Opinion
SC-08-2816.
Decided May 6, 2009.
Anthony Tedeschi, Plaintiff, pro se, Poughkeepsie, NY.
Charles Crocker, Defendant, pro se, Hopewell Junction, NY.
Plaintiff is suing for $5,000.00, which represents the down payment given to the defendant to purchase a $27,000.00 1934 Ford Coupe vehicle. Both parties were represented pro se. A small claims trial was held on February 23, 2009. The evidence presented to this Court included testimony from the plaintiff, Anthony Tedeschi, the plaintiff's brother, James Tedeschi, the defendant, Charles Crocker, as well as several exhibits, including photographs of the 1934 show car that is the subject of this lawsuit. Having duly deliberated upon the facts and proceedings held hereinbefore, the Court finds as follows:
Facts and Arguments
The salient facts are largely undisputed in this case. The parties know each other from a prior business agreement involving the sale of another vehicle, which sale proved to be a mutually successful business exchange. The instant matter involves the sale of an old show car. The defendant was selling a 1934 Ford Coupe show car. The plaintiff agreed to purchase the car from the defendant for $27,000.00. . The plaintiff signed a notarized contract, dated September 15, 2005, agreeing to purchase the car from the defendant under the following terms, as drafted by the plaintiff:
"I Anthony Tedeschi Accepts (All Responsibilities) And Payments For 1930 Ford Coupe SR VIN (SK8743PA) From Owner Chuck Crocker Until Paid In Full. Payments Will Be Made Monthly For A Period Of 6 To 9 Months Until Debt Of ($27,000 Thousand) Is Paid In Full With No Interist [sic]. I Also Take (All) Responsibilites Of Said Vehicle Until Paid In Full. Upon Completion Of Payments, Title And Ownership Of Said Vehicle Will Be Legally Tuned [sic] Over To Anthony Tedeschi During This Period Of Transaction, If A Sitvation [sic] Should Arise Chuck Crocker Concerning Death Or Incapacitation, Balance of Debt At That Time Shall Be Paid As Of Stated Contract. To Owner Or Beneficary [sic]. There After Upon Completion Of Payments I Anthony Tedeschi Will Recieve [sic] All Legal Documents Of Said Vehicle."
The contract promised that the plaintiff would have the car fully paid within nine months.
The plaintiff signed and faxed the contract to the defendant on September 15, 2005. After receiving the contract, the defendant delivered the car to the plaintiff prior to receiving the first installment payment. The car was delivered to the plaintiff in Florida on or about September 22, 2005. On March 3, 2006, the plaintiff sent the defendant the first installment check in the amount of $5,000.00 towards the price of the car. Everything was copacetic between the parties until such time that the plaintiff suffered some unexpected and serious medical issues, undergoing two separate back surgeries. Plaintiff's health hindered his ability to work and as a result, he defaulted on the payments, breaching the terms of the contract.
In fact, after the $5,000.00 payment, plaintiff made no further payments on the car. Consistent with the terms of the agreement, the title to the car was never transferred from the defendant to the plaintiff because payment was never fully made. Despite the default, the car remained in the plaintiff's possession for approximately fifteen (15) months (from September 2005 through December 28, 2006). During the time that the car was in the plaintiff's possession, the plaintiff drove the car with dealer plates on it and got into a car accident causing damage to the vehicle. The amount of damage to the car is disputed.
In December 2006, the plaintiff decided to return to New York because he needed familial support to help him tend to his health. In learning of plaintiff's intended return to New York, the defendant asked that the plaintiff bring the car back to New York with him — as it would just "make him feel better" according to the plaintiff. The plaintiff complied, and on December 28, 2006 the plaintiff returned the car to the defendant. Contemporaneous with the medical issues the plaintiff was dealing with, was a cancer diagnosis the defendant was battling. According to the defendant, his own health issues imposed financial straits for which he could no longer tolerate the plaintiff's failure to make payments on the car.
In March or April 2007, approximately four (4) months after the car was returned to the defendant, the defendant sold the car to someone else. The defendant did not repair the damage that arose out of the accident plaintiff had with the car. As such, with the accompanying damage, the sale price of the car was reduced by $10,000.00, and the car was sold for $17,000.00.
The dispute upon which this lawsuit arises is based upon whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the $5,000.00 down payment on the car, even though the car was in the plaintiff's possession for over one year. The plaintiff argues that in spite of his default in payments on the car, he is entitled to recover the down payment, for he never breached the terms of the contract since the defendant verbally told him that he could take as long as he needed to pay him the outstanding balance of $22,000.00. The plaintiff's brother, James Tedeschi, corroborates this claim when he testified that the defendant expressed no time limits to pay off the car. The plaintiff describes an amiable relationship with the defendant, with the parties speaking several times per week on the phone. The plaintiff claims that the news of the defendant selling the car to another buyer, came to him unexpectedly. Finally, the plaintiff contends that he would have never returned the car to the defendant if he had known that the defendant intended to keep the $5,000.00 down payment.
The defendant flatly disputes the claim that the parties orally agreed to additional terms to the contract, arguing that since he was experiencing medical issues of his own and needed the money to pay his own bills, he would not have agreed to give the plaintiff an open-ended time frame to pay off the remaining $22,000.00 plaintiff owed on the car. In contrast to the plaintiff's description of their relationship, is the defendant's description, who described a sharp decline in the relationship after the plaintiff defaulted on the car payments. The defendant argues that he is entitled to keep the down payment since the plaintiff defaulted in making timely monthly payments on the car and by damaging the car, which devalued it in resale by $10,000.00.
