Opinion
No. 5-100 / 04-0736
Filed April 28, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Lawrence H. Fautsch, Judge.
Petitioners appeal from a district court ruling denying their motion for summary judgment and granting the respondent's motion for summary judgment in the petitioners' declaratory judgment action that challenged the respondent's residency policy for its employees. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Scott D. Soldon and Andrea F. Hoeschen of Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller Brueggeman, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for appellants.
Barry A. Lindahl, Dubuque, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Petitioners Teamsters Local Union No. 421 and John Gotto, a union member and employee of the respondent City of Dubuque, appeal from a district court ruling denying the petitioners' motion for summary judgment and granting the respondent's motion for summary judgment in the petitioners' declaratory judgment action that challenged the respondent's residency policy for its employees. We reverse and remand.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The undisputed facts before the district court revealed the following. Since 1980 the City of Dubuque (City) has had a policy that restricts the residency of its employees. As currently written, the policy restricts, to varying extents, the residency of all part- and full-time City employees. The portion of the policy applicable in this case requires employees hired after August 31, 1980, to live within 6.5 miles of the City's corporate limits. The policy also states that failure to comply with its provisions is grounds for termination.
The policy also provides that certain employees hired or appointed after this date are required to live within the corporate limits, and permits certain other employees hired after this date to live within 6.5 miles of their assigned worksite. However, neither of these provisions is applicable under the circumstances of this case.
John Gotto has worked for the City since 1982. Approximately five years ago Gotto moved to his current residence, which is 7.2 miles outside of the City's corporate limits. In April 2002 the City informed Gotto that, unless he moved to within 6.5 miles of the corporate limits, he would be considered to have resigned his position.
Gotto, a member of the bargaining unit represented by Teamsters Local Union No. 421 (Union), is protected under Iowa's civil service laws. See generally Iowa Code ch. 400 (2001). One of those protections is found in Iowa Code section 400.17, which states, in pertinent part, "Cities may set reasonable maximum distances outside of the corporate limits of the city that police officers, fire fighters and other critical municipal employees may live."
The Union and Gotto filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that the residency policy, both on its face and as applied to Gotto, was in violation of section 400.17. The petitioners asked the district court to declare that Gotto was not a critical employee, and that the City's residency requirement exceeded statutory authorization. The City filed its answer, requesting the court to declare that Gotto was a critical employee, and that the City's residency requirement was authorized by section 400.17.
The petitioners then moved for summary judgment, asserting that under the undisputed material facts they were entitled to the declarations sought in their petition. The City also moved for summary judgment, seeking a declaration that Gotto was a critical employee within the meaning of section 400.17. The parties agreed that all material facts were undisputed.
While a court is not obliged to find a lack of material factual dispute merely because all parties assert such to be the case, the parties' assertions should weigh heavily in making that determination. Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Iowa 1984). Under the circumstances of this case we agree with the view of all parties that no genuine issue of material fact prevents resolution of the parties' dispute by way of appropriate summary judgment.
The undisputed facts include the following. At the times pertinent to this appeal Gotto was employed by the City as an Equipment Operator II. The job description for this position includes the performance of anti-icing and snow and ice removal duties on City streets. Gotto is a heavy snow plow operator, and one of eight back-up employees for anti-icing and snow and ice removal duties on assigned routes. Gotto can be required to perform such duties outside regular working hours. In the last few years Gotto has been called in to work outside of his regular schedule on only a few occasions. However, during this time period snowfall totals have been relatively light. Although Gotto is not currently assigned to a snow removal route, he had been assigned to such a route in the past, and at the discretion of his supervisor or department manager could be assigned to such a route in the future.
In addition to the facts noted above, the City presented statements from Gotto's department manager and the City manager, as well as uncontroverted affidavits from the City's police chief and fire chief. The managerial statements opined that Gotto was a critical employee. The affidavits stated that police and fire personnel would have been unable to timely respond to emergencies during winter storm events without ice and snow removal work on the City streets.
Following hearing, the district court denied the petitioners' motion for summary judgment and granted the City's motion. The court determined Gotto was a critical employee and therefore subject to the residency requirement. The court reasoned:
City employees who plow snow and de-ice roads make it possible for police and fire fighters to mobilize and reach the scene immediately. Without such assistance, there would be instances when police and fire fighters would not be able to respond to emergencies in a timely manner.
The court's ruling did not address the petitioners' claim that the City's residency policy exceeded that which was authorized by section 400.17.
