Opinion
7:02-CV-013-R
February 28, 2002
ORDER
Came on to be considered Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and the Court finds and orders as follows:
On February 14, 2002, this action was dismissed as barred by the Supreme Court's holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Plaintiff now claims that his "mandatory" supervised release is discretionary and that he has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in his good-time credits. Motion at pp. 4-6. Therefore, he argues, his civil rights action does not necessarily imply the invalidity of his continued confinement and that he should be permitted to proceed with this action. Motion at pp. 4-6. If Plaintiff is correct, he has now demonstrated that he has no protected liberty interest in his good-time credits and that his claim has no merit in the context of a civil rights action or a habeas proceeding. Where an inmate is not eligible for mandatory supervised release, good-time credits do not represent a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the state may create a constitutionally protected liberty interest requiring a higher level of due process where good-time credits are forfeited in a disciplinary action against an inmate eligible for mandatory supervised release). Absent some constitutionally protected interest, due process does not attach to a disciplinary proceeding. See id.
Plaintiff claims that he was deprived of property ($225.00) from his inmate trust account that was put on administrative hold and which should have been returned to him after the disciplinary decision. Motion p. 9. Therefore, he argues, he was deprived of property without due process of law. Id.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the "unauthorized, intentional deprivation of property" does not constitute a civil rights violation if there exists a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3204 (1984); accord Nickens v. Melton, 38 F.3d 183, 184-85 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1025, 115 S.Ct. 1376 (1995); Holloway v. Walker, 790 F.2d 1170, 1174 (5th Cir.) (finding no breach of federally guaranteed constitutional rights, even where a high level state employee intentionally engages in tortious conduct, as long as the state system as a whole provides due process of law), cert denied, 479 U.S. 984, 107 S.Ct. 571 (1986).
Teague has the state common-law action of conversion available to remedy his alleged loss of property. Myers v. Adams, 728 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. 1987). Conversion occurs when there is an unauthorized and unlawful exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another which is inconsistent with the rights of the owner. Beam v. Voss, 568 S.W.2d 413, 420-21 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ). If Defendants exercised unauthorized control over Teague's personal property as he claims, he has a factual basis to allege a cause of action in conversion. Such a common-law action in state court would be sufficient to meet constitutional due process requirements. Groves v. Cox, 559 F. Supp. 772, 773 (E.D. Va. 1983).
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks redress for the loss of property on a theory of negligence, he has failed to state a colorable claim under § 1983. Where mere negligence is involved in causing a deprivation of property, no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required. The unintentional loss of property does not state a cause of action under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S.Ct. 662, 663 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 106 S.Ct. 668, 670 (1986).
Absent a claim by Plaintiff that he has been deprived of some right secured to him by the United States Constitution or laws, neither habeas corpus nor civil rights relief may be had. Thomas v. Tortes, 717 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1010, 104 S.Ct. 1008 (1984).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that motion for rehearing is DENIED.
A copy of this order shall be transmitted to Plaintiff:
SO ORDERED