Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-366-L, Pretrial Management.
August 17, 2005
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the District Court's Standing Order of Reference, filed May 26, 2005, this case was referred to this Court for pretrial management, including the determination of non-dispositive motions and findings of fact and recommendations to the District Court on dispositive motions. Before the Court is Defendant Brad White's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Defendant Brad White's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, both filed May 11, 2005, and Defendant Brad White's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, filed June 21, 2005. Plaintiff did not file a response. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant Brad White's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction should be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Ivory Lee Tealer ("Tealer") was an inmate in the custody of the Kaufman County Jail at the time the events giving rise to this action allegedly occurred. On February 23, 2005, Tealer filed this action against Cindy Martinez ("Martinez"), a nurse, and Brad White ("White"), a nurse-practitioner, both of whom provide medical services to inmates of the Kaufman County Jail. (Compl. at 1, 3; Mem. at 1-2.) Tealer alleges that Martinez neglected to provide him with a special diabetic diet, which caused him to experience a diabetic coma. (Compl. at 3-4.) Tealer also alleges that White was aware that Tealer had been diagnosed with a broken bone in his left foot, but refused to provide any treatment. (Statement attached to Compl.) In an amendment to his complaint filed March 14, 2005, Tealer further contends that medical staff and Martinez were aware of the broken bone, but made no effort to have Tealer transported to Parkland Hospital for the previously-scheduled surgery on his foot. (Am. at 1.)On May 11, 2005, White moved to dismiss this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). He alleges that although Tealer's complaint is filed on a § 1983 complaint form, he alleges no civil rights violations and is actually asserting a state law claim for negligent medical care. (Mem. at 2-3.) White argues that Tealer has therefore failed to raise a federal question, and that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the state law medical negligence claim because of a lack of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 2-3. Tealer did not file a response, but instead attempted unsuccessfully to amend his complaint several times. White filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss on June 21, 2005, further elaborating on his assertion that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Tealer's claims.
II. ANALYSIS
White moves for dismissal of Tealer's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Def. Mot. at 9.) A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) challenges a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims. See Stockman v. Federal Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998).
The Fifth Circuit recognizes a distinction between a "facial attack" and a "factual attack" upon a complaint's subject matter jurisdiction. Rodriguez v. Tex. Comm'n on the Arts, 992 F. Supp. 876, 878 (N.D. Tex. 1998). "A facial attack requires the court merely to decide if the plaintiff has correctly alleged a basis for subject matter jurisdiction" by examining the allegations in the complaint, which are presumed to be true. Id. (citation omitted). If the defendant supports the motion with evidence, however, then the attack is "factual," and "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981). Regardless of the attack, "[t]he plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does exist." Rodriguez, 992 F. Supp. at 879 ("The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction.") (citations omitted).
The instant motion is a facial attack. White did not submit evidence in support of his assertion that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Tealer's claim, and White argues that Tealer's jurisdictional claim fails on legal, not factual, grounds. Thus, all of Tealer's factual allegations will be accepted as true for the purpose of determining whether the Court has jurisdiction over his claim.
White asserts that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Tealer's suit because notwithstanding Tealer's use of a § 1983 form, the suit fails to allege a violation of civil rights. (Mem. at 2-3.) As White points out, Tealer submitted his complaint on the standard form available for use by prisoners filing actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Northern District of Texas. In his complaint, Tealer alleges that White refused to provide treatment for Tealer's broken foot, despite repeated requests for treatment. On March 14, 2005, Tealer filed a one-page amendment to his complaint, alleging that the medical staff at Kaufman County jail made no effort to transport him to Parkland for previously scheduled surgery on his foot. (Am. to Compl. at 1.) The refusal to treat his foot, Tealer alleges, caused him "unnecessary and wanton" pain and has led him to worry that the lack of treatment, coupled with his diabetic condition, may cause him to lose his foot. Id. He further contends that "[s]uch deliberate `indifference' to such serious medical need put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious harm." Id.
The form is entitled "Form To Be Used By a Prisoner in Filing a Complaint Under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983."
"When a prisoner alleges a denial of medical care, the constitutional basis for the alleged right depends upon whether he is incarcerated pursuant to a conviction or whether he is a pretrial detainee." DiSalvo v. Bowles, 2001 WL 705782, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2001); see also Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). "Unlike convicted prisoners, whose rights to constitutional essentials like medical care . . . are guaranteed by the Eight Amendment, pretrial detainees look to the procedural and substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure provision of these same basic needs." Jacobs v. W. Feliciana Sheriff's Dept., 228 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, (1979)). It is not clear whether Tealer was a pretrial detainee or a convicted inmate at the time the alleged events giving rise to this action occurred. However, the deliberate indifference standard applies to a denial of medical care claim whether it is brought by a convicted inmate pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, or by a pretrial detainee pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Hare, 74 F.3d at 647-48.
