Opinion
Civil Action 2:24-00177-TMC-MGB
07-31-2024
Marquiz Sanchez Taylor, Petitioner, v. Warden, FCI Edgefield, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Petitioner Marquiz Sanchez Taylor (“Petitioner”), appearing pro se, has filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that he is being denied certain benefits under the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”). (Dkt. Nos. 1, 5-1.) Currently before the Court is Respondent's Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 10). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Petition and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Respondent's Motion (Dkt. No. 10) be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner filed the instant Petition on January 11, 2024, while incarcerated with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) at FCI Edgefield in South Carolina. (Dkt. No. 5-1.) In his Petition, Petitioner claims that the BOP “has failed to properly apply [FSA] time credits that he has earned to his sentence.” (Id. at 11.) Specifically, he claims that the BOP failed to apply 100 days' worth of time credits that he earned “while housed at Coastal Bend Detention Facility” prior to arriving at FCI Edgefield. (Id. at 15-16.)
Respondent filed the instant Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment on April 3, 2024. (Dkt. No. 10.) The next day, the Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Petitioner of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond. (Dkt. No. 11.) Because the Court had not received a response to Respondent's Motion by the May 6, 2024 deadline, the Court granted Petitioner an extension of time and ordered him to respond by May 27, 2024. (Dkt. No. 13.) On May 22, 2024, the Court received and filed Petitioner's response.(Dkt. No. 15.) Respondent declined to reply to Petitioner's response by the May 29, 2024 deadline. (Id.) As such, the Motion before the Court has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
Although the Court did not receive Petitioner's response until May 22, 2024, the Certificate of Service attached to Petitioner's response is dated April 3, 2024. (Dkt. No. 15-1.) The envelope included with the response indicates that the mailing was processed by the BOP on May 3, 2024. (Dkt. No. 15-2.)
DISCUSSION
“Federal sentencing law permits federal prison authorities to award prisoners credit against prison time as a reward for good behavior.” Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 476 (2010). “The BOP is vested with the authority by the Attorney General to calculate a federal prisoner's period of incarceration of the sentence imposed. Implicit in this authority is the ability to calculate, and re-calculate, the sentence as changes occur and time is earned and lost, and to correct any inaccurate calculations as they are discovered.” Morgan v. Morgan, No. 5:08-HC-2114-FL, 2010 WL 3239080, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 16, 2010) (internal citation omitted); see also Newsome v. Williams, No. 3:15-cv-141, 2016 WL 11431790, at *3 (N.D. W.Va. May 26, 2016) (“Following a federal conviction and sentencing, the United States Attorney General, acting through the BOP, is responsible for calculating an inmate's term of confinement.”), adopted, 2016 WL 4153615 (N.D. W.Va. Aug. 5, 2016). Relevant here, the FSA requires the BOP to implement an incentive system for inmates to complete recidivism reduction programs through, among other things, the award of credits to reduce inmates' sentences. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d). Eligible inmates may have their credits applied to prerelease custody or early transfer to supervised release. See 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(c)(1), (d)(1).
As noted, Petitioner contends that the BOP has failed to apply 100 days' worth of FSA earned time credits to his sentence. (See generally Dkt. No. 5-1.) However, Plaintiff has now been released from custody, rendering his Petition MOOT. Indeed, a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must be filed by a person “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Supreme Court has “interpreted the statutory language as requiring that the habeas petitioner be ‘in custody' under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). As such, “[a] habeas corpus petition is moot when it no longer presents a case or controversy under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution.” Aragon v. Shanks, 144 F.3d 690, 691 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). “This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990). In other words, “throughout the litigation, the plaintiff ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.'” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7 (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477). Since Petitioner was released from federal custody, he is no longer pursuing his release from confinement and his habeas claim is MOOT.
The Court takes judicial notice of Petitioner's release date as shown on the Federal Bureau of Prisons website https://www.bop.gov/ as May 6, 2024.
The Fourth Circuit and courts within this district agree, and repeatedly dismiss § 2241 petitions challenging only the execution of a prison sentence as moot after a petitioner is released from custody. See, e.g., Alston v. Adams, 178 Fed.Appx. 295, 296 (4th Cir. 2006) (“As [Petitioner] is no longer held in federal custody, his action against [Respondent] is moot”); Richardson v. Warden Bennettsville FCI, No. 4:21-cv-03230-JD-TER, 2022 WL 1184038, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 21, 2022) (dismissing § 2241 petition after petitioner was released from federal custody); James v. Janson, No. 9:22-cv-03452-MGL-MHC, 2023 WL 3958437, at *1-2 (D.S.C. May 26, 2023) (recommending petition be dismissed as moot where petitioner who challenged only his sentence calculation was released from federal custody), adopted, 2023 WL 3948566 (D.S.C. June 12, 2023); Jaume-Suarez v. Warden FCI Edgefield, No. 2:16-cv-3770-RMG-MGB, 2017 WL 3447448, at *1 (D.S.C. July 21, 2017) (finding prisoner's habeas petition moot where prisoner sought only an earlier release from prison and was released after filing petition), adopted, 2017 WL 3431967 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2017); Deitemeyer v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 4:14-cv-2855-TMC, 2014 WL 6473520, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2014) (“Where a petitioner attacks his sentence only and not the validity of his conviction, expiration of the sentence moots the case.” (citing Lane, 455 U.S. at 631)). Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DISMISSED as MOOT.
In his response to Respondent's Motion, Petitioner states that “[t]housands of men are in BOP custody and are affected by [the BOP's policy for calculating FSA credits].” (Dkt. No. 15 at 4.) Petitioner therefore asks the Court to “correctly determine his outdate and issue a ruling,” even if he is released “prior to [the] Court reaching its decision.” (Id.) However, Petitioner cannot bring a petition on behalf of other inmates. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining the concept of standing and separation of powers); Inmates v. Sheriff Owens, 561 F.2d 560, 562-63 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding one inmate does not have standing to sue on behalf of another inmate); Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating a prisoner cannot act as a “knight-errant” for others); McPherson v. Mutter, No. 1:23-cv-00057, 2023 WL 4612559, at *2 (S.D. W.Va. May 9, 2023), adopted, 2023 WL 4606965 (S.D. W.Va. July 18, 2023) (noting that petitioner did not having standing to file for habeas relief on behalf of other prisoners where he listed himself as the sole petitioner). As such, the undersigned need not address Petitioner's claims.
Nonetheless, even if the Petition was not rendered moot by Petitioner's release, it would likely be dismissed for the reasons set forth in Respondent's brief. Namely, 28 C.F.R. § 523.42(a) mandates that an eligible inmate will begin earning FSA time credits on the date the inmate's term of imprisonment commencers, which is: “the date the inmate arrives or voluntarily surrenders at the designated Bureau facility where the sentence will be served.” Thus, it does not appear that Petitioner was entitled to earn FSA time credits before arriving at FCI Edgefield on January 18, 2023. (See Dkt. No. 10-1.)
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court GRANT Respondent's Motion (Dkt. No. 10) and DISMISS the Petition as MOOT.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).