As noted above, the parties dispute the amount of damage to the car as a result of the plaintiff's car accident and they dispute whether there was damage to the car in transporting the car on a flatbed from Florida.
Legal Analysis and Determination
While the plaintiff claims that the defendant orally agreed to waive the time frames to pay him the remaining $22,000.00, the defendant flatly disputes this. Since the parties dispute whether the terms of the agreement were orally amended, the Court can not credit the oral agreement, as testified to by the plaintiff and his brother. Rather, the written agreement is the only contract entered into between the parties that this Court finds to be enforceable.
This is because the general rule of law is that where the parties have reduced their agreement to writing, the parole evidence rule excludes evidence of any prior oral or written agreement or of any contemporaneous oral agreement when offered to contradict, vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of the writing. Marine Midland Bank v. Thurlow, 53 NY2d 381, 387(1981); Thomas v. Scutt, 127 NY 133 (1891). See, WWW Associates v. Giancontieri, 77 NY2d 157 (1990); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213. The purpose for the rule is that the intention of the parties is evidenced by an apparently complete written contract, which serves to place themselves beyond the uncertainties of oral testimony, and the courts are not inclined to defeat this presumed intention of the parties. WWW Associates v. Giancontieri, 77 NY2d 157, 165 (1990). Moreover, the rule protects against fraud, perjury, infirmity of memory, and the death of witnesses. Thomas v. Scutt, 127 NY 133 (1891); Lese v. Lamprecht, 196 N.Y.32, 36 (1909).
Thus, the Court turns to the written contract and the terms set forth therein in determining the rights of the parties.
Here, title to the car passed to the plaintiff when the plaintiff took possession of the car with its delivery, irrespective of the fact that the title documents remained in the defendant's name. Thus, when payment was not tendered in full pursuant to the terms in the agreement, the defendant was entitled to recover the security interest in the car that he held.
The general rule of law is that the identification of an owner on a certificate of title constitutes prima facie evidence of the ownership of the vehicle. NY Veh. Traffic Law § 2108(c). Here, the defendant's name remained on the title. However, title remained in the defendant's name for purposes of registration as the recognized owner until payment in full was to be made, at which time title was to be transferred to the plaintiff. The agreement signed by the plaintiff here suggests that title passed to the plaintiff upon delivery, as there were no restrictions upon operating or using the vehicle, rather that the defendant merely retained a security interest in the vehicle in the event of a default and that the plaintiff accepted all responsibility for the car.
This is supported by the fact that the presumption of ownership may be rebutted by evidence which demonstrates that another individual owned the vehicle in question. Dorizas v. Kenny's Fleet Maintenance, Inc., et al., 254 AD2d 246 (2d Dept. 1998). More specifically, title to a motor vehicle generally passes when the parties intend that it pass. Dorizas v. Kenny's Fleet Maintenance, Inc., et al., 254 AD2d 246 (2d Dept. 1998). Similarly, the general rule of law for the title to goods, including vehicles, passes from the seller to the buyer in any manner and on any conditions explicitly agreed on by the parties. U.C.C. § 2-401(1) and § 2-105. Here, the evidence at trial demonstrated that on at least one occasion, the plaintiff operated the vehicle by putting dealer plates on the car and thus he realized the benefits associated with having possession of the car.
The rule of law that states that title passes when the parties intend it to pass is underscored by the rule that states that title passes upon physical delivery of the item. More specifically, the statute provides that "unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and even though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or place; and in particular and despite any reservation of a security interest by the bill of lading." U.C.C. § 2-401(2). Analyzing these general rules of law to the facts here, creates the inference that title was transferred to the plaintiff upon delivery of the vehicle, irrespective of the delivery of the title documents, which was deferred until full payment of the car loan was met.
Thus, plaintiff took possession when the car was delivered to him subject to the defendant repossessing the car in the event of a default, for there was no express terms stating otherwise. See U.C.C. § 9-306. The defendant had no duty to return the down payment because while in exclusive possession of the car for over one-year, the plaintiff defaulted on the payments. There being a breach in the agreement, the defendant was entitled to keep the down payment and sell the car, much the same, as would occur with a bank that repossesses a car upon default of a car loan, for defendant retained a security interest in the car until such time that payment in full was made.
Moreover, this Court is empowered by statute to adjudicate small claims in such a manner as to do "substantial justice" between the parties according to the rules of substantive law. Uniform City Court Act § 1804. The party bringing the small claim has the burden of proof and may not obtain a judgment unless he or she has demonstrated a prima facie case of liability on the part of the other party.
Here, the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing a prima facie case of liability that he is entitled to recover the money he gave to the defendant to purchase the car. The plaintiff took possession of the vehicle subject to compliance with certain terms and conditions and accepted all responsibility for the car. When the plaintiff breached the terms of that agreement by defaulting on the payments and devaluing the car with damage from the car accident, the defendant had the right to repossess the vehicle within which it maintained a security interest. The fact that the car had been devalued by $10,000 within approximately one year while it was in the plaintiff's possession, empowers this Court to adjudicate this matter as to do substantial justice between the parties, and here the plaintiff signed a contract accepting full responsibility for the car while it was in his possession.
THEREFORE, it is
ORDERED that judgment is granted in favor of the defendant, and the complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.