Taylor v. Walter

13 Citing cases

  1. Olweean v. Wayne Co. Road Comm

    385 Mich. 698 (Mich. 1971)   Cited 9 times
    In Olweean v. Wayne County Road Comm, 385 Mich. 698 (1971), the Supreme Court discussed this basic question after finding Taylor v. Walter, 385 Mich. 599 (on rehearing, 1971), inapplicable to deceased drivers.

    In our previous decisions involving driving records we have dealt exclusively with the use of such records to impeach a party's testimony. See, e.g., Sting v. Davis (1971), 384 Mich. 608, and Taylor v. Walter (1970), 384 Mich. 114 (rehearing [1971], 385 Mich. 599). To this effect we have promulgated GCR 1963, 607.

  2. Burnett v. Mitchell

    48 Mich. App. 393 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)

    Many questions are presented by this area of law but we are limited by the record to consideration of the following narrow issue: See generally: Taylor v Walter, 385 Mich. 599; 189 N.W.2d 309 (1971), adopting on rehearing Justice BLACK'S opinion for reversal, Taylor v Walter, 384 Mich. 114, 117-120; 180 N.W.2d 24, 33-35 (1970); Sting v Davis, 384 Mich. 608; 185 N.W.2d 360 (1971); Olweean v Wayne County Road Commission, 385 Mich. 698; 190 N.W.2d 108 (1971); Kuhnee v Miller, 37 Mich. App. 649; 195 N.W.2d 299 (1972); Hughes v Polk, 40 Mich. App. 634; 199 N.W.2d 224 (1972); Crane v Woodbury, 41 Mich. App. 11; 199 N.W.2d 577 (1972); and Obermiller v Patow, 45 Mich. App. 606; 207 N.W.2d 152 (1973). "In a wrongful death action may decedent's driving records be admitted to impeach or rebut direct affirmative testimony of plaintiff's eyewitness that decedent was proceeding with due care just prior to the collision."

  3. Crane v. Woodbury

    41 Mich. App. 11 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972)   Cited 6 times
    In Crane, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the plaintiff had been speeding and passing in a no-passing zone prior to his making an allegedly improper left turn in an attempt to show that plaintiff had been negligent in making the left turn.

    Defendant relies upon Taylor v. Walter, 384 Mich. 114 (1970), reheard in 1971. The result of such rehearing appears in 385 Mich. 599. In that proceeding the trial judge excluded testimony relative to the defendant's driving record on the basis that its probative value outweighed the risk of prejudice. Justice BLACK in the majority opinion rejected the court's "undue prejudice" test and concluded that all traffic violations and misdemeanors are crimes, and can be used for the purposes of impeachment.

  4. Williams v. Fiedlar

    191 N.W.2d 52 (Mich. 1971)   Cited 4 times

    BLACK, J. (concurring). When the appellant's application for leave to review came to determination September 22, 1970 ( 384 Mich. 753), I did not participate in the decision, it having been my precedently submitted view that the application should be held in abeyance pending decision of Taylor v. Walter, which last was decided October 6, 1970 ( 384 Mich. 114) and ordered reheard with result shown in 385 Mich. 599. In view of the events listed above I concur in the Court's determination that leave to review here was improvidently granted.

  5. Obermiller v. Patow

    45 Mich. App. 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 2 times

    However, an individual's record of traffic convictions may be made known to a jury: (A) To test that individual's credibility, Taylor v. Walter, 385 Mich. 599 (1971), adopting on rehearing Justice BLACK'S opinion for reversal, Taylor v. Walter, 384 Mich. 114, 117-120 (1970); Williams v. Fiedlar, 22 Mich. App. 179 (1970), aff'd, 386 Mich. 221 (1971); (B) To rebut allegations that the individual is or was habitually a careful driver, Olweean v. Wayne County Road Commission, 385 Mich. 698, 702-703 (1971); or

  6. People v. Sesson

    45 Mich. App. 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 21 times

    However, various decisions of the Michigan courts indicate that the trial judge's discretion with respect to the examination of a witness concerning his interest is a very narrow one. In Taylor v. Walter, 385 Mich. 599 (1971), reversing 384 Mich. 114 (1970), the Court held that the trial court should permit broad cross-examination of a witness in order to discredit his testimony, even where there is substantial danger of undue prejudice. The trier of fact may properly consider the interest or lack of interest on the part of a witness in the outcome of a criminal prosecution in evaluating the testimony of such witness. People v. Hughes, 20 Mich. App. 294 (1969).

  7. People v. Sanders

    43 Mich. App. 698 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972)   Cited 13 times

    Since the Luck doctrine was not advanced in these cases, their sub silentio acceptance of the admission of misdemeanors does not constitute authority sustaining such admission under the statute in all cases.Sting v. Davis, 384 Mich. 608 (1971); Taylor v. Walter, 385 Mich. 599 (1971); Link v. McCoy, 39 Mich. App. 120 (1972). The precedential effect of these decisions upon criminal law is found in footnote 21 of People v. Farrar, 36 Mich. App. 294, 305-306 (1971), and the comments of Justice BRENNAN in Sting v. Davis, supra, at p 615.

  8. Hughes v. Polk

    40 Mich. App. 634 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972)   Cited 15 times
    In Hughes, supra, this Court noted that the defendant could have seen the car he eventually hit when it was stopped at an intersection three hundred feet away from him.

    It was error for the trial court to refuse to allow plaintiffs to cross-examine defendant regarding his traffic convictions for purposes of impeachment, where the credibility of defendant's testimony as to his exercise of due care is at issue. See also Taylor v. Walter, 385 Mich. 599, 600 (On Rehearing, 1971), adopting Justice BLACK'S opinion in Taylor v. Walter, 384 Mich. 114, 117-120 (1970); cf. Kuhnee v. Miller, 37 Mich. App. 649 (1972). II.

  9. Laur v. McCaul

    39 Mich. App. 346 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972)   Cited 3 times

    "We conclude that under GCR 1963, 607, as presently adopted by this Court, a trial judge has no discretion to exclude cross-examination with regard to the driving history of a plaintiff driver or of a defendant driver, such cross-examination being proper to test the credibility of the witness's testimony with regard to the central fact issue in the case." See, also, Taylor v. Walter, 385 Mich. 599 ( on rehearing, 1971). It was error for the trial judge to deny the defendant the right to cross-examine the plaintiff concerning his driving convictions.

  10. Link v. McCoy

    197 N.W.2d 278 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972)   Cited 3 times

    "We conclude that under GCR 1963, 607, as presently adopted by this Court, a trial judge has no discretion to exclude cross-examination with regard to the driving history of a plaintiff-driver or of a defendant-driver, such cross-examination being proper to test the credibility of the witness' testimony with regard to the central fact issue in the case." Also see, Taylor v. Walter, 385 Mich. 599 (1971). It was reversible error for the trial judge not to modify his instructions and permit the jury to consider the defendant's driving record in testing his credibility.