Opinion
G032180.
10-23-2003
JAMI A. TEAGLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GEORGE ROBERT OVERS, Defendant and Appellant.
Law Office of Philip N. Friedman and Philip N. Friedman for Defendant and Appellant. Jami A. Teagle in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Pursuant to section 527.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court enjoined defendant from harassing plaintiff for a period of three years. Defendant appeals, asserting: (1) the court applied an erroneous legal standard; (2) the order is not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the court abused its discretion. We disagree with defendants arguments and, finding no ground for reversal, we affirm the order.
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.
FACTS
The statement of facts is taken from plaintiffs verified petition, which the court considered without objection. Both parties have attached exhibits to their briefs containing materials not contained in the record on appeal. We ignore these exhibits.
Plaintiff and her fiancé (Chander) acquired a 1924 beach bungalow in Huntington Beach in the late summer of 2001, and set about renovating the property, reportedly once a "drug house." Plaintiff and her fiancé also rented to a tenant (Julie). Defendant lived in an apartment across the street. On several occasions during the period of October 2001 to November 2002, defendant drove his vehicle onto plaintiffs driveway at about 1:00 a.m. and "revved" his engine to wake her up. Also on several occasions during this period, defendant yelled profanities at plaintiff as she and others were inside their house, standing outside, backing her car out of the driveway, or gardening in her front yard.
A series of events in late October 2001 seem to have triggered the subsequent hostilities. On Saturday, October 27, 2001, while Larry Leyva (Larry), one of plaintiffs construction workers, was parking his vehicle, defendant ran down the stairs of his apartment, jumped into his truck, drove quickly up to Larrys truck, grabbed the door on the drivers side, and began to scream profanities and physical threats at Larry. Plaintiff yelled at defendant to stop, and asked what was wrong. Defendant responded by jumping into his truck and driving down the street a distance of two houses, where he stopped again and screamed profanities at plaintiffs fiancé who was also parking his truck. Defendant then drove away.
Later that day, at 3:00 p.m., defendant came out of his apartment, ran onto defendants property, and screamed profanities at plaintiffs father, who was inside the house working on a window renovation. Defendant then yelled at Robert Leyva (Robert) and asked, "`Is this your job?" Robert said "[N]o," and asked if he could help. Defendant yelled at plaintiffs house generally, "`[C]ome on — Im gonna blow you off," "`[Y]ou just wait — Im gonna get you," and "`[W]ait `til 3 AM — you just wait." He then rushed toward the front door, but plaintiff and others yelled at him to "back off." Defendant ran back to his apartment. Half an hour later, defendant came down from his apartment again, "revved" the engine of his car, and parked in front of plaintiffs house, where he got out of the car and yelled at everyone in the house, "`[Y]ou just wait til 3 AM — Im gonna get you."
The next morning, at about 9:30 a.m., Julie accidentally hit defendants utility van as she was maneuvering to back into plaintiffs driveway. Defendant was not home at the time. When defendant returned, Julie went to his apartment to explain the accident and offered her insurance information and name to defendant. Defendant replied he would call the police, claim a hit and run, and said he was "gonna `blow her off." That afternoon, defendant drove away from his apartment, and, as he did so, he "flipped off Chander and mouthed something towards him." An hour later, after plaintiff and Chander had left for the day, defendant came out and yelled at Larry, "`[C]ome on — Im gonna get you." Larry left for the day, but returned moments later because he forgot his keys. Defendant apparently became enraged, grabbed a hammer and rushed toward Larry, yelling "`[C]ome on — Im gonna blow you off," and "`I know you hit my van, you sent that girl with bogus information, `come on — Im gonna get you." Larry picked up a tool to use in defense and told defendant to "back off." Julie saw the confrontation and called plaintiff and Chander, who immediately called 911, turned the car around, and headed back to the house, where four police vehicles and seven officers were trying to calm defendant down.
Apart from a general description of several incidents in which defendant yelled profanities, revved an engine on plaintiffs driveway at 1:00 a.m., and obstructed plaintiffs driveway as described ante, the next specific event alleged in plaintiffs petition occurred on November 24, 2002, while plaintiff was gardening in her front yard. Defendant stood on the staircase to his apartment, which faces plaintiffs house, and yelled, "`You cunt, yeah you cunt! Cunt! Cunt! Cunt! Cunt! You stupid cunt!" Plaintiff became fearful, ran into the house, and called the police. When the police arrived, the officer suggested she seek a restraining order.
Plaintiff also alleged that on January 29, 2003, defendant drove his car on two wheels, leaning over toward the sidewalk, where plaintiffs tenant and a friend were walking. Then, on January 30, 2003, an incident occurred that caused plaintiff to seek the immediate issuance of a restraining order. Defendant waited for Chander to back out of his driveway at 6:30 a.m. Plaintiff heard defendant "revving" his engine and saw defendant make a violent U-turn and follow Chander down the street. Defendant pulled into the oncoming lane, then hit his brakes and swerved his car into the back right end of Chanders car. Chander turned right at the next intersection, and defendant followed, still trying to cut him off. Both Chander and plaintiff, who had witnessed the beginning of the incident, called the police, who again suggested plaintiff seek a restraining order.
