Summary
finding no public policy preventing admission of person who vocalized threats of violence against college, but never acted on them
Summary of this case from Chase v. CohenOpinion
00 Civ. 9786 (RCC)
March 20, 2002
Opinion Order
Plaintiff Technical Career Institutes, Inc. ("TCJ" or "Plaintiff") brings this action seeking to vacate the September 28, 2000 award of Arbitrator Daniel F. Brent (the "Arbitrator") in favor of Defendant Local 2110, United Auto Workers, AFL-CIO ("Local 2110" or "Defendant"). The parties now cross-move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons explained below, Defendant's motion is granted and the arbitration award is confirmed. Defendant's request for attorney's fees is denied.
I. Background
Plaintiff TCI and Defendant Local 2110 are parties to a collective bargaining agreement covering the college's office clerical workers. The agreement contains a provision providing for arbitration of grievances between TCI and Local 2110, which states in part:
A grievance which has not been settled or disposed of in accordance with the steps of the grievance procedure outlined above may be submitted by the Union to arbitration not later than ten working days after receipt of the Step 3 reply. . . . Neither party shall be required to arbitrate more than one grievance in any one arbitration, except by mutual agreement. Subject to this Section, the parties agree that the decision or award of such Arbitrator shall be final and binding on each of the parties. The authority of the Arbitrator shall be limited to determining questions involving the application of express provisions of this Agreement, and no other matter shall be subject to arbitration, hereunder. The Arbitrator shall have no authority to add to, subtract from or change any of the terms of this Agreement. . . . In no event shall the same question or issue be the subject of arbitration more than once.
Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. 19 at Cooper Aff. Ex. A.
From 1992 until he was laid off in 1994, Darren Smith ("Smith") worked at TCI in the mailroom and marketing department. Then-President of TCI, Eric Biederman, wrote a letter of recommendation for Smith explaining that he had to be let go because of down-sizing at the college and praising him as a "hard work[er]," a "team player," "honest, timely and good natured" with "strong communication skills." Aug. 31, 1994 Biederman Letter, Jackson Aff. Ex. B. In 1996, Smith applied for a job at TCI as a computer technician. TCI rejected his application and explained that he was not qualified for the position. Defendant Local 2110 grieved this decision.
Smith's wife also worked at TCI and Smith often went to TCI to visit his wife and bring her to and from work. On or about August 14, 1996, while on TCI's premises, a security guard informed Smith that he could not see any employee other than his wife. Smith and the security guard subsequently became involved in an altercation. The security guard alleged that Smith said he "would go home, get my gun and come back and shoot certain individuals in TCI and I know who I am coming for." Although the police were called to escort Smith off the premises, neither the police nor TCL brought charges against him.
On October 10, 1996, TCL wrote to Local 2110 and stated: "The behavior Mr. Smith displayed will not be tolerated and accordingly, Mr. Smith is no longer permitted on the premises. Since Mr. Smith is not permitted in TCI's building he cannot be considered for future employment by TCI. In addition, Mr. Smith is not qualified for the position he sought." Oct. 10, 1996 Orem Letter, Jackson Aff. Ex. C. Local 2110 then filed a grievance concerning TCI's forbidding Smith entry onto its premises. The parties reached a settlement and release of claims on September 8, 1998. In return for four weeks pay, Smith agreed to waive all claims against TCI regarding his "employment with the Company and the termination thereof." The settlement was silent as to Smith's prohibition on TCI's premises. Settlement Agreement, Cooper Aff. Ex. D.
Subsequently, on July 22, 1999, Smith's wife, a TCI employee, applied for tuition exemption benefits for Smith, pursuant to Article 23A of the collective bargaining agreement. Article 23A states in part: "When approved in advance by the immediate supervisor, employees and their immediate families (spouse . . .) may be permitted to attend courses listed in the College catalog, provided that such courses are available and the person is qualified as determined by the Company." Collective Bargaining Agreement, Cooper Aff. Ex. A. TCL denied tuition exemption benefits to Smith and referred to the October 10, 1996 letter prohibiting Smith's entry on TCI's premises.
Local 2110 grieved this decision on behalf of Smith's wife. When the grievance procedure proved unsuccessful, the parties submitted their dispute to the Arbitrator on August 29, 2000. The parties asked the Arbitrator to resolve the following issue: "Did the Employer improperly deny tuition exemption benefits to the grievant's spouse? If so, what shall be the remedy?" Award, Jackson Aff. Ex. G.
