Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-1054-CB-C.
October 30, 2000.
FINAL JUDGMENT
Pursuant to separate order entered this date granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the claims of the plaintiff, Alfred E. Taylor, against the above-named defendants in their individual and official capacities be and hereby are DISMISSED with prejudice.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants in this action and on plaintiff's response thereto. After considering the issues raised in light of the evidence presented and the applicable law, the Court finds that summary judgment is due to be granted.
Findings of Fact
During the Spring of 1998, plaintiff Alfred Taylor, a Native American, applied for the principalship vacancies at Magnolia Elementary School, South Baldwin Elementary School and Elberta Elementary School. These positions were filled in April and May, 1998. Board Policy #818 gives preference to candidates within the school system even when qualifications of other candidates are comparable.
Hope Zeanah was the person appointed principal at Elberta Elementary School. According to the defendants, Zeanah had served as assistant principal at Elberta for four years prior to her appointment and had twelve years teaching experience, five of which were in the Baldwin County System. She also participated in the School Board's Administrative Internship Program. Zeanah was chosen because for the position because of these qualifications.
In their brief in support of the motion for summary and in their proposed findings of fact, defendants address the qualifications of the applicants chosen for the position but fail to point out that the defendants actually relied upon those reasons in making their decisions. However, in his affidavit in support of the motion, Dr. John W. Lee, Division Superintendent for Personnel, set out the qualifications of the three persons hired, followed by his statement that those were the reasons for the Board's decision.
The South Baldwin Elementary School principalship position was awarded to Barbara Cotton (not Clover Parker as alleged in plaintiff's Complaint). Barbara Cotton had previously served seven years as principal at Fairhope Middle School and prior to that, she served as assistant principal at Bay Minette Middle School for two years. She also had fourteen years of teaching experience in the school system. Cotton was chosen because for a principal position because of these qualifications.
Pamela Magee was appointed principal at Magnolia Elementary School. Prior to her appointment, she participated in the system's Administrative Internship Program. She also had nine years of teaching experience in Baldwin County. Magee was chosen because of these qualifications. According to the defendant, Pamela Magee is of "American Indian descent."
Defendant does not define the term "American Indian descent." While this appears to be an attempt to assert that Magee is also a member of the protected class, the Court cannot, without more specific evidence, equate "American Indian descent" with "Native American."
Plaintiff is a Native American who holds a "AA" specialist certificate in the field of education. At the time of filing his application with the Baldwin County Board of Education, plaintiff had been an assistant principal at Frank Boykin Elementary School in Washington County, Alabama, for two years. Plaintiff has more than twenty years' experience as a teacher.
After being rejected for the positions, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Plaintiff subsequently received his right-to-sue notice and filed this action against the individual members of the Baldwin County School Board, in their individual and official capacities, and against Albert Thomas, the Baldwin County Superintendent of Education, alleging that defendants had discriminated against him because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Conclusions of Law Issues Presented
Defendants claim they are entitled to summary judgment for several reasons. Only one of those reasons — defendants' assertion that they had legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for hiring other candidates for the positions — is applicable to all defendants and all claims. Because the Court finds that reason sufficient to grant summary judgment in favor of all defendants, it is unnecessary to address the other issues raised.
Summary Judgment Analysis
Summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears "the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial." Clark v. Coats Clark. Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party has satisfied his responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. "If the nonmoving party fails to make `a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the moving party is entitled to summary judgment." Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). "In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992).
Employment Discrimination
Plaintiff bases his employment discrimination claims on circumstantial, as opposed to direct, evidence. "To prove discriminatory treatment through circumstantial evidence: (1) a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case, (2) then the burden shifts to the defendant to produce legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action, and (3) then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that these reasons are pretextual." Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)). The same analysis applies to employment discrimination claims brought under both Title VII and § 1983. Alexander v. Fulton County 207 F.3d 1303, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000).
Defendants do not dispute plaintiff's ability to prove a prima facie case. Instead, they point out that they had legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for their decisions to hire Zeanah, Cotton and Magee, including their administrative experience, prior teaching experience and experience in or affiliation with the Baldwin County system. Therefore, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the proffered reasons are pretextual. Plaintiff attempts to meet this burden by demonstrating that he is more qualified than the persons who were hired.