The next day, plaintiff and Chander both sought restraining orders, which were granted. The hearing on the section 527.6 injunctions was held on February 14, 2003. Although defendant did not file written opposition, he did testify under oath that the statements made in plaintiffs petition were a lie.
Chander was also granted an injunction. Defendants appeal from that order was dismissed for defendants failure to pay the filing fee.
DISCUSSION
Citing subdivisions (1), (6) and (7) of section 657, defendant contends the court "made an `error of law by incorrectly applying the proper legal standard," "there is no substantial evidence supporting the trial courts order," and the court "consider[ed] improper matters and abuse[ed] [its] discretion." Section 657 sets forth the grounds on which the trial court may grant a new trial. But the grounds on which the trial court may grant a new trial have no bearing on the disposition of the appeal, unless, of course, the appeal is taken from an order granting or denying a new trial. Further, defendant does not explain what "error of law" was committed or what "proper legal standard" was "incorrectly appl[ied]." Likewise, defendant does not explain what "improper matters" were considered. To the extent defendant is suggesting the erroneous admission of evidence, we note no objection to any of the evidence was made at trial. Thus, the right to complain on appeal of the erroneous admission of evidence, if any, was waived (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a)), and, unless the brief contains reasoned argument and legal authority to support its contentions, the court may treat the argument as waived. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)
We assume defendants real point is that the injunction order is not supported by substantial evidence. Defendant, in effect, requests we weigh the evidence and find as a matter of law that it does not satisfy the "clear and convincing" standard required by section 527.6.
Standard of Review
"In assessing whether substantial evidence supports the requisite elements of . . . harassment, as defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, we review the evidence before the trial court in accordance with the customary rules of appellate review. We resolve all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the finding of the trial court if it is supported by substantial evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value." (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.) "When a trial courts factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination . . . ." (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874.) We apply these standards to the elements of section 527.6 and the evidence.
Elements of Section 527.6
"Section 527.6 . . . was enacted `to protect the individuals right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution. [Citation.] The purpose of the statute was to provide expedited injunctive relief to victims of `harassment." (Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 729-730.) Three types of "harassment" are defined in the statute: (1) "unlawful violence;" (2) "a credible threat of violence;" or (3) "a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose." (& sect; 527.6, subd. (b).) Only the person who "has suffered harassment," as defined in the statute, has standing to seek the injunction.
"Unlawful violence" is defined in the statute as "any assault or battery, or stalking as prohibited in Section 646.9 of the Penal Code." (§ 527.6, subd. (1).) A "[c]redible threat of violence" is defined in the statute as "a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose." (& sect; 527.6, subd. (2).) "Course of conduct," in turn, is defined as "a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose . . . " (§ 527.6, subd. (3).)
Finally, the "course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff." (§ 527.6, subd. (b).) If the court finds by "clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an injunction shall issue . . . ."
Application of Law to the Evidence
The evidence before the court did not establish an act of "unlawful violence," against plaintiff, although there was evidence from which these acts could be established as against Chander, Robert and Larry. Likewise, we doubt the evidence was "clear and convincing" that a "credible threat of violence" was made against plaintiff or a member of her immediate family, although the evidence did establish such threats against Chander and Larry, and more generally to anyone in plaintiffs house when defendant was yelling, "Im gonna blow you off." But we need not strain to find sufficient evidence under these prongs of section 527.6, because substantial evidence established "a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose." (§ 527.6, subd. (b).)
There is no evidence that plaintiff and Chander were ever married during the period in question.
The evidence established that on several occasions, beginning in October 2001, and continuing to January 2003, defendant would yell profanities directly at plaintiff. In addition to the incident of November 24, 2002, described graphically, ante, defendant drove his vehicle onto plaintiffs driveway at 1:00 a.m. and "revved" the engine to wake her up, parked so as to obstruct her driveway, and would yell profanities at plaintiff. In addition, the evidence supported a finding that defendant on several occasions yelled at every person in plaintiffs house, including plaintiff, that he would "`[B]low you off," "`Im gonna get you," and "`[W]ait `til 3 AM — you just wait."
We have no difficulty concluding those acts, taken together, constitute substantial evidence supporting the courts finding by clear and convincing evidence that the series of acts evidenced a continuity of purpose, that the acts would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and that plaintiff actually did suffer substantial emotional distress. Defendants conduct served no legitimate purpose. Plaintiff was justifiably alarmed by defendants conduct, and she richly deserved the protection of the section 527.6 injunction.
Although the court did not make specific findings on the record, "[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support [the order of the court] on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown." (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
DISPOSITION
The order entered under section 527.6 is affirmed. Plaintiff shall recover her costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J., and MOORE, J.