Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County Super. Ct. No. GIC846318, Kevin A. Enright, Judge.
IRION, J.
Masoud Tebbi and Shahrzad Tebbi (appellants), representing themselves in propria persona, appeal from a summary judgment entered against them in their lawsuit against Stephen R. Rose, Charlene D. Rose, 1st Monterey Financial & Property Group, Ed Fontes, and Attorneys Trustee Services (collectively, respondents). As we will explain, we conclude that the appeal is without merit, and accordingly, we affirm.
DISCUSSION
Our review of this matter is hampered by the lack of an adequate record and lack of adequate briefing by appellants. The record does not contain any of the complaints filed in this matter, and although the appeal is from an order granting a motion for summary judgment, the record does not contain any of the filings in opposition or reply to the motion for summary judgment.
From the available record, it appears that the appellants' lawsuit arose out of their claim that respondents attempted to impede their efforts to refinance a first deed of trust on their home. The record also shows that respondents filed a motion for summary judgment and that the trial court granted the motion. Further, the record reflects that appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied, and that respondents were thereafter awarded attorney fees. Appellants' notice of appeal indicates that they are appealing from the judgment following the order granting respondents' motion for summary judgment.
It is impossible for us to follow much of appellants' briefing. Appellants have failed to provide citation to the record or citation to controlling legal authority, or to set out their arguments in a coherent fashion. We will not consider appellants' unsupported and inscrutable arguments. (See Wright v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 683, 689 ["Generally, asserted grounds for appeal that are unsupported by any citation to authority and that merely complain of error without presenting a coherent legal argument are deemed abandoned and unworthy of discussion"]; City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239 [arguments not supported by adequate citations to record need not be considered on appeal]; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 ["An appellate court is not required to examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for parties"]; Evans v. Centerstone Development Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 151, 165 ["lack of organization and the improper format" of appellate brief resulted in waiver of arguments alluded to but not properly developed].)
Appellants' briefing does, however, contain one legal argument that is adequately clear and sufficiently supported by minimal citation to authority and to the record such that we are able to respond. Specifically, appellants contend that the entry of summary judgment should be reversed because respondents provided appellants with only 60 days of notice of their motion for summary judgment, rather than the 75 days of notice required by Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (a). Appellants refer to the fact, as reflected in the record, that when the summary judgment motion was filed, it was served on July 24, 2006, with the hearing noticed for September 22, 2006, which provided a total of 60 days' notice.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
The applicable case law establishes that, absent the consent of the parties, the trial court does not have the authority to waive the 75-day notice period required by section 437c, subdivision (a). (Urshan v. Musicians' Credit Union (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 758, 764 & fn. 2; McMahon v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 112, 118.) However, when the hearing date for a summary judgment motion is continued from the originally noticed date to give the opposing party adequate time to respond, the 75-day notice period is calculated using the new hearing date. (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1209 ["the notice requirement is measured from the date notice is served to the date of the actual hearing, and not the originally scheduled hearing"].)
Applying these legal principles to the procedural history reflected in the record, we reject appellants' claim of error. Although the summary judgment motion was originally set to be heard on September 22, 2006, the date was twice extended at the request of appellants, first to October 6, 2006, and then to October 20, 2006. Along with the extension of the hearing date, appellants were given an extension of the deadline to file their opposition. Thus, appellants received a total of 88 days of notice prior to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, which more than complied with the 75-day notice requirement in section 437c, subdivision (a).
As we understand appellants' argument, they also contend that an additional five days of notice was required because the motion for summary judgment was purportedly served by mail, although the proof of service indicates that the motion was served by Federal Express. We conclude that the manner of mailing has no impact on the timeliness of the notice in this case, because even if an additional five days were added to the notice period (creating a total required notice period of 80 days), the 88 days of notice received by appellants was more than what was required by law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., NARES, J.