Local 2110 argued that the settlement and release was silent on the issue of whether Smith could enter TCI's premises and he did not accept a permanent banishment by signing it. Further, Smith's settlement did not waive the rights that he was entitled to as a TCI employee's spouse, that is, tuition reimbursement. TCI submitted that it was responsible for protecting its students and faculty and could not permit Smith in the building in light of the threat he made in 1996.
The Arbitrator recognized that TCI has an obligation to protect its students and employees from violence and found that its "decision to restrict access to a non-student, non-employee who had threatened its security officers was reasonable under the circumstances." Award at 7-8. The Arbitrator went on to find that "[n]othing in the Acknowledgment and Release explicitly addresses the alleged waiver of the right to return to the premises for any reason." Id. at 9. Further, the Arbitrator noticed that Smith had entered TCI's premises on many occasions after the Acknowledgment and Release was signed, with knowledge of management. . . ." Id. at 11. Clearly Smith agreed to release claims regarding his employment and termination, but "[n]othing in the Acknowledgment and Release can reasonably be construed as a knowing waiver of the right to avail himself of TCI's educational services, as a tuition paying or non-tuition paying student." Id. at 10. Accordingly, the Arbitrator found that since "neither [TCI] nor the police pressed charges against the grievant's spouse for his alleged comments" and three years had passed without incident, Smith did not continue to bear ill will toward TCI.Id. at 12. Thus, the Arbitrator sustained the grievance and held that TCI could interview Smith and inquire about his animosity. If it found that he did not pose a discernable threat of violence, TCI should permit him to enroll in the appropriate course without tuition. Id. at 14.
TCI argued that Smith's visits to TCI were incidental and not likely to produce dangerous circumstances. In contrast, TCI did not want to give Smith widespread access to its building as a student. Id. at 11.
II. Discussion
A. Summary Judgment Standard
It is well settled that summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A "moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1985). In deciding such a motion, the Court does not resolve factual issues, rather it only determines whether there is any genuine issue to be tried. Eastman Mach. Co. v. U.S., 841 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1988). A disputed fact is only material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-249 (1986).
B. Arbitration Award
"Arbitration awards are subject to very limited review in order to avoid undermining the twin goals of arbitration, namely, settling disputes efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation."Folkways Music Publishers v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993);see also Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1960) ("[T]he court's function in confirming or vacating an arbitration award is severely limited."). The party seeking to vacate an arbitration award bears a high burden to avoid summary confirmation. Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Ottley v. Schwartzberg, 819 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir. 1987); Folkways Music Publishers v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993)). "As long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within his scope of authority, that a court is convinced he committed error does not suffice to overturn his decision." Harry Hoffman Printing, Inc. v. Graphic Communications Int'l Union, Local 261, 950 F.2d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Wackenhut Corp. v. Amalgamated Local 515, 126 F.3d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The contractual theory of arbitration . . . requires a reviewing court to affirm an award it views as incorrect — even very incorrect — so long as the decision is plausibly grounded in the parties' agreement."). Thus, "an arbitrator's award is legitimate and enforceable as long as it "draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement' and is not merely an exercise of the arbitrator's `own brand of justice'" Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 97 v. Niagra Mohawk Power Corp., 143 F.3d 704, 714 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)).
There is a narrow exception to this deferential approach, however. The Supreme Court has explained that "[i]f the contract as interpreted by [the arbitrator] violates some explicit public policy, we are obliged to refrain from enforcing it." W.R. Grace Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983). "[C]ourts may refuse to enforce arbitral awards only in those rare cases when enforcement of the award would be directly at odds with a well defined and dominant public policy resting on clear law and legal precedent." St. Mary Home, Inc. v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Dist. 1199, 116 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1997); see also United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987) (explaining the reviewing court must determine whether the award "create[s] any explicit conflict with other laws and legal precedents").
TCI argues that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority and committed an error of law by not reading the settlement agreement as enforcing a permanent ban of Smith from TCI's premises. Specifically, TCI contends that the settlement agreement is essentially a rider to the collective bargaining agreement. Davis v. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., 110 F.3d 245, 249 (4th Cir. 1997). Further, the parties' construction of the settlement agreement, not the Arbitrator's should control. Bakers Union Factory #326 v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 749 F.2d 350, 354 (6th Cir. 1985). Thus, TCI submits that the settlement agreement clearly prohibits Smith from reentering TIC premises and the Arbitrator's construction otherwise is in error.
