Teague and wife v. Downs

4 Citing cases

  1. Winchester-Simmons Co. v. Cutler

    199 N.C. 709 (N.C. 1930)   Cited 8 times

    Nor can it be held on the facts alleged in the complaint that the purpose of L.H. Cutler, Sr., in executing the deed, and thereby joining with his wife in the conveyance of the land, was fraudulent, thus rendering the deed void. In Teague v. Downs, 69 N.C. 280, it is said that as creditors of a husband had no right to subject his estate by the curtesy in lands owned by his wife, to the satisfaction of his debts, during the life of the wife, he was at liberty, if so minded, to surrender his estate in said land, and that such surrender could not be held fraudulent as to his creditors. See, also, Dortch v. Benton, 98 N.C. 190, 3 S.E. 638, in which it was held that as a debtor's homestead is not subject to sale under execution on a judgment against him, his conveyance of the homestead was not fraudulent as to his creditors, although it was otherwise as to a conveyance of the land subject to the homestead.

  2. Daniels v. Fowler

    26 S.E. 635 (N.C. 1897)   Cited 20 times

    It is immaterial and not ground of demurrer that he is not a plaintiff. Teague v. Downs, 69 N.C. 28; McCormac v. Wiggins, 84 N.C. 279. The creditors are not necessary parties.

  3. Thompson v. Wiggins

    14 S.E. 301 (N.C. 1891)   Cited 11 times

    The action can only be maintained by a guardian of the lunatic wife. The cases which recognize the husband's right to sue alone for the land, or for the rents and profits by virtue of his tenancy by the curtesy initiate, are all cases where the marriage took place prior to the Constitution of 1868. Wilson v. Arentz, 70 N.C. 670; Jones v. Carter, 73 N.C. 148; Morris v. Morris, 94 N.C. 613; Houston v. Brown, 52 N.C. 161; Teague v. Downs, 69 N.C. 280; Jones v. Cohen, 82 N.C. 75; and S. v. Mills, 91 N.C. 581, were also decisions as to the effect of the act of 1848 upon tenancy by the curtesy initiate without reference to the later action of the Constitution of 1868 upon it. Tenancy by the curtesy consummate, remains as at common law. Code, secs. 1838, 1839; Houston v. Brown, supra.

  4. McCaskill v. McCormac

    6 S.E. 423 (N.C. 1888)   Cited 6 times
    In McCaskill v. McCormac, 99 N.C. 548, the Court speaking of the right of the husband or tenant by curtesy, after the wife's death, say: "But we think it is settled by abundant authority that the purpose of the act was to protect the wife, leaving the right of the husband, and of course, his liabilities, unimpaired and unrestricted after her death."

    But we think it is settled, by abundant authority, that the purpose of the act was to protect the wife, leaving the right of the husband, and of course his liabilities, unimpaired and unrestricted after her death. This construction is too well settled to be disturbed now. Houston v. Brown, 7 Jones, 161; Long v. Graeber, 64 N.C. 431; Teague v. Downs, 69 N.C. 280; Wilson v. Arentz, 70 N.C. 670; S. v. Mills, 91 N.C. 581; Morris v. Morris, 94 N.C. 613, and the cases cited. There is no error. Affirmed.