Although Tealer did not specify whether he brings his claim against White pursuant to the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, it is apparent based on the nature of Tealer's complaint, as well as his use of the terms "deliberate indifference" to "serious medical need" in the amendment to that complaint, that he alleges a violation of his constitutional rights. See Williams v. Thomas, 692 F.2d 1032, 1040 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that a pro se plaintiff is not required to use "magic words" to state a claim). Thus, based on the allegations of deliberate indifference to medical needs contained within the § 1983 form and Tealer's amendment to that form, the Court is satisfied that Tealer's complaint is based on an alleged violation of a federal law, and should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The case White cites in arguing that a prisoner's use of a § 1983 form alone does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, Guilbeaux v. Univ. of Tex. Medical Branch, 42 F. Supp. 2d 637 (E.D. Tex. 1998), is distinguishable from the instant matter. (Mem. at 2; Supp. Mem. at 3.) In Guilbeaux, the plaintiff sought damages for pain and suffering from the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, and his physicians, based on treatment he received following surgery. Id. at 639. At a Spears hearing, the plaintiff testified that his suit was based exclusively on a claim that the doctor had failed to treat him appropriately. Id. at 642. The magistrate judge found that this and other responses from the plaintiff "unequivocally indicate that he never intended to bring suit under federal law." Id. at 642. The magistrate judge further determined that while the plaintiff mentioned the term "civil rights," he did so only after the defendants used the phrase in their motion to dismiss, and did not actually intend to allege a civil rights violation. Id. The magistrate judge found that the court therefore lacked federal question jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff had filed his suit using a § 1983 form. Id. at 641-42.
The district court in Guilbeaux does not state whether the plaintiff was a prisoner at the time he received the medical care he complained about, but it appears that he was one.
In contrast, it is apparent from the face of Tealer's complaint and the amendment to the complaint that he has alleged a violation of his civil rights, as the Court discussed above. The language in Tealer's amendment to his complaint — filed nearly two months prior to White's motion to dismiss — includes terms typically used in civil rights actions based on an alleged denial of medical care. Thus, his situation differs from that in Guilbeaux, where the plaintiff mentioned the term "civil rights" only after the defendants filed a motion to dismiss using the phrase, and even then, under questioning, did not clearly express that his suit was about civil rights.
In addition to his discussion of Guilbeaux, White argues that "numerous other courts have dismissed cases wherein pro se inmates have attempted to create civil rights violations arising from medical care they received." (Supp. Mem. at 4.) White cites one case in support, Farabee v. Navarro County, 1998 WL 355473 (N.D. Tex. June 29, 1998). (Supp. Mem. at 4.) In Farabee, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants after finding that the evidence demonstrated that Navarro County Jail officials had not acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's medical needs. 1998 WL 355473, at *4. As White points out, the district court noted in reaching its decision that "[a] plaintiff must demonstrate more than inadequate medical attention to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. However, White has not moved for dismissal under 12(b)(6) on grounds that Tealer failed to state a claim under § 1983. Rather, White moved for dismissal exclusively on grounds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Tealer's claim because he has not in fact asserted a § 1983 claim. Thus, for the purpose of determining White's 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the Court's limits its analysis to whether Tealer's complaint alleges a violation of federal law, rather than whether the complaint states a claim under § 1983. Because the Court has found, as discussed above, that Tealer's suit alleges a violation of federal law, the holding in Farabee does not dictate dismissal in the instant situation.
In Farabee, the plaintiff, who had been transferred from the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections to the Navarro County Jail, alleged that the dentist assigned to the Navarro County Jail provided inadequate care to his cavities and dentures. 1998 WL 355473, at *1, 4. The district court stated that according to the evidence in the file, the jail's dentist evaluated the plaintiff's condition, found that the plaintiff needed new dentures but suffered no acute problems, developed a dental plan of treatment, and submitted it the Missouri Department of Corrections for approval. Id. at 1. Before the dentist received approval for that plan, the plaintiff was transferred back to Missouri. Id.
At this time, the Court declines to determine sua sponte, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), whether Tealer's complaint fails to state a claim.
In further support of his assertion that Tealer "should not be permitted to recast his healthcare liability claims as § 1983 violations[,]" White cites three cases involving claims brought under Texas state laws by non-incarcerated individuals against health care providers. Id. at 3. Those cases address the appropriate state law cause of action for non-prisoner claims involving medical malpractice. Savage v. Psychiatric Inst. of Bedford, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 745, 752-53 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied) (finding that plaintiff could not circumvent the statute of limitations for health care liability claims by raising fraud and negligence claims based on the same set of facts as her medical malpractice claim); Walden v. Jeffery, 907 S.W.2d 446, 447-48 (finding that both the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, as well as precedent, prohibited the plaintiff's attempt to recast a negligence claim against her dentist as a DTPA claim) (citing Gormley v. Stover, 907 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam)); Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d. 239, 242 (Tex. 1994) ("the underlying nature of the claim determines whether section 12.01(a) [of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act] prevents suit for violation of the DTPA."). These cases do not address whether a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over an inmate's claim involving an alleged refusal to provide medical care. Thus, the holdings in those cases do not have any bearing on the Court's finding that Tealer's suit should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In sum, the Court finds that Tealer's allegations of denial of medical care, contained within his complaint and the amendment to that complaint, raise a federal question. Accordingly, Tealer's claim against White should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Because the Court finds that Tealer's claim should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because his claim raises a federal question, the Court need not address White's argument with respect to diversity jurisdiction.