essary, and orally recited reasons for his decision. Several months later, the trial court entered a final judgment in favor of Essary and against Teel. Teel did not request the trial court to enter findings of fact or conclusions of law, and none were filed.
When neither party requests findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is implied that the trial court made all fact findings necessary to support its judgment. Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2003). We must affirm the trial court's judgment on any valid legal theory supported by the evidence. In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam); Qaddura v. Indo-European Foods, Inc., 141 S.W.3d 882, 887-88 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
On appeal Teel asserts the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's implied findings with respect to three of Essary's causes of action: breach of fiduciary relationship, undue influence, and misappropriation of funds. These were the three causes of action that the trial court orally indicated were the bases for his decision.
However, a trial court's oral pronouncements allegedly explaining its decision cannot be substituted for non-existent findings of fact and conclusions of law. See In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d at 717 (court of appeals not entitled to look to trial court's comments at conclusion of bench trial as substitute for findings of fact and conclusions of law); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Wilmoth, 83 S.W.3d 929, 931 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (same).
The reason for this rule is illustrated here. Rather than countenance speculation as to whether the judgment-signed months later-was still based on the trial judge's opinions as voiced immediately upon the conclusion of the trial, the rules provide for a means to request and obtain findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the judgment. See Tex. Rs. Civ. P. 296 to 299a. Further, the rule in In re W.E.R. set forth above is not avoided by the judgment's recitation that it was "judicially pronounced and rendered on October 13, 2005; ministerially signed and ratified on March 28, 2006."
On appeal, Teel attacks only three of the possible theories supporting the judgment; she does not complain of the implied findings on Essary's remaining causes of action. As stated in Johnson v. Coggeshall, 578 S.W.2d 556, 560 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1979, no writ):
Where a judgment may rest upon more than one ground, the party aggrieved by the judgment must assign error to each ground or the judgment will be affirmed on the ground to which no complaint is made. In such situations it is said that the appellant has waived his right to complain of the ruling to which no error was assigned.
Thus, we need not address Teel's issues. We affirm the trial court's judgment. See Harris v. Gen. Motors Corp., 924 S.W.2d 187, 188 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (court must affirm when separate and independent ground supporting judgment is not challenged on appeal).