In Lee v. GTE Florida. Inc., Slip Op. No. 98-3380 (11th Cir. Sept. 13, 2000), the Eleventh Circuit addressed the burden upon a plaintiff who attempts to prove pretext by demonstrating that the employer hired a less qualified applicant. The court held that a plaintiff cannot prove pretext simply by showing that he was more qualified for the position; rather, plaintiff must prove that he was "so clearly more qualified for the position that a reasonable juror could infer discriminatory intent from the comparison." Id. at p. 6. In arriving at the quantum of evidence necessary to prove pretext by a superior qualifications, the Eleventh Circuit cited the Fifth's Circuit approval of a jury instruction inDeines v. Texas Dept of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 1999).
In Deines, for example, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's instruction to the jury stating that "disparities in qualifications are not enough in and of themselves to demonstrate discriminatory intent unless those disparities are so apparent as to virtually jump off the page and slap you in the face." The court explained that the phrase "`jump off the page and slap [you] in the face' . . . should be understood to mean that disparities in qualifications must be of such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chose the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question.Lee, at p. 5 (quoting Deines, 164 F.3d at 280-81).
In support of his argument that his qualifications and credentials are superior to those who were appointed to the positions at issue, plaintiff points to his own affidavit and supporting documents. In his affidavit, plaintiff points out that he holds a bachelor's degree, a master's degree and a "Double A" education specialist certificate. Plaintiff states that he has reviewed the record and "cannot find any sworn testimony or exhibit which indicates that any of the three (3) ladies holds a bachelor's degree . . .[,] master's degree[,] . . . [or] . . . advanced certificates." Pl.'s Aff. p. 2. However, the educational degree held by the candidates was not part of the stated criteria for the defendants' hiring decisions. Their decisions were based on the candidates' prior experience as principals, assistant principals and teachers and on their prior employment with the Baldwin County system. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that defendant has attained a higher level of advanced education than the other candidates, that fact would not make him more qualified.
It should be pointed out that plaintiff has failed to prove that he, in fact, has earned more advanced degrees than the persons hired. Plaintiff points to the defendants' failure to prove the educational qualifications of those hired. Since defendants did not rely on that criteria as a basis for their decision, it is not incumbent upon them to offer proof as to that issue. There is, therefore, insufficient evidence to compare the levels of advanced degrees attained by plaintiff with those attained by the persons hired.
Plaintiff's resume reflects that he had been an assistant principal for two years and a teacher for more than twenty years. His resume also reflects that he had spent most of his career in Washington County and that he had not worked in the Baldwin County system. In comparison, Zeanah had been an assistant principal for four years at the school where she was made principal. Zeanah also had been a teacher for twelve years and had a total of nine years in Baldwin County. Plaintiff had less experience as an assistant principal than Zeanah, although he had a few more years' teaching experience. He had no prior experience in the Baldwin County system. Based on these comparisons a jury could not find that plaintiff was clearly more qualified.
Plaintiff's qualifications compare even less favorably with those of Cotton. Cotton had prior experience as a principal, which plaintiff did not have. She had more experience as an assistant principal, and she had prior experience in the Baldwin County system. A jury could not reasonably find that plaintiff was more qualified than Cotton.
It is not clear from defendants' evidence whether Cotton was employed by the Baldwin County system at the time she was awarded the principal position at South Baldwin Elementary. Since Dr. Lee's affidavit states only that she had been employed by Baldwin County.
Finally, plaintiff's qualifications compare most favorably with those of Magee. Magee had no prior experience as a principal or assistant principal and had substantially fewer years' experience as a teacher. Magee did, however, have some administrative experience through her participation in Baldwin County's administrative internship program. Furthermore, Magee was employed by the Baldwin County system at the time she received the principalship. Consequently, while plaintiff is arguably more qualified than Magee, the differences are not so great or so obvious as to meet jump-off-the-page-and-slap-you-in-the-face standard. In other words, a reasonable juror could not infer discrimination from these differences.
Conclusion
The defendants have met their burden on summary judgment by presenting evidence that they based the decisions to hire others for the positions sought by plaintiff on legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. In response, plaintiff has failed to come forward with sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that the plaintiff's reasons were merely pretext and that discrimination was the true reason for their decisions. It is, therefore, ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be and hereby is GRANTED.