This statute was not in effect at time of trial, but plaintiff contends that it is, in part, but a clarification of law existing prior to its enactment, and that a chiropractor is, and was, competent to testify as an expert concerning matters within the scope of the profession and practice of chiropractic (citing 31 Am. Jur. 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence 107). Our Court of Appeals, in Allen v. Hinson, 12 N.C. App. 515, 183 S.E.2d 852 (1971), and Teachey v. Woolard, 16 N.C. App. 249, 191 S.E.2d 903 (1972), dealt with the law concerning the competency and scope of chiropractic testimony prior to the enactment of G.S. 90-157.2. This Court has not had an occasion to pass on the law as it existed prior to the enactment of G.S. 90-157.2, nor do we now find it necessary to do so for purposes of deciding the case before us. The Court of Appeals in this case held that it could not determine whether the proposed testimony of Dr. Logan would come within the case law in effect at the time of trial because plaintiff had failed to include in the record what Dr. Logan's testimony would have been had he been allowed to testify.
1970) (unlawfully passing school bus); Schaefer v. McCreary, 216 Neb. 739, 345 N.W.2d 821, 825 (1984) (reckless driving); Public Service Co. v. Chancey, 94 N.H. 259, 51 A.2d 845, 846 (1947) ("Unless the record showed a plea of guilty [to operating motor vehicle while intoxicated], under our decisions it would not have been admissible to establish the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint."); Eaton v. Eaton, 119 N.J. 628, 575 A.2d 858, 866 (1990) (careless driving); Alexander v. Eldred, 100 A.D.2d 666, 473 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (1984) (failure to yield); Teachey v. Woolard, 16 N.C. App. 249, 191 S.E.2d 903, 906 (1972) (unspecified "traffic offense"); Dartt v. Berghorst, 484 N.W.2d 891, 894 n. 3 (S.D. 1992) (failure to drive within lane required); Bagley v. Weaver, 211 Va. 779, 180 S.E.2d 686, 688 (1971) (plea of guilty to reckless driving admissible where defendant appeared in person and voluntarily submitted plea); White v. Lock, 175 W. Va. 227, 332 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1985) (driving left of center); Gaspord v. Hecht, 13 Wis.2d 83, 108 N.W.2d 137, 139 (1961) (failure to yield right-of-way); Haley v. Dreesen, 532 P.2d 399, 402-03 (Wyo. 1975) (driving too fast for conditions). However, the majority of these cases further hold that evidence of the prior guilty plea, while admissible, is not conclusive and may be explained by the party against whom it is offered.
2 Stansbury's N.C. Evidence 177 (Brandis rev. 1973) at p. 44. In Teachey v. Woolard, 16 N.C. App. 249, 252, 191 S.E.2d 903, 906, cert. denied 282 N.C. 430, 192 S.E.2d 840 (1972), this Court said: [e]vidence that a defendant entered a plea of guilty to a criminal charge arising out of an automobile accident is generally admissible in a civil action for damages arising out of the same accident, although it is not conclusive and may be explained. Grant v. Shadrick, 260 N.C. 674, 133 S.E.2d 457 (1963)." See also Boone v. Fuller, 30 N.C. App. 107, 226 S.E.2d 191 (1976).
We disagree. It is well established that before evidence of life expectancy under G.S. 8-46 can be introduced, there must be evidence to a reasonable certainty of permanent injury. Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1965); Teachey v. Woolard, 16 N.C. App. 249, 191 S.E.2d 903, cert. denied, 282 N.C. 430, 192 S.E.2d 840 (1972); McCoy v. Dowdy, 16 N.C. App. 242, 192 S.E.2d 81 (1972). Where plaintiff suffers from an objective injury, a jury is capable of determining whether or not the injury is permanent in nature.
A violation of the statute has been held to be negligence per se if injury proximately results therefrom. Carter v. Scheidt, 261 N.C. 702, 136 S.E.2d 105 (1964); Crotts v. Transportation Co., 246 N.C. 420, 98 S.E.2d 502 (1957) and cases there cited; Teachey v. Woolard, 16 N.C. App. 249, 191 S.E.2d 903 (1972). G.S. 20-150.1 designates four conditions under which the driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass upon the right of another.
These arguments, if accepted as correct, lead us at best into sheer speculation and conjecture as to the causation of the child's actions, what his actions might have been had the facts been different, and what a timely warning would have been under the circumstances. The plaintiff's argument that passing to the right was negligence per se is clearly without merit since the statute, G.S. 20-150.1, and case cited, Teachy v. Woolard, 16 N.C. App. 249, 191 S.E.2d 903, cert. denied 282 N.C. 430, 192 S.E.2d 840 (1972), deal with passing other vehicles proceeding in the same direction and in the same lane of traffic. The facts here show only that an accident occurred.
We are unable to distinguish this case from Webb. Other evidence which we believe was sufficient to overcome the motion for a directed verdict is (1) the defendant attempted to pass at an intersection in violation of G.S. 20-150 (c), Teachey v. Woolard, 16 N.C. App. 249, 191 S.E.2d 903 (1972); (2) the defendant failed to drive on the right side of the road, Snellings v. Roberts, 12 N.C. App. 476, 183 S.E.2d 872 (1971); (3) the defendant failed to keep a vigilant lookout, Wainwright v. Miller, 259 N.C. 379, 130 S.E.2d 652 (1963), and (4) failed to keep his vehicle under control and bring it to a halt so as to avoid the collision Wainwright v. Miller, supra. The defendant further contends that plaintiff, Frank Bell, is barred from recovery by his own negligence in allowing his son to ride his bicycle on the highway without proper safety instructions.
Denial of the motions was proper since evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff supports the findings. Dickinson v. Pake, 284 N.C. 576, 201 S.E.2d 897 (1974); Teachey v. Woolard, 16 N.C. App. 249, 191 S.E.2d 903 (1972). According to plaintiff's testimony, he reached an agreement with Lauffer and Wharton, acting as officers and directors of Atlantic, whereby he would be paid commissions which, in turn, would be used to buy shares in Atlantic.
These motions require the trial court to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Hargrove, to resolve all conflicts in his favor and to accept all inferences favorable to him. Teachey v. Woolard, 16 N.C. App. 249, 191 S.E.2d 903 (1972). The evidence most favorable to Hargrove tends to show that Plumbing and Burlington controlled the area in front of Burlington's oil tanks, that the area was within the scope of the invitation to drivers such as Hargrove, and that these drivers walked across this area while performing their duties.
We have carefully examined the charge of the court with respect to these statutes and the evidence in this case and find it to be proper in all respects. The evidence concerning the construction of the road with its widened approach to the intersection and the presence of traffic islands with indentations for traffic turning left at the intersection was undisputed. If the vehicle of the defendant was found by the jury to have been in the left lane at the traffic island indentation immediately prior to the collision, he would clearly have been "in a lane designated for left turns." Defendant relies upon Teachey v. Woolard, 16 N.C. App. 249, 191 S.E.2d 903, which is factually distinguishable. In Teachey there was no evidence that the overtaken vehicles were in lanes designated for left turns.