Gotto and the Union appeal. They claim the district court erred when it failed to rule that the City's municipal employee residency policy was invalid. They also claim the court erred in concluding Gotto was a critical employee and thus subject to the statutory residency requirement.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
We review the district court's summary judgment rulings for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Jungling, 654 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Iowa 2002). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3); Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 654 N.W.2d at 535. Where, as here, the parties agree that all material facts are undisputed, and the case presents solely legal issues, summary judgment is the appropriate remedy. Burton v. University of Iowa Hosps. Clinics, 566 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 1997).
III. Facial Validity.
The petitioners first contend the district court erred when it allowed the City's residency policy to stand. They assert the City's policy, which imposes some form of residency restriction on all employees, goes beyond section 400.17, which limits the imposition of reasonable residency requirements to "critical municipal employees." The City asserts the issue has not been preserved for our review.
The basic rule of error preservation requires that an issue raised on appeal by a non-prevailing party must have first been raised before and decided by the district court. Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 540 (Iowa 2002). Although a decision on the issue need not be an explicit basis for the court's ruling, "the record must at least reveal the court was aware of the claim or issue and litigated it." Id. If the record indicates the issue was decided by the court, then error has been preserved. Id. However, if the record indicates the court failed to resolve the issue, error is preserved only if the party brings the omission to the court's attention, and requests a ruling. Id. at 539.
The petitioners admit the district court did not address their facial validity claim in its ruling, and that they did not file a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) or otherwise bring this omission of the court's attention. They assert they need not do so, however, as the issue was clearly raised to the district court, and a conclusion that the policy is valid was implicit in and necessary to the court's determination that Gotto was a critical employee. Having reviewed the record, including the district court's ruling, we cannot agree that it demonstrates an implicit ruling on the facial validity claim. Accordingly, the petitioners' failure to seek a ruling on this claim has waived error on appeal. Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 539-40.
IV. Critical Employee.
The petitioners assert the district court also erred when it concluded Gotto was a critical employee within the meaning of section 400.17. The legislature has not expressly defined the term "other critical municipal employees," nor has its meaning been addressed by our supreme court. Accordingly, it falls to this court to determine what the legislature intended by the phrase. See Citizens' Aide/Ombudsman v. Miller, 543 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Iowa 1996) ("The ultimate goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.").
In determining legislative intent we consider not only statutory language, but also the statute's "subject matter, the object sought to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, underlying policies, . . . and the consequences of the various interpretations." State v. Albrecht, 657 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2003). We read the statute as a whole, and seek a reasonable interpretation that best effects the statute's purpose. Waterloo Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 650 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Iowa 2002). Each part of the statute is presumed to have a purpose. State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 37 (Iowa 2001). Thus, we look to the context in which the term is used, and consider its relationship to associated words and phrases. T K Roofing Co., v. Iowa Dep't of Educ., 593 N.W.2d 159, 163 (Iowa 1999).
Particularly instructive in this context is the doctrine of ejusdem generis. Under this doctrine, when a statute contains specific words, or an enumeration of specific things, followed by a more general word or phrase, the general word or phrase "is to be held to refer to things of the same kind." Maxim Techs., Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 690 N.W.2d 896, 902 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted). Stated another way, the general words "are restricted to include only objects similar to those specified." Messerschmidt v. City of Sioux City, 654 N.W.2d 879, 884 (Iowa 2002). Where the general words are introduced by the term "other" or "otherwise," we interpret the general words as referring "to the same subject matter as the string of terms, only with added flexibility . . . designed to accommodate similar [things] not specifically included in the prior . . . terms." Maxim Techs., 690 N.W.2d at 902.
Here, the general phrase "other critical municipal employees" is preceded by two specific definitional examples: "police officers" and "fire fighters." Iowa Code § 400.17. Applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, we must conclude that "other crucial municipal employees" cannot be intended to refer to every municipal employee, regardless of job description. See Messerschmidt, 654 N.W.2d at 884. Rather, the phrase encompasses only those employees who are similar to police officer and fire fighters. Id. Such a conclusion is further supported by the fact that, were we to interpret the phrase "other critical municipal employees" as applying to every municipal employee, it would render superfluous the use of the term "critical" in section 400.17. See Iowa Code § 4.4(2) ("The entire statute is intended to be effective."); In re G.J.A., 547 N.W.2d 3, 6 (Iowa 1996) ("We will presume the legislature enacted each part of the statute for a purpose and intended that each party be given effect.").