The Court is not convinced, even assuming the prior settlement agreement between the parties becomes part of the collective bargaining agreement for the Arbitrator's purposes, the settlement is absolutely silent on TCI's ban of Smith from its premises. The Arbitrator did not commit any error of law or exceed his authority. He analyzed the release and found it did not cover Mr. Smith's right to attend classes at TCI. Award at 9-10, Jackson Aft Ex cf. Bakers Union Factory #326 v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 749 F.2d at 354 (explaining importance of settlement agreement where arbitrator had ignored it). The Arbitrator analyzed the Collective Bargaining Agreement and found Smith was entitled to these rights by virtue of his wife's employment. By signing the release Smith agreed only to "waive, release and hold harmless he Company and all of its affiliates . . . from any and all liability, claims and charges relating to my employment with the Company and the termination thereof" Settlement Agreement, Cooper Aff. Ex. D. Further, the grievance concerned rights Mr. Smith is entitled to as a spouse of a TCI employee, not his TCI employment. Moreover, TCI was well aware that Smith had been on its premises after signing the Settlement Agreement. Nothing in the record supports TCI's contention that by signing the release in 1998 Smith forfeited his right to be a student.
Equally unavailing is Plaintiff's argument that the award contravenes public policy. In light of recent school shootings and violence, Plaintiff submits that someone who has allegedly made a threat against the college should not be permitted to attend its classes. Understanding that an award will only be vacated if it contradicts a clear legal precedent, Plaintiff relies on the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990, 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) and Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. These laws, however, do not provide the required support for Plaintiff's argument. Section 1092(f) requires that schools publish their public safety policies and procedures, as well as statistics on crimes such as murder, sex offenses, robbery, aggravated assault, arson, automobile theft and manslaughter. It does not support the proposition that someone who allegedly vocalized threats of violence, but never acted on them, cannot be admitted as a student. Similarly, Plaintiff does not point to, nor is there included, a specific provisions within the Improving America's Schools Act in support of a well-defined policy prohibiting students such as Mr. Smith from taking classes. While the Court certainly understands and agrees that preserving the safety and security of schools is of utmost importance, these two statutes cannot and do not support vacating the arbitration award on public policy grounds. See Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Dist. 1199, 116 F.3d at 46 (recognizing that the Drug Free Workplace Act of 1988 evinced a strong public policy against the use, possession and sale of drugs, but holding it did not support the narrower policy the employer sought to invoke, i.e., a policy against reinstatement of long-term employee following suspension after arrest for possession of marijuana). Unfortunately, neither of the parties nor the Arbitrator seems to have uncovered the seriousness or the true facts surrounding Smith's August 1996 threat. However, since the law is clear about a court's role in reviewing an arbitrator's decision, the Court must confirm the award. The Court cautions both parties to take care to assess the threat Smith might pose to TCI, its employees and students.
The Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 has since been amended to the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.
C. Attorney's Fees
As the Supreme Court recently explained, attorney's fees will not be awarded to the successful party absent "explicit statutory authority."Buckhannon Bd. Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001). When, as here, such statutory authority is absent a court may make such an award when "opposing counsel acts `in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reason.'" Heavy Constr. Lumber, Inc. v. Local 1205, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 00 Civ. 6659(ILG) 2001 WL 984949, at *9 (E.D.N Y July 27, 2001) (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)). Courts have awarded attorney's fees if the party challenging an arbitration award has refused to abide by the arbitrator's decision without justification. Id. at *9. Here, however, Plaintiff has offered "colorable arguments to justify the challenge to the arbitrator's award," and an award of attorney's fees is not "required merely because the employer-plaintiff's arguments have been rejected." Id. at *9 (citingInt'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 910, AFL-CIO v. Roberts, 992 F. Supp. 132, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). Further, the Court's rejection of TCI's arguments does not "require the conclusion that plaintiff acted in bad faith, vexatiously or wantonly." Id. at *9. As the Court finds that TCI did not act in bad faith, Local 2110's application for attorney's fees is denied.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, TCI's motion for summary judgment is denied. Local 2110's motion for summary judgment is granted and the arbitration award is confirmed. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case.
So ordered.