Thus, the crucial question becomes whether the job duties of Gotto as an Equipment Operator II are sufficiently similar to those of police officers and fire fighters so that Gotto must be considered a "critical" employee. We conclude they are not.
We first note that police officers and fire fighters are both emergency responders, who must be able to respond to crisis situations upon very short notice. Moreover, one of the primary purposes for allowing cities to impose a residency requirement on critical municipal employees is "enhancing community safety because [such] employees are in a position to respond more quickly to emergency calls. . . ." Clinton Police Dep't Bargaining Unit v. City of Clinton, 464 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Iowa 1991) (emphasis added). In light of the foregoing, we interpret "other critical municipal employees" as encompassing employees who, like police officers and fire fighters, must be able to very quickly respond to emergencies that threaten life or property.
The City contends Gotto meets this definition, as he must be able to quickly respond to weather "emergencies." However, there is no evidence in the record to support a conclusion that a very quick response time is necessary for personnel who perform the anti-icing and snow and ice removal duties that are relied on by the City to classify Gotto, an Equipment Operator II, as a "critical municipal employee." In fact, the opposite conclusion is supported, at least anecdotally, by evidence that Gotto himself has rarely been called in to work outside of his normal working hours. Moreover, it is a matter of common, everyday experience that modern forecasting technology provides substantial advance notice of essentially all significant weather events of the type the City relies on to classify Gotto as a "critical municipal employee."
Given the foregoing, we conclude the district court erred when it determined that Gotto was a critical municipal employee. The fact that fire and police personnel must be able to very quickly respond to emergency situations, and that their ability to do so would be hampered if anti-icing and snow and ice removal were not accomplished, is not tantamount to evidence that those who perform anti-icing and snow and ice removal duties must also be able to very quickly respond to a call to perform these duties.
V. Conclusion.
John Gotto, as an Equipment Operator II, does not meet the definition of an "other critical municipal employee" as that term appears in section 400.17. Because Gotto is not a critical employee under section 400.17, the City is without authority to impose a residency restriction upon him. The district court erred in denying the petitioners' motion for summary judgment and granting the respondent's motion for summary judgment. We reverse the district court's rulings and remand this case to the district court for entry of summary judgment in favor of the petitioners in accordance with this opinion. Costs on appeal are taxed to the respondent-appellee City of Dubuque.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Vogel, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
I agree that Teamsters Local Union No. 421 waived its challenge to the facial validity of the ordinance. I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that they City of Dubuque may not designate John Gotto a "critical employee" for the purposes of enforcing its residency policy. While I might not have classified Gotto a "critical employee" I would nonetheless give deference to the City of Dubuque's determination as to what jobs they consider to be "critical" for the efficient or effective management of their city.
Those provisions of the Iowa Constitution known as the "Home Rule Amendment" grant municipalities "broad authority to regulate matters of local concern, subject to preemptions by the laws of the General Assembly." See Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A; Sioux City Police Officers' Ass'n v. City of Sioux City, 495 N.W.2d 687, 693 (Iowa 1993). The City of Dubuque promulgated an ordinance stating:
All . . . persons hired after August 31, 1980, shall be, within six (6) months of the date of hire, residents of the state of Iowa and shall have their principal place of residence either within the corporate limits of the City of Dubuque or within 6.5 miles of the corporate limits of the City of Dubuque by the most direct street, road or highway.
(Emphasis Supplied by the City of Dubuque). Iowa Code section 400.17 (2003) provides in its pertinent part that, "[c]ities may set reasonable maximum distances outside of the corporate limits of the city that police officers, fire fighters and other critical municipal employees may live." Thus, because Dubuque's ordinance cannot prohibit acts permitted by statute it applies only to "police officer's, fire fighters and other critical municipal employees." See Police Officers' Ass'n, 495 N.W.2d at 693-94 (stating an ordinance is inconsistent with a statute and, therefore, preempted by it, when the ordinance prohibits an act permitted by a statute, or permits an act prohibited by the statute).
The City of Dubuque, due to its hilly topography and the snow and ice generally accompanying an Iowa winter, has determined Mr. Gotto, as an Equipment Operator II, is a critical employee. The General Assembly did not provide a definition of a "critical employee" nor has it otherwise denied or preempted the City of Dubuque's right to govern this matter of local concern. See Goodenow v. City of Maquoketa, Iowa, 574 N.W.2d 18, 26 (Iowa 1998). ("Limitations on a municipality's power and authority over local affairs are not implied; they must be imposed by the legislature."). Therefore, I would defer to the City of Dubuque's decision regarding the applicability of its residency policy to Gotto.